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## Contents

- 419 Preface to the Issue "Ethnic Groups in American Life"
- 220 OSCAR HANDLIN  
Historical Perspectives on the American Ethnic Group
- 233 KENNETH D. BENNE  
The Uses of Fraternity
- 247 J. MILTON YINGER  
Social Forces Involved in Group Identification  
or Withdrawal
- 263 MILTON M. GORDON  
Assimilation in America: Theory and Reality
- 286 OZZIE G. SIMMONS  
Mutual Images and Expectations  
of Anglo-Americans and Mexican-Americans
- 300 PETER H. & ALICE S. ROSSI  
Some Effects of Parochial-School Education in America
- 329 JOSHUA A. FISHMAN  
Childhood Indoctrination for Minority-Group Membership
- OPINIONS AND ISSUES
- 350 RAYMOND ARON  
The Situation of Democracy

*REPUTATIONS*

- 371 EDMUND R. LEACH  
Golden Bough or Gilded Twig?
- 388 HERBERT WEISINGER  
The Branch That Grew Full Straight
- 400 Notes on Contributors

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## Preface to the Issue, "Ethnic Groups in American Life"

TODAY THE INTEGRATION of all Americans into the broad American community is proceeding swiftly. As a consequence, new strains and stresses are evident, and a variety of decisions are being forced upon Americans—upon members of "majority" and "minority" groups alike—bearing on the need and desirability of perpetuating many forms of group identification. To some, the perpetuation of group identity seems a stubborn resistance to democratic progress calculated to stress differences and to breed disunity among Americans. To others, the retention of group identification is seen as both necessary and desirable for spiritual self-preservation and self-fulfillment, as well as a source of national enrichment. The perpetuation of group loyalties is, from this point of view, consonant with the American pattern, neither impeding integration nor endangering national unity.

In short, there is at this time a great need of increasing our understanding of the meaning and process of "integration." What constitutes "integration" in a society traditionally pluralist, in principle as well as in nature? As integration proceeds, what effects may be anticipated with respect to the future of religio-ethnic group life in America?

In the years ahead, forces both numerous and complex will be at work—some furthering assimilation and the loss of group identity, others serving to perpetuate group identity. Some of the commanding influences will be external to the groups themselves—the increase or decrease of world tensions, the waxing or waning of the democratic spirit, the degree of economic stability, for example. But internal factors will also be important, the character of group leadership and group education, the relevance of each group's programs and institutions to the needs, interests, and desires of its members, and the relation of the group to the broader American community.

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OSCAR HANDLIN

OSCAR HANDLIN

## Historical Perspectives on the American Ethnic Group

IT IS A COMMONPLACE of both scholarly and popular comment that American society is pluralistic in its organization. The immense size of the country, its marked regional differences and diversity of antecedents have sustained complex patterns of association and behavior and have inhibited tendencies toward uniformity. Social action in the United States, therefore, is presumed to come not within large unitary forms but within a mosaic of autonomous groupings, reflecting the underlying dissimilarities in the population.

Yet it is significant that serious attention to the operations of these groups has focused primarily upon the pathology of their relations with one another. Discrimination and prejudice, tension and conflict have provided students with their primary subject matter, perhaps because these produced the problems of greatest contemporary urgency, perhaps because they produced the most visible and most dramatic manifestations. For whatever reason, the normal functioning of American pluralism has been relatively neglected.

The result has been a serious deficiency in the understanding of the past development and present structure of American society. Viewed only at the points of breakdown, its healthy operations have remained shadowy and obscure; and without a clear comprehension of how the system worked, it has been difficult to explain the causes of its occasional failures.

This paper deals with one important type of American group, that in which membership tended to be transmitted by birth from generation to generation. An individual generally identified himself as an Odd Fellow or a Californian, as a member of the American Medical Association of the United Mine Workers, through decisions he made in the course of his own lifetime. He was usually, although not always, a Jew or a Negro, a Yankee or an Irish-American, through forces which existed from the moment of his birth and over

which he had relatively little control. Ethnic ties frequently influenced the broader range of associations in which any given person participated, but they form a discreet subject of investigation which had peculiar importance in the United States. The analysis which follows aims at providing an account of the historic reasons why that was so.

It was the conscious desire of those who planted the colonies that would later become the United States to reproduce the social order they had left in Europe, entire or in an improved form. Once it became clear that these were not simply to be provisional trading stations but permanent settlements, the residents attempted to recreate the unitary communities they had known at home. That effort would be repeated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by each succeeding group of arrivals.

In each case it failed. The communities the emigrants left had been whole and integrated, and had comprehended the total life of their members. There was one church, as there was one state, one hierarchy of occupations and status, a fixed pattern of roles and expectations, and the individual was therefore located in a precise place that defined the whole range of his associations.

Cracks in the solidarity and homogeneity of these communities had already begun to appear in seventeenth-century Europe. They would widen and deepen as time went on. Moreover, the men and women who went to America were peculiarly those least fixed in their places—religious dissenters, servants with no masters, uprooted peasants, captives by force of arms, and the victims of economic disaster. Their intentions remained attached to the norms of the society that had cast them out, but their lives were unsettled from the moment of their departure, and could rarely be restored to the old grooves after the shattering experiences of migration.

Moreover, all the conditions of the New World were uncongenial to the reestablishment of the old community. Even as coherent a group as the Massachusetts Bay Puritans found it difficult to exclude the disruptive influences of the unfamiliar environment. The terms of life of the wilderness, the dispersal of settlements over great distances, the inability to maintain discipline or to create distinct lines of authority—all these vitiated every effort to restore the traditional whole community. These hostile elements were even more powerful to the southward of New England, where settlement was less purposefully directed and where it lacked the leadership of an elite inspired by religious zeal and armed with sacerdotal sanctions.

✓ The American setting remained unfriendly to efforts to unify communal life in succeeding centuries. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, uninterrupted territorial expansion was the most consequential element in the situation. The constant penetration of one frontier after another, each with its own challenge of an altered physical environment, was repeatedly unsettling to the men who advanced into them and to the societies they abandoned. Almost everywhere the concomitant was a spatial and social mobility that exerted a continued strain upon existing organizations and habitual modes of behavior. And, before the effects of that form of expansion had played themselves out, industrialization and urbanization created new sources of communal disorder. The results were unqualifiedly destructive of every effort to reconstitute whole communities that bore some resemblance to the transplanted or inherited images derived from European antecedents.

✓ These tendencies received additional force from the heterogeneity of the American population, already notable in the seventeenth century and destined to be immensely increased thereafter. Diversity of sources ruled out the possibility that some myth of common origin might supply a basis for creating communal order; it juxtaposed different and sometimes contradictory ideals of what that order should be like; and it left prominently embedded in society conflicting interests and values. Furthermore, since the various elements stood in no clearly delineated relation of superiority and inferiority to one another, except in so far as slavery depressed the Negro, none could impose its own conceptions upon the rest. In a country in which Quakers and Presbyterians, Anglicans and Catholics, Jews and Baptists all coexisted and all had access to power, it was impossible to think of one state, one church. In towns where Yankees and Germans, Irishmen and Italians lived together, no single set of institutions could serve the social and cultural needs of the entire body of residents. Given these differences, American communities could only be fragmented rather than whole, partial rather than inclusive.

✓ The looseness of political institutions furthered the same results. Not through design but through the unanticipated circumstances of colonial settlement, authority was long only tentatively exercised and the state was long too weak to serve fully the functions expected of it. The resultant vacuum nurtured habits of spontaneous, voluntary action on the part of the citizens. Through disuse, some powers of government atrophied, and the spheres in which they had been applied came to be occupied by associations which operated, not with political sanctions, but with the unconstrained support of their

## *The American Ethnic Group*

members. A pervasive ideology that interpreted every relation between the individual and the larger groups to which he belonged as contractual and dependent upon his free acquiescence set these practices within a context of respected rights that were not readily to be violated. The end result was hostility toward large overarching organizations remote from their membership, and the encouragement of smaller bodies deriving their competence to act from the consent of their participants.

The fluidity of American society, the diversity of its population, and the looseness of its institutional forms interacted upon and stimulated one another. The results therefore were cumulative in the extent to which they inhibited the appearance of a unitary community, the various arms of which were organically articulated with one another. Despite frequent conscious efforts to guide developments in that direction, the people of the United States did not become homogeneous, nor were their modes of action integrated into common over-all forms.

The only exceptions appeared in pockets of population which, for one reason or another, became isolated from the dominant currents of American life. Relatively small groups—the Pennsylvania Amish, the Southern mountaineers, the farmers of Northern New England, for example—were able to achieve a solidarity and continuity of experience that elicited the admiration of romantic observers who set a high premium upon stability and tradition. But the price was social stagnation and detachment from the forces which shaped the rest of the nation. Indeed, the contrast offered by these aberrations is a measure of the extent to which the main lines of social organization led away from the unitary community.

The result was neither anarchy nor the casting adrift of the individual left to his own resources. Rather, the failure to create a single integrated community led to the appearance of numerous smaller bodies which operated within fragmented sectors of society. Their character can best be understood in terms of the forces that brought them into being.

Men no longer embraced within the sheltering fold of a whole community felt the pressure of two types of needs they could not satisfy alone. Important functions in their lives could only be executed in groups; and, in addition, deep-rooted emotional desires for personal association also called for common action.

The American who had left or had never been part of a community that by tradition and habit satisfied all his needs quickly became sensitive to his inability to deal with problems that extended

beyond his own person. The round of ritual and the patterns of reaffirmed beliefs of which the church had been custodian lost their potency when performed or held in isolation. It was essential to create the communion that would make them effective even without the aid of the state and at no matter what cost.

The crises of death, disease, and poverty produced a dependency that was intolerable in isolation. The necessities of these situations were twofold, bearing both upon the victim and the witness of man's helplessness. The dread of improper burial after death, of wasting illness, and of want troubled everyone conscious that he might himself be stricken down; and the worry haunted Americans more than it did other peoples who could anticipate such crises as expected incidents within a familiar setting. Equally as important, the obligation to dispose of the corpse, to succor the ill and to aid the indigent (all of which often bore a religious connotation) troubled everyone who could foresee such challenges to his conscience. It was imperative therefore that these functions should be performed in a group and with a propriety that would console both the victim and the witness. Again, in the absence of a community that did so, it was necessary to bring into being the organized means for performing these functions.

An analogous need arose out of the disruption of communications that was a consequence of the breakdown of the old community. The culture which expressed men's attitudes and which provided them with emotional and esthetic satisfaction had been wrenched away from its traditional media. The threatened deprivation of a heritage that gave life meaning hastened Americans toward contriving new forms through which they could speak and listen to one another.

✓ Yet in the process of creating the vast array of churches, philanthropic societies, and cultural institutions that became characteristic of the United States, the participants were moved not only by the importance of the functions to be served. They were influenced also by the personal need to belong to a group, whatever function it served. As individuals, they sought a sense of anchorage through identification with some larger entity, hoping thus to offset the effects of the unsettling elements of life in and on the way to America. The achievement of such an identification would provide some compensation, furthermore, for the psychological loss of the unitary community.

The distinctive qualities of family life in the United States made the need for anchorage to a group particularly acute there. Whether

## *The American Ethnic Group*

in the seventeenth century or the nineteenth, the extended family quickly shrank after immigration to the conjugal pair and its offspring. Detached from the community and often physically and socially isolated, the American family was thrown back upon its own resources; and uncertainty as to the roles of its members frequently produced severe internal tensions. Such conditions increased the desire for identification with a group that would provide the family with roots in the past, locate it in the larger society, and supply it both with a pattern of approved standards of behavior and with the moral sanctions to aid in maintaining internal discipline.

The wish to belong for the sake of identification and the wish to belong out of the need for some functional service coincided most nearly when it came to subjects about which men had inherited firmly implanted beliefs and attitudes. In satisfying the need for religious worship and ritual and in arming themselves against the contingencies of dependency, they were likely to use forms that would draw together people of a common heritage and thus also satisfy the need for a sense of belonging.

Within the complex pattern of American associational life, therefore, clusters of organizations which served discreet ends but which were linked by derivation from a common pool of membership appeared. That pool constituted the ethnic group. A shared heritage, presumed or actual, formed the matrix within which the group organized its communal life. That heritage, in the United States, was sometimes associated with descent from common national or regional origins, sometimes with color, and sometimes with religion. Some groups were already aware of their identity at arrival, as were the Jews of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; others, like the nineteenth-century Italians, only developed theirs through the experience of life in the New World. In either case, these were not monolithic entities but aggregates of individuals, often internally divided and sometimes unclear about the boundaries to which their membership extended.

The ethnic group by no means preempted the total social experience of Americans. Other associations drew their participants from sources only slightly delimited by considerations of antecedents. But ethnic groups were peculiarly important by virtue of their durability, which extended them across the generations, and by virtue also of the critical segments of personal life that they organized.

Not every individual, of course, fitted neatly into one ethnic box or another. Many, particularly in the large cities of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, remained unaffiliated and unattached and



drifted into the disorganization resulting from their lack of a fixed place. Others were torn by multiple identifications, which were the product either of mixed antecedents or of the incompatibility of individual interests and intentions with the norms of the group. Still others permitted themselves only a limited and partial affiliation, participating in some activities on some occasions and refraining from taking a part in others. But it was precisely in such flexibility that the strength of the ethnic group lay. By permitting men to organize their lives on their own terms, without compulsion and with a wide latitude of choice, the ethnic group provided them with the means of acting cooperatively in those sectors of life in which they felt the need to do so, and yet it refrained from imposing irksome restraints upon them. It thus supplanted the totally organized, integrated community with a fluid pattern of association, that left the individual as unconfined as he wished to be.

The American ethnic groups maintained their fluidity through a delicate balance between the forces that detached and those that connected their members to the society outside their boundaries. They were able to preserve their identity without becoming segregated or isolated enclaves in the total society. Functioning effectively over long periods, they nevertheless were inhibited from acquiring attributes that would have permanently and decisively set apart the individuals affiliated with them. That balance left room for wide areas of personal choice on the part of the members, to whose interests and ideas the group was necessarily sensitive.

The internal dynamics of many groups led them, at the same time, to seek to preserve their own identity and yet to reach out to influence and even absorb outsiders. These contradictory impulses were particularly characteristic, although by no means confined to groups of English descent, who felt a special compulsion to make their limits coextensive with the whole nation.

By the eighteenth century, a missionary spirit had dissolved the earlier exclusive sense of election that had formerly separated one element from another. The desire to bar outsiders gave way to an urge to assimilate them; and a variety of groups came to consider themselves in competition for new adherents. The rivalry for the loyalty of new members was stimulated thereafter by the constant appearance of new religious sects which conducted unremitting raids upon the unaffiliated or the loosely affiliated.

Yet the ability to make converts, either in the religious or social sense, demanded some accommodation to the tastes, interests, and ideas of those who were to be persuaded. No group could attract



## *The American Ethnic Group*

outsiders by stressing the unique qualities of its own antecedents. A subtle process of adjustment, therefore, found each drifting away from the particularities of its heritage and reaching out toward a more general view of itself that would confirm and strengthen its place in the whole society. Through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries a gradual softening of exclusionary doctrines and practices and a general accommodation to a shared pattern of beliefs and behavior that might be termed "American" were manifestations of this process.

The desire to assimilate outsiders altered many ethnic organizations as these widened the scope of their endeavors. Quaker efforts at benevolence, for instance, originally directed within the group, acquired a universal character when the group recognized its obligations to the whole society. Institutions like those for higher education, which were established to serve a specific ethnic group, also changed as they expanded their appeal. The early sectarian colleges were thus driven toward a steady broadening of their social bases. The whole process of extending the boundaries of the group tended to dilute its ethnic character.

The competition for the loyalty of their members also affected those groups which had no clear missionary intentions. The Jews and Italians of 1900, for instance, aimed not at drawing other Americans within their folds, but simply at preserving their hold over their own adherents. But to do so, they had to offset the attractions of potential rivals by establishing their own images as fully American and by emphasizing the depth of their own roots in the country. That involved a sacrifice of their own particularity. To the extent that they celebrated Haym Solomon or Christopher Columbus, they drew attention to elements that made them similar to rather than different from other Americans. They could develop a capacity for resisting the incursions of other groups only by diminishing the range of differences that set them apart. The necessities of a situation in which a multitude of ethnic groups coexisted in an open society prevented any one of them from erecting walls about itself unless it wished to become completely isolated.

The situation remained open because some contact among the members of various groups was inescapable in important sectors of social action. The organization of American economic, political, and cultural life compelled individuals often to disregard ethnic lines.

There were significant degrees of concentration in the distribution of occupations by ethnic groups. That situation was in part a product of their members' common experience and common prepa-

ration for the job market. Irishmen who came to New York City in 1850 lacked the skill or capital for anything but unskilled labor; Yankee newcomers to the same city had the education and resources to go into trade or take places as clerks. Furthermore, ties of kinship, country of origin, and religion sometimes significantly affected the conduct of business and the access to opportunity. It was advantageous to be a Scotsman in mid-nineteenth-century Pittsburgh, as Andrew Carnegie discovered. Conversely, prejudice and discrimination barred the way to desirable situations. Young women who were colored or foreign in appearance were not likely to become secretaries to executives, no matter how competent they were.

✓ Nevertheless, the American productive system did not tolerate the development of caste-like groupings. Individuals always found it possible to move upward. In the swiftly expanding, competitive order of American enterprise, in which success held a preeminent value and in which the dangers of catastrophic failure were always imminent, men could not afford to subordinate the calculations of the market place to noneconomic considerations. The entrepreneur, aware of his own interests, hired the most efficient hand, bought from the cheapest seller, sold to the highest bidder, or suffered in consequence. That course built into the economic system the necessity for cooperation across ethnic lines, and this grew steadily more compelling as business became less personal and more closely oriented to considerations of price and cost. Business, professional, and labor organizations, which often had a distinct ethnic character to begin with, felt a steady pressure, therefore, to make room for qualified outsiders.

So too, ethnic groups often formed significant voting blocs. Party allegiances, thus engaged, enjoyed considerable continuity over time and occasionally outweighed other considerations in determining the outcome of political contests. But no group formed a majority secure enough to hold power, except on a very local level; those who sought office or advantages through politics quickly recognized the necessity for developing alliances that transcended ethnic divisions. The machines of Boston and New York in 1910 were Irish, but they depended upon working arrangements with Germans, Jews, and Italians. ✓ As in the economy, the imperatives of politics in an open society prevented any group from maintaining exclusiveness for very long.

Out of the conditions of these and other contacts there grew a vast array of media for general communication. The newspapers, the public schools, television—all addressed individuals rather than the

## The American Ethnic Group

members of groups. Even when they began with a specific ethnic orientation, the advantages of reaching out for the largest possible audience transformed those which survived and expanded. In the long run, the more general the medium, the more powerful it became. Its influence, therefore, tended to break down group exclusiveness.

As a result, a given American at any moment located himself in society by a complex of reference points. He was a German, but also a Lutheran, a Republican, a farmer, a Midwesterner, a reader of the *Volkszeitung* and the *Tribune*, a Mason, and a member of the Turnverein. Not all these affiliations were purely ethnic, although there was an ethnic element in most of them; and not all had equal weight in his existence. Which were salient and which subordinate depended upon the particular configuration that established the individual's identity. The ethnic factor was important by virtue of its connections with the past, with the family, and with the most impressionable years in the development of the personality. But it receded in importance if it were isolated, if the man's German affiliations appeared only on infrequent occasions, while his primary associations as a citizen, a resident, and a producer had other contexts.

The fluidity of the social system increased the necessities for contact and added to the variety of individual configurations. A rough correlation was always discernible between social status and ethnic membership. While the pattern was certainly not consistent at every time and place, social and ethnic groupings tended to coincide. Recent immigrants generally entered the labor market at the bottom, a place commensurate with their want of skill, capital, and prestige. That circumstance established the low social character of the group. Italian peasants who migrated to the United States at the end of the nineteenth century were prepared only for unskilled labor; Italians therefore were identified as among the lowest social groups. But in turn, by association, any kind of work that Italians did was imputed to be inferior. In actuality, the group's experience and the reputation it acquired thus reinforced one another.

Nevertheless, the actuality was never as restrictive as the reputation. Occasionally individuals did succeed in rising in the social and occupational hierarchy; Giannini and Bellanca were not permanently held down by their antecedents. Social mobility was a genuine, although as yet unmeasured, feature of American life.

Some men who moved up passed out of the group of their origin and entered another more compatible with their new positions; social and religious conversion remained significant throughout American

history. But whether such individuals altered their identification or not, social mobility opened important avenues of contact with other groups. The exceptional men who remained within the group of their birth played a significant mediating role. Their rise in status brought with it the eminence of outside recognition and of leadership within the group, and it also broadened their contacts with the rest of society, which treated them as spokesmen for the group. They were thus marginal, influenced by a variety of contacts, and subject to a multiplicity of expectations.

Within the groups that were the product of immigration, the rate of upward mobility seems certainly to have increased in the second and subsequent generations. The children of those who had moved were even more marginal than their parents; born within a group, they passed significant parts of their youth and adolescence outside it. They too became channels for contacts across ethnic lines that occurred with increasing frequency and intensity, for the group could survive only by adjusting to their changing interests.

Conversely, the range of contacts narrowed when a group was excluded permanently or temporarily from the opportunities of American society. The prejudice that depressed the Negroes, the discrimination that sometimes held back Jews and Catholics, not only turned these people defensively inward but also reduced the possibilities for mediation and for mutual interaction between them and others. The abatement of prejudice and discrimination therefore was almost an essential precondition for opening the group to the influence of the broader society.

Underlying all these relationships and further militating against the solidarity of the group was a spirit for which no better term is available than individualism. In the eighteenth century, and even more intensely in the nineteenth, the assumption had formed that every man was to be judged and treated as an individual, without consideration of his group affiliations. His place in society, by the American creed, was to be the product of his own efforts, independent of antecedents or inheritance or identification. There were certainly great deviations in actuality from this ideal, but it nevertheless remained a vital element in American thought.

Above all, this assumption implied that group interests were invariably to be subordinated to individual ones. The consequences were nowhere more clearly illustrated than in relationship to intermarriage. The defined posture of every ethnic group was a hostility to marriages that crossed its own lines; only through endogamy could the group perpetuate itself across the generations and secure

## *The American Ethnic Group*

its survival. Yet, while the statistics are notoriously inaccurate, there is no doubt that unions across group lines were frequent, barred neither by legal impediments nor by social disapproval except where color was involved.

Marriage in America was not a means of securing the continuity of the group but of satisfying the desire of the individual for fulfillment as a personality, apart from any social considerations. The theme of romantic love grew steadily in importance; and it emphasized the capacity of the individual to surmount the barriers of ethnic difference, as also those of class. It was symptomatic of the conviction that the values associated with the individual invariably took precedence over those of the group. It existed to serve him, not he, it.

Thus, the very provisions of American society that permitted the ethnic group to exist freely also permitted its members to adjust their identification to the needs of their own personalities. The strength of these groups, derived from the voluntary accession of their participants, could not be used to isolate or segregate them.

It is against this background that one can best understand the points of breakdown at which conflicts among ethnic groups have appeared. A variety of such groups coexisted without difficulty so long as a fluid social order maximized their members' freedom of association. That is why the periods of greatest immigration and greatest expansion were usually free of tension. ✓

Conflicts appeared rather as the result of efforts to introduce rigidity into the system, most often when one group sought to assert its own preeminence and to impose its own standards upon the others. Nativism, for example, was not simply a battle of "Americans" against immigrants. It was, rather, the effort of particular ethnic groups, whose position was challenged by events over which they had little control, to maintain their earlier dominance under cover of a fixed conception of Americanism. \*

The extreme of conflict appeared when the terms of ethnic affiliation were so defined as to eliminate all fluidity and to separate unalterably one group from another. The racist ideology of the latter half of the nineteenth century thus categorized individuals by heredity and treated their identifications as genetically fixed. It threatened therefore to eliminate the possibilities for contact and free movement that had theretofore been the essential conditions of group life in the United States. The Negro, who was most clearly identified, most decisively isolated, and burdened with the imputa- ✓

tion of inferiority from his past as a slave, was the most seriously threatened by these views. But the danger to other groups—like the Jews and the Italians—was also serious, only slightly less so than that to the Negroes.

In the last two decades, the dissolution of racist ideas has ended that threat to the fluid social order of the United States, at least for groups not stigmatized by color. And there is the promise that the extension of the same degree of equality to Negroes will relax the most important tensions in their relations with other Americans and provide them with the basis for a sound group life of their own.

From time to time, efforts at voluntary segregation have also posed a threat to the free functioning of the ethnic group in American society. It is certainly possible such tendencies may gain force in the coming years. The spread of suburban life, which reduces the anonymity of the individual, the desire for stability and security in personal relationships, the drive for conformity in patterns of behavior, and the pressure to belong to some group—no matter which—are all evidence of developments in this direction. Whether they will be able to counteract the forces that continue to encourage mobility and fluidity remains to be seen.

In any case, the ultimate measure of their effect upon the ethnic group will be the latitude left to the individual in choosing the associations within which he conducts his life. In a period in which the isolated individual must confront the immense powers of the state and of the other massive organizations of the naked society, mediating institutions, such as those provided by the ethnic group, can still serve important functions. They can provide him with legitimate means, by which he can assert his distinctive individuality if he wishes to do so. On the other hand, if these groups become rigid and fall into place among the other instruments by which the individual is controlled and regulated, then they become assimilated to the other massive organizations that crush rather than liberate him.

KENNETH D. BENNE

## The Uses of Fraternity

MANY PEOPLE find it a contradiction to emphasize group experience as a condition of eliciting and stabilizing individuality in members of our mass society. Such an emphasis often evokes defensive and anxious responses against both "groups" and "conformity." The anxiety seems deepest in those intellectuals most committed to the battle for individualism and freedom, who see a radical disjunction, if not a downright contradiction, between "group" and "individual," between "fraternity" and "freedom." As the cohorts of a specious "togetherness" grow stronger and more vocal, anxiety is transmuted into despair. Yet this despair-engendering disjunction is not a valid one, although it disturbs many democratic-minded American intellectuals.

A clarification of the meaning and uses of "fraternity" may help. The traditional literature of democracy gives us relatively little aid. Liberty and equality have been extensively compared and contrasted, analyzed, berated and defended, but fraternity has remained neglected. Connoting as it does the relations of siblings, and by extension any peer relation, fraternity has stood in Western minds under the shadow of parent-child relations and, by extension, of leader-follower or, in bureaucratic forms, superior-subordinate relations.

The normative orientation of our democratic culture, including its qualified commitment to "brotherhood," was shaped within a Hebraic-Christian religious heritage. In this heritage, the ideal relation, in the first instance, is between parent and child—the relation of God to man—and, only secondarily, a peer relation—the relation of man to man. In the former, the themes of dependence and counter-dependence, often posturing as independence, predominate. As the Bible enjoins man to function in the image of God, personal maturity



is conceived in terms of independence, autonomy, self-sufficiency. It is difficult to keep in focus the alternative ideal of maturity—the ability to function autonomously, creatively, and productively in interdependence—an ideal more consonant with the democratic value of fraternity. The second lacks the “reality” of the first, not only in the secular thinking about processes of maturation and socialization by psychotherapists and teachers, by parents and publicists, but also in the religious thinking of priests and rabbis.

In contemporary scientific studies of human development, their main line, as inspired by Freud, is for the most part firmly within this religiously shaped tradition. In Freudian thought the “representative anecdote” (to use Kenneth Burke’s term) for characterizing the agony of maturation is the Oedipus myth. In this view, both the central problem and the dynamism of personal maturation remain within the parent-child relation and the various surrogates of this relation. Freud might have evolved a different version of the process of human development had he instead taken the parable of Joseph and his brethren as “representative anecdote.” If he had, the place of peer relations in man’s development would have been illuminated. The values and dis-values of peer-group membership in eliciting a man’s talents and stabilizing his orientations would have moved from the periphery to the center of our awareness. Joseph’s relations with Jacob and Rachel would still have been important, but equally so would his peer relations.

Our traditional thinking on human relations has developed a vast literature on leadership but only a tiny one on membership. “Members” tend to dissolve into a faceless host of followers, and so fail to be studied in their own right. Nor is it surprising that the thinking about an individual’s socialization has been dominated by parent-child and teacher-pupil relations. Correspondingly, it has neglected the problems of peer relations within the processes of education and socialization. This imbalance of attention is no accident, and it represents more than a cognitive difficulty, one that goes considerably deeper into the values of our culture. Before it can be overcome, Americans will have to do more than acquire additional concepts and knowledge of groups and peer-group relations. Yet the relative emphasis on the influence of parents (or parent-surrogates) and peer groups in the processes of socialization seems to be undergoing a fundamental change within our increasingly bureaucratized and suburbanized culture.

David Riesman has observed in the adult community of our culture a continued habit of mind once considered characteristic of



adolescence.<sup>1</sup> Possessed of no inner convictions, or torn by pulls and counter-pulls as to right orientations, many adults, when faced with alternatives, turn to their peers in determining what opinions to hold, what conduct to adopt. "Other-directedness" replaces "inner-directedness." The "normal" takes the place of the "normative." The peer group has become, and tends to remain, the principal arbiter of adult choices and evaluations.

William H. Whyte has dissected the governing values of the managerial elites and sub-elites in our suburbs and exurbs.<sup>2</sup> He, too, notes a decline of inner direction. The chief aim of life is to satisfy the demands of "the organization," its Kafkaesque internal needs, and its needs in public relations, which are often contradictory. Organizational policies (more and more determined by group processes) are elevated to the status once occupied in the Protestants' system of values by theology and the ways of the fathers.

These changes in the guiding values of adults are bound to bring correlative changes in the rearing of children. Indeed, shifts in these patterns must have been occurring far earlier in order to have made the alleged changes in character patterns noted in many contemporary adults. One theme runs through much of the already large and growing literature on the patterns of early socialization in American culture. The influence of peer groups in adolescent attitudes, orientations, and the criteria of taste and morality (always a strong one) is being accentuated in contemporary "teen-age" culture. And the role of the peer group, as against the family group, in validating the self seems to be gaining ground in children well below the age of adolescence.

The purveyors of the instruments of enculturation—popular music, magazines, comic books, television programs—are well aware of the emergence of a distinctive "youth" market and are exploiting it. They realize that the peer group has gained as an arbiter of youthful taste and conduct. Even a casual examination of the products prepared for this market indicates a "new" image of hero and heroine, for whom the peer group, not the adult, is the source of criteria for self-validation, for determining success or failure. Youthful heroes and heroines accept the authoritative limits to their actions set by their parents more to humor or conciliate them than through any conviction that they may be right. Nor do they respect such limits in a spirit of healthy rebellion that projects an alternative rightness.

A favorite approach by young people in persuading parents as to a new idea about clothing, recreation, or privileges is that all the others in their age group now possess and enjoy whatever they are

asking for. It is hard for parents to resist this appeal, since their own choices of what is needed in a good home are made on the same consensual basis. One story shows a convergence in the process of consensual validation on the part of two generations. The parents in a suburban town were widely entreated by their fifth-grade children to extend bedtime on the basis that all the others in the fifth grade were enjoying this new freedom. The parents got together and adopted a common standard for negotiating with their children. It is difficult to say how typical this way of dealing with a "value-issue" between children and parents actually is. Probably its main atypicality lies in the highly conscious way in which the processes of consensual validation were employed by the parents.

The trends in our culture seem to elevate the peer group as an influence in both early and continuing socialization and to diminish both the influence of parents and parental surrogates in early socialization and also that of internalized parent figures (in the form of superego and ego ideal) on continuing processes of socialization in adults. Whether the effects of these trends are admirable or not, they respond to a social reality—the fact of persuasive change, which moves all men away from a reliance upon fixed traditions as the validators of choice and conduct.

Today, socialization and resocialization are not complete, in any sense of the word, at the end of adolescence. Adults are pressed by a changing reality to make and remake major choices as to career, outlook on the world, or political and ethical orientations. Previous choices are being continually upset. Adults who do not avoid the reality of the choices confronting them, though they frequently do so, turn for guidance to some source other than fixed traditions. Consensual validation by some group or groups of peers is a realistic adjustment to this situation. It is not something that can be abolished by preaching against it.

If we accept the trend as actual and in some measure based on reality, that does not, however, support the near despair of many democratic intellectuals; the values of individuality or of liberty, in a positive rather than a negative sense, need not fall prey to the trend. Stripped of its sophistications, the claim that they must runs like this. If in early experience peer-group influences become a socializing force with a much greater influence than they once had, the values of individuality and freedom in our culture are doomed. The argument assumes that peer-group influences cannot be utilized to elicit, strengthen and develop individual resourcefulness and talent. It assumes also the triumph of "equality in mediocrity." In this de-

graded sense, equality is stripped of its normative meaning of uninhibited access to resources for various patterns of individual or subgroup development, and it becomes instead a uniformity or sameness among people.

These assumptions bring our attention back to the relation of fraternity to liberty and equality. The part fraternity has played within the traditional drama of socialization may help to explain the fixation which impels many people to oppose peer-group influences on "individuality" and "equality."

In traditional patterns of socialization, peer-group influences have been related dialectically to those of parents or parent-surrogates—that is, they have been assumed to operate in opposition to the legitimate influences of parents or parent-surrogates. Ideally, if the dialectic were completed, out of the conflict there should come a synthesis, in which children could become the productive partners of their parents or teachers. The normative orientation of our culture and the dominant social organization which has fostered it have so far operated against the completion of this dialectic.

Peer groups among siblings within a family are often formed to resist objectionable parental directives or influences. The normal rivalry for parental approval is then suppressed in the interest of a united front. Any group with the primary goal of defense against authority develops rigid codes of loyalty and standards of uniform behavior. The range of individual variation among its members is narrowed. Their distrust of deviations from group codes is augmented when, outside the defensive or offensive alliance, the members are rivals. There is something clandestine in the affairs of such associations; vows of secrecy are rigidly enforced. Thus, the function of fraternity in its earliest manifestations within a traditional family has been to reward the standardization of its members and to punish individual variations.

In this respect, the situation is not different in the nonfamilial adolescent peer group, which also functions both offensively and defensively in the dialectical process of transferring authority away from the family. Again, the function of fraternity has traditionally been identified with group standards which punish individual variations and which tend to reward conformity to a type. The enemy here is not only powerful: it carries with it legitimacy, which in part the rebels themselves accept. Mechanisms for handling guilt get involved with this brave banding together to defy authority.

The profusion of adult peer groups, or voluntary associations, have likewise served offensive and defensive purposes in resisting the

pressures of the dominant society, such as the purposes of immigrants striving to maintain the ethnic patterns of the old country against the pressures of the dominant Anglo-Saxon, white, Protestant culture. Groups like the religious denominations within a religiously pluralistic society have traditionally been enrolled for attack and defense, however ambivalent their professed ethic of brotherhood may have made them in recognizing this motivation. Upwardly mobile vocational groupings—labor unions, for example—have developed a semi-military internal organization in their struggles to heighten the social and economic status of their members.

In the light of these experiences, it is hardly surprising that peer-group solidarity and loyalty should be considered as inherently opposed to individual variations in taste, thought, or conduct. The uses of fraternity that we know first and best have been to reduce and narrow, rather than to widen and enhance, the range of members' individual variations in expression and development. Fraternity in this view is opposed to liberty, and peer group to individuality.

But this opposition is neither inherent nor necessary in peer-group experience. Cohesion and the suppression of individual variations are not inevitable concomitants in the life of a group. A group organized for purposes other than simple offense or defense against authority develops an internal division of labor, the better to achieve its common purpose. Differences in ability and talent lend strength to a group, if the talents complement one another in relation to its goal. A good baseball team cannot be made up entirely of pitchers; it requires a variety of abilities, in the interest of the game. The emphasis is on achievement, not on defense or offense against authority. Where the accepted goal of a group requires complementary and variegated abilities, variations in individual behavior are rewarded rather than punished, encouraged rather than condemned.

The principle of complementarity among members has forced itself upon the attention of students of group life. The rationalization of life that has accompanied the bureaucratization of work, of health and social services, and of education has necessitated the deliberate formation of groups—in contrast with families, agrarian neighborhoods, or guilds, which were not consciously built. This process has made objective studies of the formation and operation of groups both possible and necessary. Men who are to build groups must know something about how they work; they cannot depend on traditions.

Study has drawn attention to some characteristics of groups other than those related to early socialization and has focused on groups in

which the engrossing drama of counterdependence and dependence is not so focal or so deep. A comparison of the operation of authority-subordinate relations with that of peer relations in the lives of various groups is now possible.

It is easy to see in problem-solving and activity groups—as in all those formed for achieving a task—that group processes may be applied to elicit, reward and develop differing abilities for whatever the goal requires. But this observation about the operation of task groups falls far short of answering questions about peer-group experiences in releasing individual talent. The effects of group participation on the value systems and life orientations of the members are also important. Many peer-group influences on children and adults in contemporary organizations with a well-rationalized task are now working toward destroying individuality rather than developing distinctive styles and talents. Contemporary group experiences often educate members against a value system which would lead them to continue to develop their own abilities. The functional rationalization of society has often led to an increase in the irrationality of its members. If teachers or other group leaders focus primarily or solely on rationalizing the task or problem-solving aspects of group life, they may fail to recognize the deeply “miseducative” effects of these group-experiences on their members.<sup>3</sup>

Peer-group experiences, however, can not only help members to work more effectively with others but also to develop the basic attitudes and values that aid the growth of an autonomous and rational individual. Some of these values are: an awareness and acceptance of self in its limitations and uniqueness; a validation of self as capable (within limits) of creative accomplishment; a commitment to build and maintain an interdependence with others, in which help can be both given and received; and a positive appraisal of the differences and conflicts among members as potentially productive of growth and progress. These values are either absent or are being destroyed in many natural processes of socialization today. Yet the peer group, which is rising in importance as a means of early and continuing socialization, can strengthen a value system that supports creative individuality, the practice of liberty and genuine equality.

People learn value systems, in the first instance, as they form relations with others. These relations in turn develop norms, with corresponding rationales, which the individual then internalizes. If people, young or old, can build groups with standards that reward and strengthen honest self-expression and self-acceptance, creativity,

mutual helpfulness, and the capacity to cope with conflicts (within the self or with others), then the members of such groups will assimilate these values as conditions of membership.

Conformity is not necessarily stultifying; in itself, it does not define the standards of a group. To understand the power of conformity is to become aware of the wide range of purposes, for good or bad, this power can serve. Thoreau, the advocate of individuality and civil disobedience, learned his values in association with others. He found them through his conforming to certain values within his family and in the New England culture of his day. His own values were shared by many of the Unitarians of his time, and were certainly not unknown to his own peer group in Concord. In short, he had group support for recognizing, respecting, articulating, and asserting his individuality.

The pressures for conformity need not suppress individuality unless the standards of the group reward its suppression and punish its expression. Fraternity can be applied either to destroy or to build the personal values and orientations necessary for the practice of liberty and equality. Theoretically, there is no essential incompatibility, therefore, between peer-group influences and the development of individual potentialities. These influences can build the basic values in individuals that are necessary for the social nurture of unique potentialities, and the major obstacles are practical ones that can be overcome.

Since 1947, the present writer, together with an increasing number of university colleagues, has tried to help people build training groups that to some degree embody growth-releasing and growth-sustaining standards. The members of such a group are asked to construct their own miniature society, the only requirement being that they jointly observe and analyze and jointly seek to learn from their own experiences. The training leader helps the group to carry out this requirement. Such groups succeed—though often painfully—in constructing a peer group which to some degree embodies the standards discussed above, and some members do acquire values consonant with these standards. The degree of cohesion and individual involvement is often higher in training groups than in other kinds of associations to which the members have belonged. Training groups demonstrate that, at least under special circumstances, the practical difficulties of making fraternity serve the disciplines of liberty and equality can be overcome.<sup>4</sup>

What are some of these practical difficulties? Groups must develop trust in the honesty and helpful intention of the training en-

vironment and its leader. Peer groups normally unite (defensively or offensively) against the symbols of authority, and from this fact flow the identity-destroying effects of the group on its members, its punishment of individual variations, its exaltation of uniformity. In training groups, the members must resolve their normal resistance to authority if the group is to relax that defensiveness and support a wide range of individual variations. In this process the dominant normative orientations of our culture toward authority-subordinate relations and toward peer relations are reviewed and revised by the members. The "authority figure" must also be disciplined to accept the rigorous testing he must undergo in order to earn trust. As the group overcomes its distrust and works out its relation with him, its defensiveness relaxes, and there develop not only a toleration of individual differences but also the active encouragement to express them creatively.

Group members must struggle through and beyond the habit of stereotyping one another, to develop a mode of perceiving one another in all the bewildering and fascinating multiplicity that personalities freed from stereotyping present. The behavioral correlate is the achievement of a sense of real encounter. Members make at least a little progress beyond the bloodless interchanges that characterize so many of our relations with others, and move toward the often frightening but growth-releasing encounter of person with person.<sup>5</sup> Conflict as well as agreement characterize this new level of human relations. Members come to see the microcosmic world they are building and also the larger social world as inherently ambiguous and paradoxical; but the ambiguities and paradoxes are now faced in a setting of mutual trust and security. For the realistic acceptance of conflict and ambiguity is one condition of creative response to environment. Some of the members of training groups learn this fundamental truth.

The writer has worked with a number of training groups composed of managers from industrial and governmental bureaucracies. The conflicts with which such organization men struggle are not essentially different from those of teachers and social workers, priests and psychiatrists, though their roles may differ. One experience from a training group of industrial managers may give the flavor of conversation in such a group, and will illustrate a problem with which the organization man must often contend.

A member confessed to the group that he was not actually interested in getting ahead in his company and that he had to hide this from his colleagues, so as not to be considered queer. At first, this



confession produced a punishing response from other members; on the surface, they had accepted the normal assumption that the road to self-validation was to rise in the bureaucratic structure, and to question it appeared somehow subversive. As some members began to take the side of the deviant one, conflict developed and subgroups formed; these argued over the proper hierarchy of values for a manager who was also a person. In time, it became clear that the real focus of the conflict was within each person and that it concerned the legitimacy of the organizational demands as related to their own unique needs. Various conflicts in personal values were brought out and clarified, and differing strategies for changing the system were discussed. The man who opened the discussion discovered he was not so much of a deviate among managers as he had believed.

It is not surprising that in many of the quandaries brought out in such a training group the members should regress to an adolescent attitude, for it is in adolescence that nonfamilial peer-group identifications first gain their power. Though they are not necessarily valid ones, choices made then are now thrust up into consciousness again and reviewed. Such choices might be concerned with career, outlook on life and the world, the falsities in the adult world, or the identity and adequacy of self. These are questions that are normally of great concern to many adolescents, but adults in training groups revive them with a new earnestness.

A training group of adults thus provides a lens for examining the true nature of the fateful choices which our culture has led people to make in their adolescence. Contemporary adolescents might raise different questions in a training group, for the world has changed. In a middle-aged adult group, however, the results of some of the stresses and strains of our culture that were operative in their adolescence can be observed.

Many crippling constructions of a self-image are revealed, reviewed, and revised in training groups. Among them are those masculine self-images that deny and suppress feminine components in the male, and female self-images that deny and suppress correlative male components. One of the most stultifying effects of our culture comes from the stereotyping that forces people to deny parts of themselves. These false constructions make for a waste of energy in the defense of an invalid self-image before one's self and the world. Abraham Maslow has said that the acceptance of one's total nature is one of the most dependable criteria of a creative personality.<sup>6</sup> It is a plausible hypothesis that today both peer groupings and families support this form of crippling self-rejection.



The training group, of course, is only one example of the current attempts to use peer-group experience to support a valid self-acceptance and the acceptance of one's individual limitations and potentialities. The group is perhaps a unique attempt to foster a value system that supports continuing realization of these potentialities, an experimental attempt to apply fraternity in an "unorthodox" manner and for "unorthodox" ends.

Another example of a like use in fraternity is the reported effort of detached group workers to establish rehabilitating relations with youth gangs.<sup>7</sup> This process presents difficulties like those encountered by the trainer in a training group. The worker, like the trainer, does not try to deny the importance of peer-group experience in the personal lives of the gang members. He recognizes that it has a value, even under the constricting and stultifying form of the gang. He must begin by affirming the personal value of fraternity. By implication, he does not affirm *a priori* the adequacy of the values of the adult environment, against which the gang is in revolt. He comes in, not to break up the gang, but to gain a special kind of membership in it that will enable him to work with it toward remaking its standards in patterns that release growth. This is the same problem that the training-group leader faces in struggling toward a mutual relation with the training group. In both situations, trust of the authoritative adult environment, or of the leader as surrogate of that environment, must be achieved before the group can give up its fixation on primitive offensive or defensive goals and its slavish reliance on standards that inhibit the growth of its individual members.

A closely related example comes from the experimental efforts of social workers in Boston to construct neighborhood peer groups around physically or emotionally handicapped youngsters.<sup>8</sup> One criterion in choosing the peers is the nature of the boy's or girl's handicap. These workers are trying to learn more about how to construct and utilize peer groups as part of the rehabilitation of handicapped persons in general. Equally important are some of the reported effects on normal children who work with the handicapped ones in peer relations. The workers consciously endeavor not only to assist the rehabilitation of the handicapped member but also to help the other members to grow in the process. Growth comes from the acquiring a new shared outlook of acceptance of their differences. In a sense, the handicapped person dramatizes the differences and deviations that are inherent in every individual, though in more subtle forms.

In a boys' group, for example, the boys are expected to show

tenderness as well as robustness. This is a hard but important thing for male children in our culture to learn to do. As members work through the dramatic differences between themselves and the handicapped member, other differences, not so dramatic, in themselves and others tend to be accepted also. The adult worker is needed to help the group accomplish these new insights, but he must work with the group in such a way as not to destroy its peer character. Again, a new and difficult role for the authority figure in socializing processes is indicated. He must exert a reeducative influence within a group, without destroying the group's peer character, on which its reeducative value depends.

Thus the practical difficulties in utilizing fraternity to develop the disciplines of liberty and equality can be overcome, at least in specially created settings. True, the experimental demonstrations of this fact have accomplished little when measured against the magnitude of the social problem to be solved, but their results have been encouraging enough to warrant extended effort along analogous lines. It is important that the experimentation not be limited in the future to the educational, semitherapeutic and therapeutic contexts to which it has thus far been confined. Our society has drifted into patterns of early and continuing socialization which elevate peer-group influences to a new prominence. In this drift, values of individuality, of liberty and equality, have been eroded and in some cases lost. Our inherited normative orientation and our unanalyzed experiences with peer groups in our own socialization frequently block us from seeing that the best hope for maintaining, strengthening and extending these eroded values may well lie in transforming the quality of peer-group experiences.<sup>9</sup>

To make peer-group experiences serve individuality, leaders in socialization must re-analyze and re-evaluate the normative orientations of our culture toward valid processes of socialization and valid ideals of personal maturity. They must achieve an understanding of the uses and abuses of fraternity.

Relations with authority will never disappear from work and citizenship or from early and continuing processes of socialization. However, the role of authority in socialization must be reconceived. Authority figures must learn a new respect for peer-group processes as potentialities for either growth or stultification. Like training-group leaders and detached group workers, authority figures must translate this respect into actions appropriate to the social affiliations they control and direct. This translation will require the relatively novel utilization of authority to enhance the normative content

## The Uses of Fraternity

of peer-group life without destroying its essential character. The first step in endowing group life with creative responsibilities may well be a realistic revaluation, both cognitive and affective, of the uses and abuses of fraternity.

### REFERENCES

- 1 See particularly David Riesman (with Reuel Denny and Nathan Glazer), *The Lonely Crowd*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1950; also David Riesman, *Individualism Reconsidered*, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1954.
- 2 William H. Whyte, *The Organization Man*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1956.
- 3 Paul Goodman's comment on "progressive education" is eloquent on this point. "This radical proposal, aimed at solving the dilemmas of education in the modern circumstances of industrialism and democracy, was never given a chance. It succeeded in destroying the faculty psychology in the interests of educating the whole person, and in emphasizing group experiences, but failed to introduce learning-by-doing with real problems. The actual result of the gains has been to . . . foster adjustment to society as it is" (*Growing Up Absurd*, New York, Random House, 1960, p. 225).
- 4 National Training Laboratories, *Explorations in Human Relations Training*. Washington, D. C.: National Education Association, 1953. Kenneth D. Benne and Warren G. Bennis, *What Is a Training Group?* Boston University Human Relations Center Research Reports and Technical Notes, No. 21.
- 5 It was in conducting training groups that the author discovered the experiential meaning of Martin Buber's fundamental distinction between collectivity and community. "Collectivity is not a binding but a bundling together: individuals packed together, armed and equipped in common, with only as much life from man to man as will inflame the marching step. But community . . . is the being no longer side by side but with one another of a multitude of persons. And this multitude, though it also moves toward one goal, yet experiences everywhere a turning to, a dynamic facing of, the other, a flowing from I to thou. . . . Collectivity is based on an organized atrophy of personal existence, community on its increase and confirmation in life lived toward one another." Martin Buber, *Between Man and Man* (Boston, Beacon Press, 1955), p. 31. See also Buber's earlier work, *I and Thou*, Edinburgh, R. and R. Clark, 1937.
- 6 Abraham Maslow, "Creativity in Self-Actualizing People," in H. H. Anderson (ed.), *Creativity and Its Cultivation*, New York, Harper, 1959.
- 7 See, for example, *Reaching the Fighting Gang*, New York, New York City Youth Board, 1960.
- 8 See Richard Bond, Virginia Burns, Ralph Kolodny and Marjory Warren, "The Neighborhood Peer Group," *The Group*, 1954, vol. 17, no. 2, and Ralph

KENNETH BENNE

Kolodny, Samuel Waldfogel and Virginia Burns, "Summer Camping in the Treatment of Ego-Defensive Children," *Mental Hygiene*, 1960, vol. 44, no. 2.

- 9 The ideal of a mature personality argued for in this essay is not really very different from David Riesman's "autonomous person," Paul Goodman's "independent" or Erich Fromm's "productive" personality. What the present discussion adds may be the search for ways of deliberately creating the social (or group) conditions which make the development of such personalities most likely within the limitations and compulsions of an industrial society. This search has led the writer to reassess the potentialities of a means often used "naturally" to defeat the development of the kinds of personalities desired.

J. MILTON YINGER

## Social Forces Involved in Group Identification or Withdrawal

A GENERATION AGO it was widely believed that the many minority groups in American society would readily become acculturated to the dominant patterns and, in the course of a few generations, assimilated into the total population. Although racial groups were generally excepted from this thesis, its proponents contended that linguistic and national-origin lines would be obliterated and even religious divisions, unlikely to be eliminated in a society that practiced freedom of religion, would be greatly reduced. In recent years, this thesis has been challenged.<sup>1</sup> Many students of the current scene argue that the process of assimilation is neither inevitable nor desirable. Extensive acculturation can scarcely be denied, but assimilation—the loss of group identity—has become problematic, both as fact and as value.

Perhaps this issue can be explored most effectively, not by asserting one proposition or another, but by raising a series of questions. What are the conditions under which minority groups—ethnic, racial, or religious—persist as distinguishable entities within the structure of society? What conditions are associated with their dissolution? What are the consequences for society of the maintenance of groups on the basis of race, religion, or ethnicity, rather than (or in addition to) groups based on occupation, residence, class, avocational interests, or other criteria? It is well to remember that “group” is a generic term that includes collectivities of widely varying degrees of cohesiveness. It does not include statistical categories (all persons whose names begin with “S,” for example), for the term implies as a minimum an awareness by the individuals involved of some common identity and shared fate. The members of more cohesive groups will, in addition, engage in social interaction. And if this interaction is persistent and repetitive, the group is characterized by social structure.<sup>2</sup> We can

avoid errors of interpretation if we keep these levels of cohesiveness in mind in the study of minority groups. Even the simple awareness of a common identity may be an influence on minority-group members. But it is the meaning of "group" in the fuller sense, involving social interaction and social structure, that is of greatest importance.

To this sociological view we can profitably add the social-psychological concept of "reference group," by means of which we look at groups through the eyes of an individual. The term is not synonymous with a group to which one belongs, although membership groups are perhaps the most numerous and important reference groups. A group that one uses as his context of belief, motivation, and action with regard to a specific issue is his reference group. It may be used as a kind of check point in making comparisons and contrasts; or it may be a group in which one wishes to hold or to gain membership—thus a group whose standards and claims are paramount in situations concerned with choice.<sup>3</sup>

The special study of minority groups is best carried on by treating it as one phase of the general study of groups, seeking to answer such questions as these: What conditions promote group cohesiveness? What satisfactions come from groups? How do groups shape perception, motivation, and behavior? What happens when the different groups to which one belongs offer contradictory interpretations and influences? What processes are set in motion when social change or physical and social mobility weaken the group structures to which one has become accustomed?

When these questions are asked with reference to minority groups, in an effort to discover the forces involved in group identification or withdrawal, we are led to many ambivalent situations and paradoxes. Apparent group pride and identity may mask self-alienation and low morale. The decline of distinctiveness in the standards of a group may be accompanied by an increase in the sense of identity with it. The forces at work on one generation are sometimes dramatically different from the forces influencing the next generation. The quick observer of this complicated situation is liable to mistake an eddy for the mainstream, a short-run trend for a permanent development.

With these hazards in mind, I am led to the belief that the assimilation thesis is neither as accurate as its proponents thought nor as wide of the mark as many current writers believe. Language differences have been reduced, but certainly not eliminated.<sup>4</sup> Most of the Indian tribes that were here when the Europeans came still exist as distinct groups with separate cultures. The continuing importance

of the foreign-born in the American population should not be forgotten. Although the percentage of the foreign-born has fallen from the high point of 14.5 percent in 1910 to 5.8 percent in 1960, there are still over ten million persons in the United States who were born abroad. According to Donald Bogue's estimates, this number will increase slightly in the next twenty years.<sup>5</sup> Pride in national group has been tenacious with some people and has resulted in the continuation of separate associations, not simply among those with a low degree of acculturation, but sometimes among those who are thoroughly established. On the basis of his study of Norwegians in Wisconsin, Peter Munch writes: "In human society, there are forces working both ways, both toward assimilation and toward differentiation of groups. And the existence in this country of easily distinguishable ethnic groups, even after more than a hundred years' residence, through three or four or even five generations, under a tremendous social pressure, suggests that here there have been *positive* forces working towards a *differentiation* of groups on the basis of ethnic origin."<sup>6</sup>

Related to language and national origin, and probably more important than either, are the lines of religious division. Not only are there distinctions among the major groups, but also internal patterns of differentiation. In Protestantism, there have been tendencies toward union among some churches, but national churches, especially among the Lutherans, are still important. Although some Roman Catholic Churches are multinational, many continue to have an ethnic identity. Judaism can be characterized as an ethnic church whose members are drawn almost entirely from those of common descent; and its internal differentiation reflects, although less and less clearly, differences in national origin.

Ninety-five percent of Americans readily identify themselves with some one of the major religious groups, approximately two-thirds with Protestantism, one-quarter with Catholicism, and three percent with Judaism.<sup>7</sup> A transfer of membership is relatively uncommon; probably no more than five percent of adults have shifted from the religious group of their birth to another of the three major religious groups.<sup>8</sup> Even membership in small, private associations is substantially, although by no means completely, along religious lines. On the basis of such facts, Ruby Jo Kennedy, Will Herberg, and others have suggested that America is not a single but a triple melting pot: we are witnessing the gradual amalgamation of groups within the three major religious traditions, but little assimilation among them. Although the ethnic lines which formerly coincided with and reenforced

religious divisions may gradually be fading, the religious lines of distinction remain clear.

Is this indeed the case? By examining that specific question we hope to be able to find some of the general principles involved in group identification and withdrawal. It is clear that religious divisions, with some reenforcing ethnic aspects, maintain a great deal of vitality in contemporary America. Are the lines of division as sharp as they appear, or do they hide a deeper tendency toward assimilation to common patterns? What factors give salience to an ethnic religion as a reference group in contrast to other possible reference groups? The answers to these questions must be sought on two levels. To some degree, the members of ethnic-religious groups are responding to the same forces that affect member of all other religious groups. What requires explanation is not the particular elements of ethnic religion, but the trends among all religions. In some measure, however, ethnic-religious groups are responding to forces that affect them uniquely or particularly strongly.

It is often said that ethnic religions are sharing in a "return to religion" that affects the whole society. Growing membership lists, numerous articles in mass-circulation magazines, the rise of many religious books to the best-seller lists, and the frequent affirmation of the strength of our religious heritage by political leaders attest to the frequency of religious themes in contemporary life. Sixty-three percent of Americans are church members today, compared with 22 percent in 1900. Although there is wide disagreement as to the intrinsic value of contemporary religious developments, there is extensive agreement as to the explanation for them. The great personal confusion, anxiety, and suffering of our time encourage men to return to the religious road to salvation.

Before we accept this explanation, we must determine to what men are returning. Is it a return at all? Are the churches of the country, including the ethnic churches, gaining strength as religious organizations, or are they, at least in part, serving simply as a convenient rallying point for secular interests? Herberg writes: "Every aspect of contemporary religious life reflects this paradox—pervasive secularism amid mounting religiosity, 'the strengthening of the religious structure in spite of increasing secularization.'"<sup>9</sup> We can understand the "return to religion" only by noting the simultaneous secularization of the churches. What one returns to is often an institution that makes few creedal demands. Only marginally does it touch the life of business, politics, or education.

In so far as this thesis is correct, the continuing existence of



## *Group Identification or Withdrawal*

ethnic churches is not a sign of their strength but of their "weakness," in the sense that they have become more like the churches of the majority and are less vital in the lives of their members. The national creed, the occupational group, and other associations have taken on many of the functions formerly residing in the religious group. This is certainly not the whole picture, however. Religion in one sense is the effort to build a defense against man's ultimate problems, to help him bear the most difficult strains of life. The continuing vitality of ethnic-religious groups in the United States is partly to be accounted for by the sharp challenge to all religious interpretations of life in the modern world: the depersonalization of life, the crushing of the individual by the processes of technology, the terror of "the lonely crowd"—these are problems many people have felt deeply. Every religion affirms the ultimate dignity and importance of the believer, whatever his status. This affirmation is of special importance to a member of a minority group. Whatever other means he may use to protest discrimination against him and to struggle with his many problems, he is likely to turn to religion. The nature of his religious expression will vary greatly, depending on his total situation.

Other systems of belief and action are concerned with this same question. Religious developments, in fact, can often be seen as one of several alternative responses to a situation. Continued affiliation with an ethnic group, therefore, can best be understood not only as a sharing of a situation with other religions but also as a sharing of a situation with many secular modes of response. Paul Tillich describes the variety of patterns of belief and action that have sprung from the soil of technical society. If the existential protest of Kierkegaard was an effort to resist a world in which everybody was transformed into a thing, the same observation may be made of many others who in very different ways sought to resist the depersonalization of life: Marx, by attacking the institutions that he thought responsible for the crushing of the individual; Nietzsche, by demanding self-affirmation in the face of the dehumanizing force of modern society; psychoanalysis, by searching for a self that is uncoerced and spontaneous; Sartre, by "isolating the individual from the embracing structure of technical civilization." On this level, the ethnic churches cannot be studied separately, nor even in conjunction with other churches; they must be seen in context with many functionally alternative responses to contemporary society.<sup>10</sup>

One of the central themes of contemporary sociology is the description and analysis of the sense of insignificance, the rootlessness,

the alienation, of many persons in modern society. The increased specialization of interests, the mobility, the bringing together into interdependent communities of individuals with widely different backgrounds—all make it difficult to establish relaxed and informal contacts, to feel a sense of some vital connection. Evidence exists that such alienation helps to explain some aspects of prejudice ("I belong," says the prejudiced person), of some of the more exuberant varieties of patriotism ("I am strong," says the chauvinist), and of some aspects of religion ("I have a home," says the believer).<sup>11</sup>

We can refer only briefly to two questions concerning the family that are important for our topic. It is widely assumed that in a period of rapid change the family is a conservative agency. Parents often try to train their children as they themselves were trained and resist the forces in the new environment that are pulling the children into unaccustomed ways. The reference groups of the two generations are then different, giving differing standards of judgment, with resulting conflict. In a rapidly changing situation, parents often become confused; they develop "disturbed and inconsistent images of their children's future," as Margaret Mead puts it.<sup>12</sup> Were this the whole picture, the family would be a source of enormous strain; but does it not also serve as a bridge, preparing the way for change? Alex Inkeles has found that parents among Russian émigrés did not simply transmit the old, because that was what was in them; they also saw the changes around them and actively shaped their children to deal with the new situation.<sup>13</sup> Further study of the conditions that promote the various tendencies in family influence is needed.

Opposition to intermarriage is another way in which family influence is widely assumed to promote ethnic-religious group continuation. The data substantially support this thesis, and yet not so clearly, in my judgment, as is generally believed. In her study of New Haven, Ruby Jo Kennedy has found the following rates of intermarriage:

	1870	1900	1930	1940
	(percentage marrying within the religious group)			
Catholic	95	86	82	84
Protestant	99	91	78	80
Jew	100	99	97	94

Since during this period marriage across boundaries of national origin had increased, Kennedy concluded that there was a "triple melting pot," a tendency toward assimilation *within* the three religious groups, but little such tendency *among* them. Studying the

same city, A. B. Hollingshead found in 1948 that the rates of in-group marriage were 97.1 percent for Jews, 93.8 percent for Catholics, and 74.4 percent for Protestants.<sup>14</sup>

Not all evidence, however, supports the thesis of a low rate of intermarriage across religious lines. Taking his data from the *Catholic Directory*, John L. Thomas found that almost 30 percent of marriages involving a Catholic were mixed. This included only sanctioned Catholic marriages; had nonsanctioned unions been included, the rate would have been higher.<sup>15</sup> The special United States Census study of religion (1957) reported that 8.6 percent of all Protestants were married to persons of other religious preference, 21.6 percent of Catholics were intermarried, and 7.2 percent of Jews.<sup>16</sup> With reference to the limited population of midtown Manhattan, Jerold S. Heiss discovered on the basis of an area-probability sample that 21 percent of Catholic, 34 percent of Protestant, and 18 percent of Jewish marriages were mixed.<sup>17</sup> These data show us the need for exploring the conditions under which intermarriage occurs. Many studies indicate that intermarriage is at a minimum when religious difference is reenforced by national, class, language, residential, and other differences. When these supporting differences disappear, intermarriage increases. Moreover, intermarriage is probably cumulative: children of mixed marriages are more likely to marry outside the group than are children of endogamous unions.

Almost all research in this area gives general data concerning intermarriage rates. Over-all percentages obscure internal differences. We would be better served by a careful attention to the variables associated with religious-group endogamy and those associated with exogamy, whatever the present empirical distribution. We could then say: in so far as these conditions prevail, intermarriage rates are likely to be at a given level. The long-run trends seem to me to be strengthening most of the conditions which increase intermarriage—the decrease of religious differences, the reduction of supporting lines of differentiation, the cumulative effect of past mixed marriages. These trends are not strong; family and ethnic-religious groups are still closely associated; but the “triple melting pot” thesis needs to be held somewhat lightly.

Prejudice and discrimination are important factors influencing the degree of identification with an ethnic group. Their effects are ambivalent: when they are strong, there are pressures to escape the group, tendencies toward self-hatred, and intragroup conflict. Yet there are also pressures toward group identity and solidarity, pride and loyalty to the group, emphasis on its past greatness and its

present achievements, the development of organizations to oppose discrimination. Prejudice may lead one to declare with Theodor Herzl: "We are a people—the enemy makes us a people." In general, it appears that pressure against a strong group makes it stronger; it increases the morale of its members and heightens their sense of identity. Pressure against a weak group demoralizes the members, heightens intragroup conflict, accentuates the tendencies toward self-hatred and programs of escape (most of them symbolic).

When prejudice and discrimination are on the decline, it is easier to be a group member; there is less punishment, less loss of self-esteem; but fewer forces of defensive solidarity are set in motion. The weaker the group, the more the identification of its members is increased by a situation in which prejudice and discrimination are being reduced. A strong group may find it more difficult to maintain its separate identity under such favorable circumstances. If this proposition is correct—and I state it only as a tentative hypothesis—one would expect the American Negro group to gain in solidarity, in strength, in pride, in the readiness of its members to identify with it, as prejudice and discrimination are reduced; for Negroes have been weak, in the sense of a lack of economic, political, and educational weapons. Identity with Judaism, on the other hand, may be made less likely when there is little prejudice and discrimination. Other reference groups gain in importance when the overwhelming needs for protection and for fulfillment rest less heavily on the ethnic community.

The functions of identification with an ethnic-religious group can be studied, not only by an analysis of the group as a whole, but by the examination of internal differentiation. Variations in belief, in organizational structure, in religious aesthetics, and in other aspects of religious life are closely related to differences in secular status and experience. The proliferation of separate churches and sects can best be explained, not only by disagreements over dogma and rite, but also by variation in needs, values, and experiences in a heterogeneous society. As Richard Niebuhr has shown,<sup>18</sup> different classes, races, ethnic groups and regions develop different religious values and structures. Although Niebuhr refers primarily to variation among Protestant groups, the basic thesis can be applied to Catholicism and Judaism as well. Denominations, to be sure, do not appear within the structure of Catholicism, but the great diversity of the membership of the Catholic Church is reflected in the wide range of its activities and styles of communication.

It would, of course, be an error to overlook the forces supporting

## *Group Identification or Withdrawal*

the continuing distinctiveness of Catholicism. It is scarcely surprising that a church whose historical roots are in ancient and medieval Europe should be different in many ways from, let us say, Congregationalism, with its roots in early modern England and America. When other forces are added—such as the relative recency of immigration of a large part of America's Catholic population, the international structure of the Church, the relatively greater regional, class, and occupational homogeneity of the membership, compared with Protestantism—one recognizes that there are forces that help to preserve a distinctive Catholic tradition and a close identification with it on the part of most members.

Some of these forces, however, are less powerful than they have been, and the Catholic Church, like all other religious groups, is being strongly influenced by the contemporary situation. When a minority group becomes more highly differentiated internally, with differing degrees of mobility and of contact with other groups, with widely differing associations with the economic, political, and educational structures of the total society, religious differentiation inevitably appears. The reference groups with which a professional person feels identified are to some degree different from those of an artisan or merchant; the kinds of personal tensions with which religion attempts to deal are different for members of the middle and upper classes than for members of the lower class; protection against *anomie* (normlessness) doubtless requires, not some vague attachment to a heterogeneous group, but a close institutional attachment to a group whose total life-style corresponds to one's needs and inclinations. It requires a feeling of direct participation with one's peers, with a group in which one feels entirely at home. Human beings who are not quite certain where they belong want to assert: "I belong; here, at least, there is no doubt, I belong. To the nation, yes; to the lodge; to my occupational group; but if there is any doubt about these, above all to my religious group, about which no one will raise a doubt." Thus the association with a subdivision of an ethnic-religious group is an attempt to deal with the same problems that identity with the larger group represents.

Perhaps these concepts can be tested by applying them more explicitly to some of the developments in Judaism in the American situation. The movement which most directly reveals the influence of the American environment is Conservative Judaism.<sup>19</sup> Sociologically speaking, this was an attempt to do for the large number of Eastern European migrants, particularly in the second and third generations in the United States, what the Reform movement sought

to do for the earlier migrants from Western Europe: it formed a link between the total Jewish culture of the past and the requirements and possibilities of the American present. It did not duplicate Reform Judaism in the size and direction of its changes for several reasons: America's tradition of freedom of religion required that it "give up" fewer of its distinctive patterns; the greatly increased size of the Jewish population encouraged the maintenance of some of the older forms, because contact with non-Jews was often limited; the lively memories of persecution were not readily dismissed; the continuing immigration of Orthodox Jews from Europe renewed the established ways; support for a Zionist cause—not for themselves, but for European coreligionists—helped sustain a sense of identity with Judaism as they had known it; and finally, the new eruptions of anti-Semitism, from the Dreyfus affair to the genocide of Hitler's "new order," revitalized the meaning of Judaism as a religious response to the tragedies of life.

Recent developments (since 1940, we may say arbitrarily) have set in motion forces that are strongly affecting Judaism and the nature of identification with it. Broadly speaking, we may say that there has been a renewal of interest in the religious community and a blurring of the lines of distinction among the three denominations of American Jews, Orthodox, Conservative, and Reformed. Orthodoxy continues to change, but, perhaps more surprisingly, there is some return to traditional patterns among the Reform groups. This in part expresses the general "return to religion" discussed above; many of the forces affecting a "neo-orthodoxy" in Christianity are also influential among Jews. There are, however, some additional factors: the tragedies of the Hitlerian period have undoubtedly given vitality and a sense of common identity to all branches of Judaism. Economic distinctions have been reduced, so that the metaphor of "the German employer and the Russian employee" is less and less accurate. Residential migration into mixed suburbs, where one's children are more likely to ask, "What is a Jew?" has led many to rethink their religious origins. During the last thirty years, in which immigration has been sharply reduced, the association of Jewishness with foreignness and with the "strange" ways of unmodified Orthodoxy has been greatly diminished.

It thus appears that in this generation, at least, the lines among Catholic, Protestant, and Jew remain clear, despite the reduction in secular differences among the constituent groups. This may well express the tensions of a society in which we seek to "escape from freedom" by embracing a partially traditional system of answers; it

## *Group Identification or Withdrawal*

may be a manifestation of "the lonely crowd," in which we seek a feeling of identity by relating ourselves more closely to an established group; and these manifestations may be possible because close identity with a religious group does not alienate us from the total society. Religion has become somewhat marginal, while our basic allegiance is given to "the American Way of Life."<sup>20</sup> Religious difference is freely permitted, hence it becomes the legatee of all the ethnic differences that otherwise might have persisted more strongly. To be a Catholic or a Jew is to be considered much less "alien" than even a generation ago. (The testimony of the 1960 presidential election, although somewhat ambiguous in this regard, largely supports this view.) Thus the dysfunction of religious-group identity is reduced while its functions continue. If this argument is valid, the continuing vitality of Catholicism and Judaism is not a sign of the slowing down of the "Americanization" of Catholics and Jews. It is, indeed, a sign of how deeply involved they are in the total pattern of American society.<sup>21</sup>

It remains to ask, what are the consequences for the total society of continued identification—to the degree and in the manner that we have suggested—with separate ethnic-religious groups? This leads us to one of the central questions of contemporary sociology: how does a complex, urban society manage to exist as a healthy system? how does it establish and maintain a sufficient level of integration and consensus to maintain order and carry through the necessary accommodations among its heterogeneous peoples? It cannot rely on what Durkheim called the "mechanical solidarity" of a relatively undifferentiated community; and a free society resists an integration that is imposed by coercion. Does it not, therefore, at the least require a consensus on its fundamental values, on religion, which is often thought to be the deepest source of integration? Can it afford to be indifferent to the continued vitality of the ethnic-religious groups which divide a society in important ways?

It might be said parenthetically that modern societies had only begun (that is, within the last few generations) to struggle with this question when it abruptly became a problem for the entire world. Before Marconi, the Wright Brothers, and Einstein we might, perhaps, have been entitled simply to ask: how can the diverse members of a modern society live together in trust and cooperation? is similarity necessary? is tolerance enough? But now, having only begun to develop patterns that deal with the question on the societal level, we discover it to be a world problem. The question of the affiliation



or rejection of an ethnic group on the national level seems almost trivial, because the differences among groups are small, compared with the massive difficulties associated with group identification in a world made suddenly small. The question is not trivial, however, because only after we have understood and developed patterns appropriate to the needs of modern societies can we hope to create a system for the world in which similarities are not coerced and differences do not divide.

On this question we are again confronted by a paradox: the integration of a complex and heterogeneous society requires both basic commonalties and freedom to be different. These are readily granted as important values of American society: but they are not always recognized as functionally necessary patterns for a heterogeneous, changing society. There are, of course, many common elements in Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism, elements that have been increased in the last several decades. The classicist in each tradition insists that the reduction of distinctiveness is a loss, and from his point of view it is. His point of view, however, is unlikely to prevail. In particular, the reduction of the parochial, the exclusive, and the claims of absolute truth seems inevitable in our kind of society. It is dysfunctional in a mobile and diverse society to have a group of religions, each of which claims some kind of ultimate superiority; the elements in Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism which sponsor such claims are disruptive. Claims by Protestants that the Bible is the final and literal truth, by Catholics that theirs is the only true church, and by Jews that they are the chosen people can only exacerbate the divisions of a society.

In a diverse society in which absolute religious claims are asserted, three things may happen: the society will be seriously split; or the differences will be reduced; or the traditional religious assertions will lose force, while a new, unifying system of beliefs and actions will be developed, often around national and patriotic themes. All three things are happening in the United States, the last being perhaps the strongest tendency. "The American Way of Life" becomes the operative faith to a substantial degree. Those who wish to relate the national faith to one of the traditional religions are free to do so, provided they do not challenge any of the basic premises of Americanism. Emphasis on religious variation thus tends to shift the burden of integration to other parts of the social system—particularly to the sentiments of nationalism. If this interpretation is correct, universalistic religions may face self-defeating limits to the insistence upon their differences.

## *Group Identification or Withdrawal*

The other side of the paradox also requires examination. On the contemporary scene, in fact, the need for a common core of values is doubtless more readily granted than is the need for diversity. The latter, therefore, requires special emphasis. The integration of any society, however homogeneous it may seem to an outsider, is pluralistic; it requires the harmonizing of different individual roles and different groups. The vast complexity of a modern society extends pluralism to an extraordinary degree. The constant interaction of people with different national and religious backgrounds, with different occupations and different levels of education, makes mutual tolerance, as the minimum degree of accommodation, a vital necessity. (That pluralism is the only imaginable pattern for a peaceful world need scarcely be mentioned.) A century ago, John Stuart Mill observed that a diversity of religious views was essential to a free, heterogeneous society, to minimize any authoritarian tendencies in the church and to maximize the autonomy of religious influences from other centers of power. Contemporary political sociology, drawing on a long tradition, has documented the importance of a strong network of private associations, standing between the individual and the state, if democracy is to thrive.<sup>22</sup> A vigorous group of partially competing religious organizations may be among the most significant of such associations. Their importance to the members lends them strength to counter the opposite dangers of a lack of meaningful attachments in a changing world, on the one hand, and the threat of domination by the state on the other. The fact that our major religious divisions cut across other lines such as class, occupation, and race helps greatly to prevent the cumulative reenforcement of dividing forces that can split a society into warring segments.<sup>23</sup>

What can we expect in the years ahead from the processes of group identification and withdrawal? First, there is the inevitability of continuing change in the doctrines, rites, and group structure of religious organizations. In analyses of this question one sometimes gets the impression that the third generation has arrived at some point of equilibrium; although there was clearly a sharp change between the first and second and between the second and third generations, a point of relative stability has now been reached. One might more readily expect a continuing "Americanization," a continuing adjustment to the setting in which religious groups are found. This probably will not mean much loss of membership, for although the distinctiveness of belonging will be reduced, so also will some of the penalties associated with identification with a minority group. Professional staffs will sustain the group by emphasizing its unique-

ness while participating in a process which reduces that uniqueness. This is in no way to suggest hypocrisy on their part, but to indicate the way in which the total field of influences within which they work inevitably affects their responses. For the layman, continuing identification with his religious group will not necessarily represent the strength of the religious tradition. The tradition will undergo continuing modification, partly as a result of his influence. But in a vast and complicated society, in a day of depersonalization, the religious group will help one to answer the difficult question, Who am I? At the same time, occupational, political, and other reference groups that cut across religious lines will continue to reduce the sense of the religious group as a total community. Future developments of ethnic-religious groups depend in part, of course, on the external situation in which the members find themselves. Barring a sharp increase in discrimination, we are likely to continue to see the paradox of continued identification accompanied by a deeper and deeper involvement in the other groups of our society. In terms of the need both for a common foundation and for a vigorous pluralism, this seems to me to be a desirable situation.

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## Group Identification or Withdrawal

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- 11 At this point a vital question of values arises. The supporter of religion will say, Surely it is better that men search for an anchorage in religion than in prejudice or chauvinism. The critic of religion is likely to respond, There is some evidence that the more religious are also the more prejudiced, and that piety arms patriotism with an excessively good conscience—these are not functional alternatives. Clearly, some kinds of religious inclination are associated with bigotry and chauvinism; others are an antidote to these faults. A basic challenge to the scientist and the religionist is to describe the differences and discover the conditions that promote either relation.
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- 18 Richard Niebuhr, *The Social Sources of Denominationalism*, New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1929; reprinted, Hamden, Conn., The Shoestring Press, 1954.
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- 21 See Herbert J. Gans, "American Jewry: Present and Future," *Commentary*, May 1956, pp. 422-430; and "The Future of American Jewry," *Commentary*, June 1956, pp. 555-563.

J. MILTON YINGER

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MILTON M. GORDON

## Assimilation in America: Theory and Reality

THREE IDEOLOGIES or conceptual models have competed for attention on the American scene as explanations of the way in which a nation, in the beginning largely white, Anglo-Saxon, and Protestant, has absorbed over 41 million immigrants and their descendants from variegated sources and welded them into the contemporary American people. These ideologies are Anglo-conformity, the melting pot, and cultural pluralism. They have served at various times, and often simultaneously, as explanations of what has happened—descriptive models—and of what should happen—goal models. Not infrequently they have been used in such a fashion that it is difficult to tell which of these two usages the writer has had in mind. In fact, one of the more remarkable omissions in the history of American intellectual thought is the relative lack of close analytical attention given to the theory of immigrant adjustment in the United States by its social scientists.

The result has been that this field of discussion—an overridingly important one since it has significant implications for the more familiar problems of prejudice, discrimination, and majority-minority group relations generally—has been largely preempted by laymen, representatives of belles lettres, philosophers, and apologists of various persuasions. Even from these sources the amount of attention devoted to ideologies of assimilation is hardly extensive. Consequently, the work of improving intergroup relations in America is carried out by dedicated professional agencies and individuals who

The materials of this article are based on a larger study of the meaning and implications of minority group assimilation in the United States, which I have carried out for the Russell Sage Foundation and which is scheduled to be published as a book by the Foundation.

deal as best they can with day-to-day problems of discriminatory behavior, but who for the most part are unable to relate their efforts to an adequate conceptual apparatus. Such an apparatus would, at one and the same time, accurately describe the present structure of American society with respect to its ethnic groups (I shall use the term "ethnic group" to refer to any racial, religious, or national-origins collectivity), and allow for a considered formulation of its assimilation or integration goals for the foreseeable future. One is reminded of Alice's distraught question in her travels in Wonderland: "Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?" "That depends a good deal," replied the Cat with irrefutable logic, "on where you want to get to."

The story of America's immigration can be quickly told for our present purposes. The white American population at the time of the Revolution was largely English and Protestant in origin, but had already absorbed substantial groups of Germans and Scotch-Irish and smaller contingents of Frenchmen, Dutchmen, Swedes, Swiss, South Irish, Poles, and a handful of migrants from other European nations. Catholics were represented in modest numbers, particularly in the middle colonies, and a small number of Jews were residents of the incipient nation. With the exception of the Quakers and a few missionaries, the colonists had generally treated the Indians and their cultures with contempt and hostility, driving them from the coastal plains and making the western frontier a bloody battleground where eternal vigilance was the price of survival.

Although the Negro at that time made up nearly one-fifth of the total population, his predominantly slave status, together with racial and cultural prejudice, barred him from serious consideration as an assimilable element of the society. And while many groups of European origin started out as determined ethnic enclaves, eventually, most historians believe, considerable ethnic intermixture within the white population took place. "People of different blood" [sic]—write two American historians about the colonial period, "English, Irish, German, Huguenot, Dutch, Swedish—mingled and intermarried with little thought of any difference."<sup>1</sup> In such a society, its people predominantly English, its white immigrants of other ethnic origins either English-speaking or derived largely from countries of northern and western Europe whose cultural divergences from the English were not great, and its dominant white population excluding by fiat the claims and considerations of welfare of the non-Caucasian minorities, the problem of assimilation understandably did not loom unduly large or complex.



The unfolding events of the next century and a half with increasing momentum dispelled the complacency which rested upon the relative simplicity of colonial and immediate post-Revolutionary conditions. The large-scale immigration to America of the famine-fleeing Irish, the Germans, and later the Scandinavians (along with additional Englishmen and other peoples of northern and western Europe) in the middle of the nineteenth century (the so-called "old immigration"), the emancipation of the Negro slaves and the problems created by post-Civil War reconstruction, the placing of the conquered Indian with his broken culture on government reservations, the arrival of the Oriental, first attracted by the discovery of gold and other opportunities in the West, and finally, beginning in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and continuing to the early 1920's, the swelling to proportions hitherto unimagined of the tide of immigration from the peasantries and "pales" of southern and eastern Europe—the Italians, Jews, and Slavs of the so-called "new immigration," fleeing the persecutions and industrial dislocations of the day—all these events constitute the background against which we may consider the rise of the theories of assimilation mentioned above. After a necessarily foreshortened description of each of these theories and their historical emergence, we shall suggest analytical distinctions designed to aid in clarifying the nature of the assimilation process, and then conclude by focusing on the American scene.

### *Anglo-Conformity*

"Anglo-conformity"<sup>2</sup> is a broad term used to cover a variety of viewpoints about assimilation and immigration; they all assume the desirability of maintaining English institutions (as modified by the American Revolution), the English language, and English-oriented cultural patterns as dominant and standard in American life. However, bound up with this assumption are related attitudes. These may range from discredited notions about race and "Nordic" and "Aryan" racial superiority, together with the nativist political programs and exclusionist immigration policies which such notions entail, through an intermediate position of favoring immigration from northern and western Europe on amorphous, unreflective grounds ("They are more like us"), to a lack of opposition to any source of immigration, as long as these immigrants and their descendants duly adopt the standard Anglo-Saxon cultural patterns. There is by no means any necessary equation between Anglo-conformity and racist attitudes.

It is quite likely that "Anglo-conformity" in its more moderate aspects, however explicit its formulation, has been the most prevalent ideology of assimilation goals in America throughout the nation's history. As far back as colonial times, Benjamin Franklin recorded concern about the clannishness of the Germans in Pennsylvania, their slowness in learning English, and the establishment of their own native-language press.<sup>3</sup> Others of the founding fathers had similar reservations about large-scale immigration from Europe. In the context of their times they were unable to foresee the role such immigration was to play in creating the later greatness of the nation. They were not at all men of unthinking prejudices. The disestablishment of religion and the separation of church and state (so that no religious group—whether New England Congregationalists, Virginian Anglicans, or even all Protestants combined—could call upon the federal government for special favors or support, and so that man's religious conscience should be free) were cardinal points of the new national policy they fostered. "The Government of the United States," George Washington had written to the Jewish congregation of Newport during his first term as president, "gives to bigotry no sanction, to persecution no assistance."

Political differences with ancestral England had just been written in blood; but there is no reason to suppose that these men looked upon their fledgling country as an impartial melting pot for the merging of the various cultures of Europe, or as a new "nation of nations," or as anything but a society in which, with important political modifications, Anglo-Saxon speech and institutional forms would be standard. Indeed, their newly won victory for democracy and republicanism made them especially anxious that these still precarious fruits of revolution should not be threatened by a large influx of European peoples whose life experiences had accustomed them to the bonds of despotic monarchy. Thus, although they explicitly conceived of the new United States of America as a haven for those unfortunates of Europe who were persecuted and oppressed, they had characteristic reservations about the effects of too free a policy. "My opinion, with respect to immigration," Washington wrote to John Adams in 1794, "is that except of useful mechanics and some particular descriptions of men or professions, there is no need of encouragement, while the policy or advantage of its taking place in a body (I mean the settling of them in a body) may be much questioned; for, by so doing, they retain the language, habits and principles (good or bad) which they bring with them."<sup>4</sup> Thomas Jefferson, whose views on race and attitudes towards slavery were notably

liberal and advanced for his time, had similar doubts concerning the effects of mass immigration on American institutions, while conceding that immigrants, "if they come of themselves . . . are entitled to all the rights of citizenship."<sup>5</sup>

The attitudes of Americans toward foreign immigration in the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century may correctly be described as ambiguous. On the one hand, immigrants were much desired, so as to swell the population and importance of states and territories, to man the farms of expanding prairie settlement, to work the mines, build the railroads and canals, and take their place in expanding industry. This was a period in which no federal legislation of any consequence prevented the entry of aliens, and such state legislation as existed attempted to bar on an individual basis only those who were likely to become a burden on the community, such as convicts and paupers. On the other hand, the arrival in an overwhelmingly Protestant society of large numbers of poverty-stricken Irish Catholics, who settled in groups in the slums of Eastern cities, roused dormant fears of "Popery" and Rome. Another source of anxiety was the substantial influx of Germans, who made their way to the cities and farms of the mid-West and whose different language, separate communal life, and freer ideas on temperance and sabbath observance brought them into conflict with the Anglo-Saxon bearers of the Puritan and Evangelical traditions. Fear of foreign "radicals" and suspicion of the economic demands of the occasionally aroused workingmen added fuel to the nativist fires. In their extreme form these fears resulted in the Native-American movement of the 1830's and 1840's and the "American" or "Know-Nothing" party of the 1850's, with their anti-Catholic campaigns and their demands for restrictive laws on naturalization procedures and for keeping the foreign-born out of political office. While these movements scored local political successes and their turbulences so rent the national social fabric that the patches are not yet entirely invisible, they failed to influence national legislative policy on immigration and immigrants; and their fulminations inevitably provoked the expected reactions from thoughtful observers.

The flood of newcomers to the westward expanding nation grew larger, reaching over one and two-thirds million between 1841 and 1850 and over two and one-half million in the decade before the Civil War. Throughout the entire period, quite apart from the excesses of the Know-Nothings, the predominant (though not exclusive) conception of what the ideal immigrant adjustment should be was probably summed up in a letter written in 1818 by John Quincy

Adams, then Secretary of State, in answer to the inquiries of the Baron von Fürstenwaerther. If not the earliest, it is certainly the most elegant version of the sentiment, "If they don't like it here, they can go back where they came from." Adams declared:<sup>6</sup>

They [immigrants to America] come to a life of independence, but to a life of labor—and, if they cannot accommodate themselves to the character, moral, political and physical, of this country with all its compensating balances of good and evil, the Atlantic is always open to them to return to the land of their nativity and their fathers. To one thing they must make up their minds, or they will be disappointed in every expectation of happiness as Americans. They must cast off the European skin, never to resume it. They must look forward to their posterity rather than backward to their ancestors; they must be sure that whatever their own feelings may be, those of their children will cling to the prejudices of this country.

The events that followed the Civil War created their own ambiguities in attitude toward the immigrant. A nation undergoing wholesale industrial expansion and not yet finished with the march of westward settlement could make good use of the never faltering waves of newcomers. But sporadic bursts of labor unrest, attributed to foreign radicals, the growth of Catholic institutions and the rise of Catholics to municipal political power, and the continuing association of immigrant settlement with urban slums revived familiar fears. The first federal selective law restricting immigration was passed in 1882, and Chinese immigration was cut off in the same year. The most significant development of all, barely recognized at first, was the change in the source of European migrants. Beginning in the 1880's, the countries of southern and eastern Europe began to be represented in substantial numbers for the first time, and in the next decade immigrants from these sources became numerically dominant. Now the notes of a new, or at least hitherto unemphasized, chord from the nativist lyre began to sound—the ugly chord, or discord, of racism. Previously vague and romantic notions of Anglo-Saxon peoplehood, combined with general ethnocentrism, rudimentary wisps of genetics, selected tidbits of evolutionary theory, and naive assumptions from an early and crude imported anthropology produced the doctrine that the English, Germans, and others of the "old immigration" constituted a superior race of tall, blonde, blue-eyed "Nordics" or "Aryans," whereas the peoples of eastern and southern Europe made up the darker Alpines or Mediterraneans—both "inferior" breeds whose presence in America threatened, either by intermixture or supplementation, the traditional American stock and culture. The obvious corollary to this doctrine was to exclude the

allegedly inferior breeds; but if the new type of immigrant could not be excluded, then everything must be done to instill Anglo-Saxon virtues in these benighted creatures. Thus, one educator writing in 1909 could state:<sup>7</sup>

These southern and eastern Europeans are of a very different type from the north Europeans who preceded them. Illiterate, docile, lacking in self-reliance and initiative, and not possessing the Anglo-Teutonic conceptions of law, order, and government, their coming has served to dilute tremendously our national stock, and to corrupt our civic life . . . . Everywhere these people tend to settle in groups or settlements, and to set up here their national manners, customs, and observances. Our task is to break up these groups or settlements, to assimilate and amalgamate these people as a part of our American race, and to implant in their children, so far as can be done, the Anglo-Saxon conception of righteousness, law and order, and popular government, and to awaken in them a reverence for our democratic institutions and for those things in our national life which we as a people hold to be of abiding worth.

Anglo-conformity received its fullest expression in the so-called Americanization movement which gripped the nation during World War I. While "Americanization" in its various stages had more than one emphasis, it was essentially a consciously articulated movement to strip the immigrant of his native culture and attachments and make him over into an American along Anglo-Saxon lines—all this to be accomplished with great rapidity. To use an image of a later day, it was an attempt at "pressure-cooking assimilation." It had prewar antecedents, but it was during the height of the world conflict that federal agencies, state governments, municipalities, and a host of private organizations joined in the effort to persuade the immigrant to learn English, take out naturalization papers, buy war bonds, forget his former origins and culture, and give himself over to patriotic hysteria.

After the war and the "Red scare" which followed, the excesses of the Americanization movement subsided. In its place, however, came the restriction of immigration through federal law. Foiled at first by presidential vetoes, and later by the failure of the 1917 literacy test to halt the immigrant tide, the proponents of restriction finally put through in the early 1920's a series of acts culminating in the well-known national-origins formula for immigrant quotas which went into effect in 1929. Whatever the merits of a quantitative limit on the number of immigrants to be admitted to the United States, the provisions of the formula, which discriminated sharply against the countries of southern and eastern Europe, in effect institutionalized the assumptions of the rightful dominance of Anglo-Saxon pat-

terns in the land. Reaffirmed with only slight modifications in the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, these laws, then, stand as a legal monument to the creed of Anglo-conformity and a telling reminder that this ideological system still has numerous and powerful adherents on the American scene.

### *The Melting Pot*

While Anglo-conformity in various guises has probably been the most prevalent ideology of assimilation in the American historical experience, a competing viewpoint with more generous and idealistic overtones has had its adherents and exponents from the eighteenth century onward. Conditions in the virgin continent, it was clear, were modifying the institutions which the English colonists brought with them from the mother country. Arrivals from non-English homelands such as Germany, Sweden, and France were similarly exposed to this fresh environment. Was it not possible, then, to think of the evolving American society not as a slightly modified England but rather as a totally new blend, culturally and biologically, in which the stocks and folkways of Europe, figuratively speaking, were indiscriminately mixed in the political pot of the emerging nation and fused by the fires of American influence and interaction into a distinctly new type?

Such, at any rate, was the conception of the new society which motivated that eighteenth-century French-born writer and agriculturalist, J. Hector St. John Crèvecoeur, who, after many years of American residence, published his reflections and observations in *Letters from an American Farmer*.<sup>8</sup> Who, he asks, is the American?

He is either an European, or the descendant of an European, hence that strange mixture of blood, which you will find in no other country. I could point out to you a family whose grandfather was an Englishman, whose wife was Dutch, whose son married a French woman, and whose present four sons have now four wives of different nations. *He* is an American, who leaving behind him all his ancient prejudices and manners, receives new ones from the new mode of life he has embraced, the new government he obeys, and the new rank he holds. He becomes an American by being received in the broad lap of our great *Alma Mater*. Here individuals of all nations are melted into a new race of men, whose labours and posterity will one day cause great changes in the world.

Some observers have interpreted the open-door policy on immigration of the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century as reflecting an underlying faith in the effectiveness of the American

melting pot, in the belief "that all could be absorbed and that all could contribute to an emerging national character."<sup>9</sup> No doubt many who observed with dismay the nativist agitation of the times felt as did Ralph Waldo Emerson that such conformity-demanding and immigrant-hating forces represented a perversion of the best American ideals. In 1845, Emerson wrote in his Journal:<sup>10</sup>

I hate the narrowness of the Native American Party. It is the dog in the manger. It is precisely opposite to all the dictates of love and magnanimity; and therefore, of course, opposite to true wisdom . . . . Man is the most composite of all creatures . . . . Well, as in the old burning of the Temple at Corinth, by the melting and intermixture of silver and gold and other metals a new compound more precious than any, called Corinthian brass, was formed; so in this continent,—asylum of all nations,—the energy of Irish, Germans, Swedes, Poles, and Cossacks, and all the European tribes,—of the Africans, and of the Polynesians,—will construct a new race, a new religion, a new state, a new literature, which will be as vigorous as the new Europe which came out of the smelting-pot of the Dark Ages, or that which earlier emerged from the Pelasgic and Etruscan barbarism. *La Nature aime les croisements.*

Eventually, the melting-pot hypothesis found its way into historical scholarship and interpretation. While many American historians of the late nineteenth century, some fresh from graduate study at German universities, tended to adopt the view that American institutions derived in essence from Anglo-Saxon (and ultimately Teutonic) sources, others were not so sure.<sup>11</sup> One of these was Frederick Jackson Turner, a young historian from Wisconsin, not long emerged from his graduate training at Johns Hopkins. Turner presented a paper to the American Historical Association, meeting in Chicago in 1893. Called "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," this paper proved to be one of the most influential essays in the history of American scholarship, and its point of view, supported by Turner's subsequent writings and his teaching, pervaded the field of American historical interpretation for at least a generation. Turner's thesis was that the dominant influence in the shaping of American institutions and American democracy was not this nation's European heritage in any of its forms, nor the forces emanating from the eastern seaboard cities, but rather the experiences created by a moving and variegated western frontier. Among the many effects attributed to the frontier environment and the challenges it presented was that it acted as a solvent for the national heritages and the separatist tendencies of the many nationality groups which had joined the trek westward, including the Germans and Scotch-Irish of the eighteenth century and the Scandinavians and Germans of the nine-



teenth. "The frontier," asserted Turner, "promoted the formation of a composite nationality for the American people . . . . In the crucible of the frontier the immigrants were Americanized, liberated, and fused into a mixed race, English in neither nationality nor characteristics. The process has gone on from the early days to our own." And later, in an essay on the role of the Mississippi Valley, he refers to "the tide of foreign immigration which has risen so steadily that it has made a composite American people whose amalgamation is destined to produce a new national stock."<sup>12</sup>

Thus far, the proponents of the melting pot idea had dealt largely with the diversity produced by the sizeable immigration from the countries of northern and western Europe alone—the "old immigration," consisting of peoples with cultures and physical appearance not greatly different from those of the Anglo-Saxon stock. Emerson, it is true, had impartially included Africans, Polynesians, and Cossacks in his conception of the mixture; but it was only in the last two decades of the nineteenth century that a large-scale influx of peoples from the countries of southern and eastern Europe imperatively posed the question of whether these uprooted newcomers who were crowding into the large cities of the nation and the industrial sector of the economy could also be successfully "melted." Would the "urban melting pot" work as well as the "frontier melting pot" of an essentially rural society was alleged to have done?

It remained for an English-Jewish writer with strong social convictions, moved by his observation of the role of the United States as a haven for the poor and oppressed of Europe, to give utterance to the broader view of the American melting pot in a way which attracted public attention. In 1908, Israel Zangwill's drama, *The Melting Pot*, was produced in this country and became a popular success. It is a play dominated by the dream of its protagonist, a young Russian-Jewish immigrant to America, a composer, whose goal is the completion of a vast "American" symphony which will express his deeply felt conception of his adopted country as a divinely appointed crucible in which all the ethnic divisions of mankind will divest themselves of their ancient animosities and differences and become fused into one group, signifying the brotherhood of man. In the process he falls in love with a beautiful and cultured Gentile girl. The play ends with the performance of the symphony and, after numerous vicissitudes and traditional family opposition from both sides, with the approaching marriage of David Quixano and his beloved. During the course of these developments, David, in the rhetoric of the time, delivers himself of such sentiments as these:<sup>13</sup>

America is God's crucible, the great Melting Pot where all the races of Europe are melting and re-forming! Here you stand, good folk, think I, when I see them at Ellis Island, here you stand in your fifty groups, with your fifty languages and histories, and your fifty blood hatreds and rivalries. But you won't be long like that, brothers, for these are the fires of God you've come to—these are the fires of God. A fig for your feuds and vendettas! Germans and Frenchmen, Irishmen and Englishmen, Jews and Russians—into the Crucible with you all! God is making the American.

Here we have a conception of a melting pot which admits of no exceptions or qualifications with regard to the ethnic stocks which will fuse in the great crucible. Englishmen, Germans, Frenchmen, Slavs, Greeks, Syrians, Jews, Gentiles, even the black and yellow races, were specifically mentioned in Zangwill's rhapsodic enumeration. And this pot patently was to boil in the great cities of America.

Thus around the turn of the century the melting-pot idea became embedded in the ideals of the age as one response to the immigrant receiving experience of the nation. Soon to be challenged by a new philosophy of group adjustment (to be discussed below) and always competing with the more pervasive adherence to Anglo-conformity, the melting-pot image, however, continued to draw a portion of the attention consciously directed toward this aspect of the American scene in the first half of the twentieth century. In the mid-1940's a sociologist who had carried out an investigation of intermarriage trends in New Haven, Connecticut, described a revised conception of the melting process in that city and suggested a basic modification of the theory of that process. In New Haven, Ruby Jo Reeves Kennedy<sup>14</sup> reported from a study of intermarriages from 1870 to 1940 that there was a distinct tendency for the British-Americans, Germans, and Scandinavians to marry among themselves—that is, within a Protestant "pool"; for the Irish, Italians, and Poles to marry among themselves—a Catholic "pool"; and for the Jews to marry other Jews. In other words, intermarriage was taking place across lines of nationality background, but there was a strong tendency for it to stay confined within one or the other of the three major religious groups, Protestants, Catholics, and Jews. Thus, declared Mrs. Kennedy, the picture in New Haven resembled a "triple melting pot" based on religious divisions, rather than a "single melting pot." Her study indicated, she stated, that "while strict endogamy is loosening, religious endogamy is persisting and the future cleavages will be along religious lines rather than along nationality lines as in the past. If this is the case, then the traditional 'single-melting-pot' idea must be abandoned, and a new conception, which we term the 'triple-

melting-pot' theory of American assimilation, will take its place as the true expression of what is happening to the various nationality groups in the United States."<sup>15</sup> The triple melting-pot thesis was later taken up by the theologian, Will Herberg, and formed an important sociological frame of reference for his analysis of religious trends in American society, *Protestant-Catholic-Jew*.<sup>16</sup> But the triple melting-pot hypothesis patently takes us into the realm of a society pluralistically conceived. We turn now to the rise of an ideology which attempts to justify such a conception.

### *Cultural Pluralism*

Probably all the non-English immigrants who came to American shores in any significant numbers from colonial times onward—settling either in the forbidding wilderness, the lonely prairie, or in some accessible urban slum—created ethnic enclaves and looked forward to the preservation of at least some of their native cultural patterns. Such a development, natural as breathing, was supported by the later accretion of friends, relatives, and countrymen seeking out oases of familiarity in a strange land, by the desire of the settlers to rebuild (necessarily in miniature) a society in which they could communicate in the familiar tongue and maintain familiar institutions, and, finally, by the necessity to band together for mutual aid and mutual protection against the uncertainties of a strange and frequently hostile environment. This was as true of the "old" immigrants as of the "new." In fact, some of the liberal intellectuals who fled to America from an inhospitable political climate in Germany in the 1830's, 1840's, and 1850's looked forward to the creation of an all-German state within the union, or, even more hopefully, to the eventual formation of a separate German nation, as soon as the expected dissolution of the union under the impact of the slavery controversy should have taken place.<sup>17</sup> Oscar Handlin, writing of the sons of Erin in mid-nineteenth-century Boston, recent refugees from famine and economic degradation in their homeland, points out: "Unable to participate in the normal associational affairs of the community, the Irish felt obliged to erect a society within a society, to act together in their own way. In every contact therefore the group, acting apart from other sections of the community, became intensely aware of its peculiar and exclusive identity."<sup>18</sup> Thus cultural pluralism was a fact in American society before it became a theory—a theory with explicit relevance for the nation as a whole, and articu-

lated and discussed in the English-speaking circles of American intellectual life.

Eventually, the cultural enclaves of the Germans (and the later arriving Scandinavians) were to decline in scope and significance as succeeding generations of their native-born attended public schools, left the farms and villages to strike out as individuals for the Americanizing city, and generally became subject to the influences of a standardizing industrial civilization. The German-American community, too, was struck a powerful blow by the accumulated passions generated by World War I—a blow from which it never fully recovered. The Irish were to be the dominant and pervasive element in the gradual emergence of a pan-Catholic group in America, but these developments would reveal themselves only in the twentieth century. In the meantime, in the last two decades of the nineteenth, the influx of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe had begun. These groups were all the more sociologically visible because the closing of the frontier, the occupational demands of an expanding industrial economy, and their own poverty made it inevitable that they would remain in the urban areas of the nation. In the swirling fires of controversy and the steadier flame of experience created by these new events, the ideology of cultural pluralism as a philosophy for the nation was forged.

The first manifestations of an ideological counterattack against draconic Americanization came not from the beleaguered newcomers (who were, after all, more concerned with survival than with theories of adjustment), but from those idealistic members of the middle class who, in the decade or so before the turn of the century, had followed the example of their English predecessors and "settled" in the slums to "learn to sup sorrow with the poor."<sup>19</sup> Immediately, these workers in the "settlement houses" were forced to come to grips with the realities of immigrant life and adjustment. Not all reacted in the same way, but on the whole the settlements developed an approach to the immigrant which was sympathetic to his native cultural heritage and to his newly created ethnic institutions.<sup>20</sup> For one thing, their workers, necessarily in intimate contact with the lives of these often pathetic and bewildered newcomers and their daily problems, could see how unfortunate were the effects of those forces which impelled rapid Americanization in their impact on the immigrants' children, who not infrequently became alienated from their parents and the restraining influence of family authority. Were not their parents ignorant and uneducated "Hunkies," "Sheenies," or "Dagoes," as that limited portion of the American environment in which they

moved defined the matter? Ethnic "self-hatred" with its debilitating psychological consequences, family disorganization, and juvenile delinquency, were not unusual results of this state of affairs. Furthermore, the immigrants themselves were adversely affected by the incessant attacks on their culture, their language, their institutions, their very conception of themselves. How were they to maintain their self-respect when all that they knew, felt, and dreamed, beyond their sheer capacity for manual labor—in other words, all that they *were*—was despised or scoffed at in America? And—unkindest cut of all—their own children had begun to adopt the contemptuous attitude of the "Americans." Jane Addams relates in a moving chapter of her *Twenty Years at Hull House* how, after coming to have some conception of the extent and depth of these problems, she created at the settlement a "Labor Museum," in which the immigrant women of the various nationalities crowded together in the slums of Chicago could illustrate their native methods of spinning and weaving, and in which the relation of these earlier techniques to contemporary factory methods could be graphically shown. For the first time these peasant women were made to feel by some part of their American environment that they possessed valuable and interesting skills—that they too had something to offer—and for the first time, the daughters of these women who, after a long day's work at their dank "needletrade" sweatshops, came to Hull House to observe, began to appreciate the fact that their mothers, too, had a "culture," that this culture possessed its own merit, and that it was related to their own contemporary lives. How aptly Jane Addams concludes her chapter with the hope that "our American citizenship might be built without disturbing these foundations which were laid of old time."<sup>21</sup>

This appreciative view of the immigrant's cultural heritage and of its distinctive usefulness both to himself and his adopted country received additional sustenance from another source: those intellectual currents of the day which, however overborne by their currently more powerful opposites, emphasized liberalism, internationalism, and tolerance. From time to time, an occasional educator or publicist protested the demands of the "Americanizers," arguing that the immigrant, too, had an ancient and honorable culture, and that this culture had much to offer an America whose character and destiny were still in the process of formation, an America which must serve as an example of the harmonious cooperation of various heritages to a world inflamed by nationalism and war. In 1916 John Dewey, Norman Hapgood, and the young literary critic, Randolph

Bourne, published articles or addresses elaborating various aspects of this theme.

The classic statement of the cultural pluralist position, however, had been made over a year before. Early in 1915 there appeared in the pages of *The Nation* two articles under the title "Democracy versus the Melting-Pot." Their author was Horace Kallen, a Harvard-educated philosopher with a concern for the application of philosophy to societal affairs, and, as an American Jew, himself derivative of an ethnic background which was subject to the contemporary pressures for dissolution implicit in the "Americanization," or Anglo-conformity, and the melting-pot theories. In these articles Kallen vigorously rejected the usefulness of these theories as models of what was actually transpiring in American life or as ideals for the future. Rather he was impressed by the way in which the various ethnic groups in America were coincident with particular areas and regions, and with the tendency for each group to preserve its own language, religion, communal institutions, and ancestral culture. All the while, he pointed out, the immigrant has been learning to speak English as the language of general communication, and has participated in the over-all economic and political life of the nation. These developments in which "the United States are in the process of becoming a federal state not merely as a union of geographical and administrative unities, but also as a cooperation of cultural diversities, as a federation or commonwealth of national cultures,"<sup>22</sup> the author argued, far from constituting a violation of historic American political principles, as the "Americanizers" claimed, actually represented the inevitable consequences of democratic ideals, since individuals are implicated in groups, and since democracy for the individual must by extension also mean democracy for his group.

The processes just described, however, as Kallen develops his argument, are far from having been thoroughly realized. They are menaced by "Americanization" programs, assumptions of Anglo-Saxon superiority, and misguided attempts to promote "racial" amalgamation. Thus America stands at a kind of cultural crossroads. It can attempt to impose by force an artificial, Anglo-Saxon oriented uniformity on its peoples, or it can consciously allow and encourage its ethnic groups to develop democratically, each emphasizing its particular cultural heritage. If the latter course is followed, as Kallen puts it at the close of his essay, then,<sup>23</sup>

The outlines of a possible great and truly democratic commonwealth become discernible. Its form would be that of the federal republic; its substance a democracy of nationalities, cooperating voluntarily and

autonomously through common institutions in the enterprise of realization through the perfection of men according to their kind. The common language of the commonwealth, the language of its great tradition, would be English, but each nationality would have for its emotional and involuntary life its own peculiar dialect or speech, its own individual and inevitable esthetic and intellectual forms. The political and economic life of the commonwealth is a single unit and serves as the foundation and background for the realization of the distinctive individuality of each *natio* that composes it and of the pooling of these in a harmony above them all. Thus "American civilization" may come to mean the perfection of the cooperative harmonies of "European civilization"—the waste, the squalor and the distress of Europe being eliminated—a multiplicity in a unity, an orchestration of mankind.

Within the next decade Kallen published more essays dealing with the theme of American multiple-group life, later collected in a volume.<sup>24</sup> In the introductory note to this book he used for the first time the term "cultural pluralism" to refer to his position. These essays reflect both his increasingly sharp rejection of the onslaughts on the immigrant and his culture which the coming of World War I and its attendant fears, the "Red scare," the projection of themes of racial superiority, the continued exploitation of the newcomers, and the rise of the Ku Klux Klan all served to increase in intensity, and also his emphasis on cultural pluralism as the democratic antidote to these ills. He has since published other essays elaborating or annotating the theme of cultural pluralism. Thus, for at least forty-five years, most of them spent teaching at the New School for Social Research, Kallen has been acknowledged as the originator and leading philosophical exponent of the idea of cultural pluralism.

In the late 1930's and early 1940's the late Louis Adamic, the Yugoslav immigrant who had become an American writer, took up the theme of America's multicultural heritage and the role of these groups in forging the country's national character. Borrowing Walt Whitman's phrase, he described America as "a nation of nations," and while his ultimate goal was closer to the melting-pot idea than to cultural pluralism, he saw the immediate task as that of making America conscious of what it owed to all its ethnic groups, not just to the Anglo-Saxons. The children and grandchildren of immigrants of non-English origins, he was convinced, must be taught to be proud of the cultural heritage of their ancestral ethnic group and of its role in building the American nation; otherwise, they would not lose their sense of ethnic inferiority and the feeling of rootlessness he claimed to find in them.

Thus in the twentieth century, particularly since World War II,



"cultural pluralism" has become a concept which has worked its way into the vocabulary and imagery of specialists in intergroup relations and leaders of ethnic communal groups. In view of this new pluralistic emphasis, some writers now prefer to speak of the "integration" of immigrants rather than of their "assimilation."<sup>25</sup> However, with a few exceptions,<sup>26</sup> no close analytical attention has been given either by social scientists or practitioners of intergroup relations to the meaning of cultural pluralism, its nature and relevance for a modern industrialized society, and its implications for problems of prejudice and discrimination—a point to which we referred at the outset of this discussion.

### *Conclusions*

In the remaining pages I can make only a few analytical comments which I shall apply in context to the American scene, historical and current. My view of the American situation will not be documented here, but may be considered as a series of hypotheses in which I shall attempt to outline the American assimilation process.

First of all, it must be realized that "assimilation" is a blanket term which in reality covers a multitude of subprocesses. The most crucial distinction is one often ignored—the distinction between what I have elsewhere called "behavioral assimilation" and "structural assimilation."<sup>27</sup> The first refers to the absorption of the cultural behavior patterns of the "host" society. (At the same time, there is frequently some modification of the cultural patterns of the immigrant-receiving country, as well.) There is a special term for this process of cultural modification or "behavioral assimilation"—namely, "acculturation." "Structural assimilation," on the other hand, refers to the entrance of the immigrants and their descendants into the social cliques, organizations, institutional activities, and general civic life of the receiving society. If this process takes place on a large enough scale, then a high frequency of intermarriage must result. A further distinction must be made between, on the one hand, those activities of the general civic life which involve earning a living, carrying out political responsibilities, and engaging in the instrumental affairs of the larger community, and, on the other hand, activities which create personal friendship patterns, frequent home intervisiting, communal worship, and communal recreation. The first type usually develops so-called "secondary relationships," which tend to be relatively impersonal and segmental; the latter type leads to "primary relationships," which are warm, intimate, and personal.

With these various distinctions in mind, we may then proceed.

Built on the base of the original immigrant "colony" but frequently extending into the life of successive generations, the characteristic ethnic group experience is this: within the ethnic group there develops a network of organizations and informal social relationships which permits and encourages the members of the ethnic group to remain within the confines of the group for all of their primary relationships and some of their secondary relationships throughout all the stages of the life cycle. From the cradle in the sectarian hospital to the child's play group, the social clique in high school, the fraternity and religious center in college, the dating group within which he searches for a spouse, the marriage partner, the neighborhood of his residence, the church affiliation and the church clubs, the men's and the women's social and service organizations, the adult clique of "marrieds," the vacation resort, and then, as the age cycle nears completion, the rest home for the elderly and, finally, the sectarian cemetery—in all these activities and relationships which are close to the core of personality and selfhood—the member of the ethnic group may if he wishes follow a path which never takes him across the boundaries of his ethnic structural network.

The picture is made more complex by the existence of social class divisions which cut across ethnic group lines just as they do those of the white Protestant population in America. As each ethnic group which has been here for the requisite time has developed second, third, or in some cases, succeeding generations, it has produced a college-educated group which composes an upper middle class (and sometimes upper class, as well) segment of the larger groups. Such class divisions tend to restrict primary group relations even further, for although the ethnic-group member feels a general sense of identification with all the bearers of his ethnic heritage, he feels comfortable in intimate social relations only with those who also share his own class background or attainment.

In short, my point is that, while *behavioral assimilation* or acculturation has taken place in America to a considerable degree, *structural assimilation*, with some important exceptions has not been extensive.<sup>28</sup> The exceptions are of two types. The first brings us back to the "triple melting pot" thesis of Ruby Jo Reeves Kennedy and Will Herberg. The "nationality" ethnic groups have tended to merge within each of the three major religious groups. This has been particularly true of the Protestant and Jewish communities. Those descendants of the "old" immigration of the nineteenth century, who were Protestant (many of the Germans and all the Scandi-

navians), have in considerable part gradually merged into the white Protestant "subociety." Jews of Sephardic, German, and Eastern-European origins have similarly tended to come together in their communal life. The process of absorbing the various Catholic nationalities, such as the Italians, Poles, and French Canadians, into an American Catholic community hitherto dominated by the Irish has begun, although I do not believe that it is by any means close to completion. Racial and quasi-racial groups such as the Negroes, Indians, Mexican-Americans, and Puerto Ricans still retain their separate sociological structures. The outcome of all this in contemporary American life is thus pluralism—but it is more than "triple" and it is more accurately described as *structural pluralism* than as cultural pluralism, although some of the latter also remains.

My second exception refers to the social structures which implicate intellectuals. There is no space to develop the issue here, but I would argue that there is a social world or subsociety of the intellectuals in America in which true structural intermixture among persons of various ethnic backgrounds, including the religious, has markedly taken place.

My final point deals with the reasons for these developments. If structural assimilation has been retarded in America by religious and racial lines, we must ask why. The answer lies in the attitudes of both the majority and the minority groups and in the way these attitudes have interacted. A saying of the current day is, "It takes two to tango." To apply the analogy, there is no good reason to believe that white Protestant America has ever extended a firm and cordial invitation to its minorities to dance. Furthermore, the attitudes of the minority-group members themselves on the matter have been divided and ambiguous. Particularly for the minority religious groups, there is a certain logic in ethnic communality, since there is a commitment to the perpetuation of the religious ideology and since structural intermixture leads to intermarriage and the possible loss to the group of the intermarried family. Let us, then, examine the situation serially for various types of minorities.

With regard to the immigrant, in his characteristic numbers and socioeconomic background, structural assimilation was out of the question. He did not want it, and he had a positive need for the comfort of his own communal institutions. The native American, moreover, whatever the implications of his public pronouncements, had no intention of opening up his primary group life to entrance by these hordes of alien newcomers. The situation was a functionally complementary standoff.

The second generation found a much more complex situation. Many believed they heard the siren call of welcome to the social cliques, clubs, and institutions of white Protestant America. After all, it was simply a matter of learning American ways, was it not? Had they not grown up as Americans, and were they not culturally different from their parents, the "greenhorns?" Or perhaps an especially eager one reasoned (like the Jewish protagonist of Myron Kaufmann's novel, *Remember Me To God*, aspiring to membership in the prestigious club system of Harvard undergraduate social life) "If only I can go the last few steps in Ivy League manners and behavior, they will surely recognize that I am one of them and take me in." But, alas, Brooks Brothers suit notwithstanding, the doors of the fraternity house, the city men's club, and the country club were slammed in the face of the immigrant's offspring. That invitation was not really there in the first place; or, to the extent it was, in Joshua Fishman's phrase, it was a "look me over but don't touch me" invitation to the American minority group child.<sup>29</sup> And so the rebuffed one returned to the homelier but dependable comfort of the communal institutions of his ancestral group. There he found his fellows of the same generation who had never stirred from the home fires. Some of these had been too timid to stray; others were ethnic ideologists committed to the group's survival; still others had never really believed in the authenticity of the siren call or were simply too passive to do more than go along the familiar way. All could now join in the task that was well within the realm of the sociologically possible—the build-up of social institutions and organizations within the ethnic enclave, manned increasingly by members of the second generation and suitably separated by social class.

Those who had for a time ventured out gingerly or confidently, as the case might be, had been lured by the vision of an "American" social structure that was somehow larger than all subgroups and was ethnically neutral. Were they, too, not Americans? But they found to their dismay that at the primary group level a neutral American social structure was a mirage. What at a distance seemed to be a quasi-public edifice flying only the all-inclusive flag of American nationality turned out on closer inspection to be the clubhouse of a particular ethnic group—the white Anglo-Saxon Protestants, its operation shot through with the premises and expectations of its parental ethnicity. In these terms, the desirability of whatever invitation was grudgingly extended to those of other ethnic backgrounds could only become a considerably attenuated one.

With the racial minorities, there was not even the pretense of an

invitation. Negroes, to take the most salient example, have for the most part been determinedly barred from the cliques, social clubs, and churches of white America. Consequently, with due allowance for internal class differences, they have constructed their own network of organizations and institutions, their own "social world." There are now many vested interests served by the preservation of this separate communal life, and doubtless many Negroes are psychologically comfortable in it, even though at the same time they keenly desire that discrimination in such areas as employment, education, housing, and public accommodations be eliminated. However, the ideological attachment of Negroes to their communal separation is not conspicuous. Their sense of identification with ancestral African national cultures is virtually nonexistent, although Pan-Africanism engages the interest of some intellectuals and although "black nationalist" and "black racist" fringe groups have recently made an appearance at the other end of the communal spectrum. As for their religion, they are either Protestant or Catholic (overwhelmingly the former). Thus, there are no "logical" ideological reasons for their separate communality; dual social structures are created solely by the dynamics of prejudice and discrimination, rather than being reinforced by the ideological commitments of the minority itself.

Structural assimilation, then, has turned out to be the rock on which the ships of Anglo-conformity and the melting pot have foundered. To understand that behavioral assimilation (or acculturation) without massive structural intermingling in primary relationships has been the dominant motif in the American experience of creating and developing a nation out of diverse peoples is to comprehend the most essential sociological fact of that experience. It is against the background of "structural pluralism" that strategies of strengthening intergroup harmony, reducing ethnic discrimination and prejudice, and maintaining the rights of both those who stay within and those who venture beyond their ethnic boundaries must be thoughtfully devised.

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OZZIE G. SIMMONS

## The Mutual Images and Expectations of Anglo-Americans and Mexican-Americans

A NUMBER of psychological and sociological studies have treated ethnic and racial stereotypes as they appear publicly in the mass media and also as held privately by individuals.<sup>1</sup> The present paper is based on data collected for a study of a number of aspects of the relations between Anglo-Americans and Mexican-Americans in a South Texas community, and is concerned with the principal assumptions and expectations that Anglo- and Mexican-Americans hold of one another; how they see each other; the extent to which these pictures are realistic; and the implications of their intergroup relations and cultural differences for the fulfillment of their mutual expectations.<sup>2</sup>

### *The Community*

The community studied (here called "Border City") is in South Texas, about 250 miles south of San Antonio. Driving south from San Antonio, one passes over vast expanses of brushland and grazing country, then suddenly comes upon acres of citrus groves, farmlands rich with vegetables and cotton, and long rows of palm trees. This is the "Magic Valley," an oasis in the semidesert region of South Texas. The Missouri Pacific Railroad (paralleled by Highway 83, locally called "The longest street in the world") bisects twelve major towns and cities of the Lower Rio Grande Valley between Brownsville, near the Gulf of Mexico, and Rio Grande City, 103 miles to the west.

Based on an address at the annual meeting of the Mexican Christian Institute at San Antonio in 1958.

## Anglo-Americans and Mexican-Americans

Border City is neither the largest nor the smallest of these cities, and is physically and culturally much like the rest. Its first building was constructed in 1905. By 1920 it had 5,331 inhabitants, and at the time of our study these had increased to an estimated 17,500. The completion of the St. Louis, Brownsville, and Mexico Railroad in 1904 considerably facilitated Anglo-American immigration to the Valley. Before this the Valley had been inhabited largely by Mexican ranchers, who maintained large haciendas in the traditional Mexican style based on peonage. Most of these haciendas are now divided into large or small tracts that are owned by Anglo-Americans, who obtained them through purchase or less legitimate means. The position of the old Mexican-American landowning families has steadily deteriorated, and today these families, with a few exceptions, are completely overshadowed by the Anglo-Americans, who have taken over their social and economic position in the community.

The Anglo-American immigration into the Valley was paralleled by that of the Mexicans from across the border, who were attracted by the seemingly greater opportunities for farm labor created by the introduction of irrigation and the subsequent agricultural expansion. Actually, there had been a small but steady flow of Mexican immigration into South Texas that long antedated the Anglo-American immigration.<sup>3</sup> At present, Mexican-Americans probably constitute about two-fifths of the total population of the Valley.

In Border City, Mexican-Americans comprise about 56 percent of the population. The southwestern part of the city, adjoining and sometimes infiltrating the business and industrial areas, is variously referred to as "Mexiquita," "Mexican-town," and "Little Mexico" by the city's Anglo-Americans, and as the *colonia* by the Mexican-Americans. With few exceptions, the *colonia* is inhabited only by Mexican-Americans, most of whom live in close proximity to one another in indifferently constructed houses on tiny lots. The north side of the city, which lies across the railroad tracks, is inhabited almost completely by Anglo-Americans. Its appearance is in sharp contrast to that of the *colonia* in that it is strictly residential and displays much better housing.

In the occupational hierarchy of Border City, the top level (the growers, packers, cannery workers, businessmen, and professionals) is overwhelmingly Anglo-American. In the middle group (the white-collar occupations) Mexicans are prominent only where their bilingualism makes them useful, for example, as clerks and salesmen. The bottom level (farm laborers, shed and cannery workers, and domestic servants) is overwhelmingly Mexican-American.

These conditions result from a number of factors, some quite distinct from the reception accorded Mexican-Americans by Anglo-Americans. Many Mexican-Americans are still recent immigrants and are thus relatively unfamiliar with Anglo-American culture and urban living, or else persist in their tendency to live apart and maintain their own institutions whenever possible. Among their disadvantages, however, the negative attitudes and discriminatory practices of the Anglo-American group must be counted. It is only fair to say, with the late Ruth Tuck, that much of what Mexican-Americans have suffered at Anglo-American hands has not been perpetrated deliberately but through indifference, that it has been done not with the fist but with the elbow.<sup>4</sup> The average social and economic status of the Mexican-American group has been improving, and many are moving upward. This is partly owing to increasing acceptance by the Anglo-American group, but chiefly to the efforts of the Mexican-Americans themselves.

### *Anglo-American Assumptions and Expectations*

Robert Lynd writes of the dualism in the principal assumptions that guide Americans in conducting their everyday life and identifies the attempt to "live by contrasting rules of the game" as a characteristic aspect of our culture.<sup>5</sup> This pattern of moral compromise, symptomatic of what is likely to be only vaguely a conscious moral conflict, is evident in Anglo-American assumptions and expectations with regard to Mexican-Americans, which appear both in the moral principles that define what intergroup relations ought to be, and in the popular notions held by Anglo-Americans as to what Mexican-Americans are "really" like. In the first case there is a response to the "American creed," which embodies ideals of the essential dignity of the individual and of certain inalienable rights to freedom, justice, and equal opportunity. Accordingly, Anglo-Americans believe that Mexican-Americans must be accorded full acceptance and equal status in the larger society. When their orientation to these ideals is uppermost, Anglo-Americans believe that the assimilation of Mexican-Americans is only a matter of time, contingent solely on the full incorporation of Anglo-American values and ways of life.

These expectations regarding the assimilation of the Mexican are most clearly expressed in the notion of the "high type" of Mexican. It is based on three criteria: occupational achievement and wealth (the Anglo-American's own principal criteria of status) and command of Anglo-American ways. Mexican-Americans who can so qualify are

## *Anglo-Americans and Mexican-Americans*

acceptable for membership in the service clubs and a few other Anglo-American organizations and for limited social intercourse. They may even intermarry without being penalized or ostracized. Both in their achievements in business and agriculture and in wealth, they compare favorably with middle-class Anglo-Americans, and they manifest a high command of the latter's ways. This view of the "high type" of Mexican reflects the Anglo-American assumption that Mexicans are assimilable; it does not necessarily insure a full acceptance of even the "high type" of Mexican or that his acceptance will be consistent.

The assumption that Mexican-Americans will be ultimately assimilated was not uniformly shared by all the Anglo-Americans who were our informants in Border City. Regardless of whether they expressed adherence to this ideal, however, most Anglo-Americans expressed the contrasting assumption that Mexican-Americans are essentially inferior. Thus the same people may hold assumptions and expectations that are contradictory, although expressed at different times and in different situations. As in the case of their adherence to the ideal of assimilability, not all Anglo-Americans hold the same assumptions and expectations with respect to the inferiority of Mexican-Americans; and even those who agree vary in the intensity of their beliefs. Some do not believe in the Mexican's inferiority at all; some are relatively moderate or sceptical, while others express extreme views with considerable emotional intensity.

Despite this variation, the Anglo-Americans' principal assumptions and expectations emphasize the Mexicans' presumed inferiority. In its most characteristic pattern, such inferiority is held to be self-evident. As one Anglo-American woman put it, "Mexicans are inferior because they are so typically and naturally Mexican." Since they are so obviously inferior, their present subordinate status is appropriate and is really their own fault. There is a ready identification between Mexicans and menial labor, buttressed by an image of the Mexican worker as improvident, undependable, irresponsible, childlike, and indolent. If Mexicans are fit for only the humblest labor, there is nothing abnormal about the fact that most Mexican workers are at the bottom of the occupational pyramid, and the fact that most Mexicans are unskilled workers is sufficient proof that they belong in that category.

Associated with the assumption of Mexican inferiority is that of the homogeneity of this group—that is, all Mexicans are alike. Anglo-Americans may classify Mexicans as being of "high type" and "low type" and at the same time maintain that "a Mexican is a Mexican."

Both notions serve a purpose, depending on the situation. The assumption that all Mexicans are alike buttresses the assumption of inferiority by making it convenient to ignore the fact of the existence of a substantial number of Mexican-Americans who represent all levels of business and professional achievement. Such people are considered exceptions to the rule.

### *Anglo-American Images of Mexican-Americans*

To employ Gordon Allport's definition, a stereotype is an exaggerated belief associated with a category, and its function is to justify conduct in relation to that category.<sup>6</sup> Some of the Anglo-American images of the Mexican have no ascertainable basis in fact, while others have at least a kernel of truth. Although some components of these images derive from behavior patterns that are characteristic of some Mexican-Americans in some situations, few if any of the popular generalizations about them are valid as stated, and none is demonstrably true of all. Some of the images of Mexican-Americans are specific to a particular area of intergroup relations, such as the image of the Mexican-American's attributes as a worker. Another is specific to politics and describes Mexicans as ready to give their votes to whoever will pay for them or provide free barbecues and beer.<sup>7</sup> Let us consider a few of the stereotypical beliefs that are widely used on general principles to justify Anglo-American practices of exclusion and subordination.

One such general belief accuses Mexican-Americans of being unclean. The examples given of this supposed characteristic most frequently refer to a lack of personal cleanliness and environmental hygiene and to a high incidence of skin ailments ascribed to a lack of hygienic practices. Indeed, there are few immigrant groups, regardless of their ethnic background, to whom this defect has not been attributed by the host society, as well as others prominent in stereotypes of the Mexican. It has often been observed that for middle-class Americans cleanliness is not simply a matter of keeping clean but is also an index to the morals and virtues of the individual. It is largely true that Mexicans tend to be much more casual in hygienic practices than Anglo-Americans. Moreover, their labor in the field, the packing sheds, and the towns is rarely clean work, and it is possible that many Anglo-Americans base their conclusions on what they observe in such situations. There is no evidence of a higher incidence of skin ailments among Mexicans than among Anglo-Americans. The belief that Mexicans are unclean is useful for ration-

## *Anglo-Americans and Mexican-Americans*

alizing the Anglo-American practice of excluding Mexicans from any situation that involves close or allegedly close contact with Anglo-Americans, as in residence, and the common use of swimming pools and other recreational facilities.

Drunkenness and criminality are a pair of traits that have appeared regularly in the stereotypes applied to immigrant groups. They have a prominent place in Anglo-American images of Mexicans. If Mexicans are inveterate drunkards and have criminal tendencies, a justification is provided for excluding them from full participation in the life of the community. It is true that drinking is a popular activity among Mexican-Americans and that total abstinence is rare, except among some Protestant Mexican-Americans. Drinking varies, however, from the occasional consumption of a bottle of beer to the heavy drinking of more potent beverages, so that the frequency of drinking and drunkenness is far from being evenly distributed among Mexican-Americans. Actually, this pattern is equally applicable to the Anglo-American group. The ample patronage of bars in the Anglo-American part of Border City, and the drinking behavior exhibited by Anglo-Americans when they cross the river to Mexico indicate that Mexicans have no monopoly on drinking or drunkenness. It is true that the number of arrests for drunkenness in Border City is greater among Mexicans, but this is probably because Mexicans are more vulnerable to arrest. The court records in Border City show little difference in the contributions made to delinquency and crime by Anglo- and Mexican-Americans.

Another cluster of images in the Anglo-American stereotype portrays Mexican-Americans as deceitful and of a "low" morality, as mysterious, unpredictable, and hostile to Anglo-Americans. It is quite possible that Mexicans resort to a number of devices in their relations with Anglo-Americans, particularly in relations with employers, to compensate for their disadvantages, which may be construed by Anglo-Americans as evidence of deceitfulness. The whole nature of the dominant-subordinate relationship does not make for frankness on the part of Mexicans or encourage them to face up directly to Anglo-Americans in most intergroup contacts. As to the charge of immorality, one need only recognize the strong sense of loyalty and obligation that Mexicans feel in their familial and interpersonal relations to know that the charge is baseless. The claim that Mexicans are mysterious and deceitful may in part reflect Anglo-American reactions to actual differences in culture and personality, but like the other beliefs considered here, is highly exaggerated. The imputation of hostility to Mexicans, which is manifested in a reluctance

to enter the *colonia*, particularly at night, may have its kernel of truth, but appears to be largely a projection of the Anglo-American's own feelings.

All three of these images can serve to justify exclusion and discrimination: if Mexicans are deceitful and immoral, they do not have to be accorded equal status and justice; if they are mysterious and unpredictable, there is no point in treating them as one would a fellow Anglo-American; and if they are hostile and dangerous, it is best that they live apart in colonies of their own.

Not all Anglo-American images of the Mexican are unfavorable. Among those usually meant to be complimentary are the beliefs that all Mexicans are musical and always ready for a fiesta, that they are very "romantic" rather than "realistic" (which may have unfavorable overtones as well), and that they love flowers and can grow them under the most adverse conditions. Although each of these beliefs may have a modicum of truth, it may be noted that they tend to reinforce Anglo-American images of Mexicans as childlike and irresponsible, and thus they support the notion that Mexicans are capable only of subordinate status.

### *Mexican-American Assumptions, Expectations, and Images*

Mexican-Americans are as likely to hold contradictory assumptions and distorted images as are Anglo-Americans. Their principal assumptions, however, must reflect those of Anglo-Americans—that is, Mexicans must take into account the Anglo-Americans' conflict as to their potential equality and present inferiority, since they are the object of such imputations. Similarly, their images of Anglo-Americans are not derived wholly independently, but to some extent must reflect their own subordinate status. Consequently, their stereotypes of Anglo-Americans are much less elaborate, in part because Mexicans feel no need of justifying the present intergroup relation, in part because the very nature of their dependent position forces them to view the relation more realistically than Anglo-Americans do. For the same reasons, they need not hold to their beliefs about Anglo-Americans with the rigidity and intensity so often characteristic of the latter.

Any discussion of these assumptions and expectations requires some mention of the class distinctions within the Mexican-American group.<sup>8</sup> Its middle class, though small as compared with the lower class, is powerful within the group and performs the critical role of intermediary in negotiations with the Anglo-American group. Middle-class status is based on education and occupation, family back-



## *Anglo-Americans and Mexican-Americans*

ground, readiness to serve the interests of the group, on wealth, and the degree of acculturation, or command of Anglo-American ways. Anglo-Americans recognize Mexican class distinctions (although not very accurately) in their notions of the "high type" and "low type" of Mexicans.

In general, lower-class Mexicans do not regard the disabilities of their status as being nearly as severe as do middle-class Mexican-Americans. This is primarily a reflection of the insulation between the Anglo-American world and that of the Mexican lower class. Most Mexicans, regardless of class, are keenly aware of Anglo-American attitudes and practices with regard to their group, but lower-class Mexicans do not conceive of participation in the larger society as necessary nor do they regard Anglo-American practices of exclusion as affecting them directly. Their principal reaction has been to maintain their isolation, and thus they have not been particularly concerned with improving their status by acquiring Anglo-American ways, a course more characteristic of the middle-class Mexican.

Mexican-American assumptions and expectations regarding Anglo-Americans must be qualified, then, as being more characteristic of middle- than of lower-class Mexican-Americans. Mexicans, like Anglo-Americans, are subject to conflicts in their ideals, not only because of irrational thinking on their part but also because of Anglo-American inconsistencies between ideal and practice. As for ideals expressing democratic values, Mexican expectations are for obvious reasons the counterpart of the Anglo-Americans'—that Mexican-Americans should be accorded full acceptance and equal opportunity. They feel a considerable ambivalence, however, as to the Anglo-American expectation that the only way to achieve this goal is by a full incorporation of Anglo-American values and ways of life, for this implies the ultimate loss of their cultural identity as Mexicans. On the one hand, they favor the acquisition of Anglo-American culture and the eventual remaking of the Mexican in the Anglo-American image; but on the other hand, they are not so sure that Anglo-American acceptance is worth such a price. When they are concerned with this dilemma, Mexicans advocate a fusion with Anglo-American culture in which the "best" of the Mexican ways, as they view it, would be retained along with the incorporation of the "best" of the Anglo-American ways, rather than a one-sided exchange in which all that is distinctively Mexican would be lost.

A few examples will illustrate the point of view expressed in the phrase, "the best of both ways." A premium is placed on speaking good, unaccented English, but the retention of good Spanish is valued

just as highly as "a mark of culture that should not be abandoned." Similarly, there is an emphasis on the incorporation of behavior patterns that are considered characteristically Anglo-American and that will promote "getting ahead," but not to the point at which the drive for power and wealth would become completely dominant, as is believed to be the case with Anglo-Americans.

Mexican ambivalence about becoming Anglo-American or achieving a fusion of the "best" of both cultures is compounded by their ambivalence about another issue, that of equality versus inferiority. That Anglo-Americans are dominant in the society and seem to monopolize its accomplishments and rewards leads Mexicans at times to draw the same conclusion that Anglo-Americans do, namely, that Mexicans are inferior. This questioning of their own sense of worth exists in all classes of the Mexican-American group, although with varying intensity, and plays a substantial part in every adjustment to intergroup relations. There is a pronounced tendency to concede the superiority of Anglo-American ways and consequently to define Mexican ways as undesirable, inferior, and disreputable. The tendency to believe in his own inferiority is counterbalanced, however, by the Mexican's fierce racial pride, which sets the tone of Mexican demands and strivings for equal status, even though these may slip into feelings of inferiority.

The images Mexicans have of Anglo-Americans may not be so elaborate or so emotionally charged as the images that Anglo-Americans have of Mexicans, but they are nevertheless stereotypes, overgeneralized, and exaggerated, although used primarily for defensive rather than justificatory purposes. Mexican images of Anglo-Americans are sometimes favorable, particularly when they identify such traits as initiative, ambition, and industriousness as being peculiarly Anglo-American. Unfavorable images are prominent, however, and, although they may be hostile, they never impute inferiority to Anglo-Americans. Most of the Mexican stereotypes evaluate Anglo-Americans on the basis of their attitudes toward Mexican-Americans. For example, one such classification provides a two-fold typology. The first type, the "majority," includes those who are cold, unkind, mercenary, and exploitative. The second type, the "minority," consists of those who are friendly, warm, just, and unprejudiced. For the most part, Mexican images of Anglo-Americans reflect the latter's patterns of exclusion and assumptions of superiority, as experienced by Mexican-Americans. Thus Anglo-Americans are pictured as stolid, phlegmatic, cold-hearted, and distant. They are also said to be braggarts, conceited, inconstant, and insincere.

*Intergroup Relations, Mutual Expectations,  
and Cultural Differences*

A number of students of intergroup relations assert that research in this area has yet to demonstrate any relation between stereotypical beliefs and intergroup behavior; indeed, some insist that under certain conditions ethnic attitudes and discrimination can vary independently.<sup>9</sup> Arnold M. Rose, for example, concludes that "from a heuristic standpoint it may be desirable to assume that patterns of intergroup relations, on the one hand, and attitudes of prejudice and stereotyping, on the other hand, are fairly unrelated phenomena although they have reciprocal influences on each other . . ."<sup>10</sup> In the present study, no systematic attempt was made to investigate the relation between the stereotypical beliefs of particular individuals and their actual intergroup behavior; but the study did yield much evidence that both images which justify group separatism and separateness itself are characteristic aspects of intergroup relations in Border City. One of the principal findings is that in those situations in which contact between Anglo-Americans and Mexicans is voluntary (such as residence, education, recreation, religious worship, and social intercourse) the characteristic pattern is separateness rather than common participation. Wherever intergroup contact is necessary, as in occupational activities and the performance of commercial and professional services, it is held to the minimum sufficient to accomplish the purpose of the contact.<sup>11</sup> The extent of this separateness is not constant for all members of the two groups, since it tends to be less severe between Anglo-Americans and those Mexicans they define as of a "high type." Nevertheless, the evidence reveals a high degree of compatibility between beliefs and practices in Border City's intergroup relations, although the data have nothing to offer for the identification of direct relationships.

In any case, the separateness that characterizes intergroup relations cannot be attributed solely to the exclusion practices of the Anglo-American group. Mexicans have tended to remain separate by choice as well as by necessity. Like many other ethnic groups, they have often found this the easier course, since they need not strain to learn another language or to change their ways and manners. The isolation practices of the Mexican group are as relevant to an understanding of intergroup relations as are the exclusion practices of the Anglo-Americans.

This should not, however, obscure the fact that to a wide extent

the majority of Mexican-Americans share the patterns of living of Anglo-American society; many of their ways are already identical. Regardless of the degree of their insulation from the larger society, the demands of life in the United States have required basic modifications of the Mexicans' cultural tradition. In material culture, Mexicans are hardly to be distinguished from Anglo-Americans, and there have been basic changes in medical beliefs and practices and in the customs regarding godparenthood. Mexicans have acquired English in varying degrees, and their Spanish has become noticeably Anglicized. Although the original organization of the family has persisted, major changes have occurred in patterns of traditional authority, as well as in child training and courtship practices. Still, it is the exceedingly rare Mexican-American, no matter how acculturated he may be to the dominant society, who does not in some degree retain the more subtle characteristics of his Mexican heritage, particularly in his conception of time and in other fundamental value orientations, as well as in his modes of participation in interpersonal relations.<sup>12</sup> Many of the most acculturated Mexican-Americans have attempted to exemplify what they regard as "the best of both ways." They have become largely Anglo-American in their way of living, but they still retain fluent Spanish and a knowledge of their traditional culture, and they maintain an identification with their own heritage while participating in Anglo-American culture. Nevertheless, this sort of achievement still seems a long way off for many Mexican-Americans who regard it as desirable.

A predominant Anglo-American expectation is that the Mexicans will be eventually assimilated into the larger society; but this is contingent upon Mexicans' becoming just like Anglo-Americans. The Mexican counterpart to this expectation is only partially complementary. Mexicans want to be full members of the larger society, but they do not want to give up their cultural heritage. There is even less complementarity of expectation with regard to the present conduct of intergroup relations. Anglo-Americans believe they are justified in withholding equal access to the rewards of full acceptance as long as Mexicans remain "different," particularly since they interpret the differences (both those which have some basis in reality and those which have none) as evidence of inferiority. Mexicans, on the other hand, while not always certain that they are not inferior, clearly want equal opportunity and full acceptance now, not in some dim future, and they do not believe that their differences (either presumed or real) from Anglo-Americans offer any justification for the denial of opportunity and acceptance. Moreover, they do not find that accul-

## Anglo-Americans and Mexican-Americans

turation is rewarded in any clear and regular way by progressive acceptance.

It is probable that both Anglo-Americans and Mexicans will have to modify their beliefs and practices if they are to realize more nearly their expectations of each other. Mutual stereotyping, as well as the exclusion practices of Anglo-Americans and the isolation practices of Mexicans, maintains the separateness of the two groups, and separateness is a massive barrier to the realization of their expectations. The process of acculturation is presently going on among Mexican-Americans and will continue, regardless of whether changes in Anglo-Mexican relations occur. Unless Mexican-Americans can validate their increasing command of Anglo-American ways by a free participation in the larger society, however, such acculturation is not likely to accelerate its present leisurely pace, nor will it lead to eventual assimilation. The *colonia* is a relatively safe place in which new cultural acquisitions may be tried out, and thus it has its positive functions; but by the same token it is only in intergroup contacts with Anglo-Americans that acculturation is validated, that the Mexican's level of acculturation is tested, and that the distance he must yet travel to assimilation is measured.<sup>13</sup>

### Conclusions

There are major inconsistencies in the assumptions that Anglo-Americans and Mexican-Americans hold about one another. Anglo-Americans assume that Mexican-Americans are their potential, if not actual, peers, but at the same time assume they are their inferiors. The beliefs that presumably demonstrate the Mexican-Americans' inferiority tend to place them outside the accepted moral order and framework of Anglo-American society by attributing to them undesirable characteristics that make it "reasonable" to treat them differently from their fellow Anglo-Americans. Thus the negative images provide not only a rationalized definition of the intergroup relation that makes it palatable for Anglo-Americans, but also a substantial support for maintaining the relation as it is. The assumptions of Mexican-Americans about Anglo-Americans are similarly inconsistent, and their images of Anglo-Americans are predominantly negative, although these are primarily defensive rather than justificatory. The mutual expectations of the two groups contrast sharply with the ideal of a complementarity of expectations, in that Anglo-Americans expect Mexicans to become just like themselves, if they are to be accorded equal status in the larger society, whereas Mexican-Americans want

full acceptance, regardless of the extent to which they give up their own ways and acquire those of the dominant group.

Anglo-Americans and Mexicans may decide to stay apart because they are different, but cultural differences provide no moral justification for one group to deny to the other equal opportunity and the rewards of the larger society. If the full acceptance of Mexicans by Anglo-Americans is contingent upon the disappearance of cultural differences, it will not be accorded in the foreseeable future. In our American society, we have often seriously underestimated the strength and tenacity of early cultural conditioning. We have expected newcomers to change their customs and values to conform to American ways as quickly as possible, without an adequate appreciation of the strains imposed by this process. An understanding of the nature of culture and of its interrelations with personality can make us more realistic about the rate at which cultural change can proceed and about the gains and costs for the individual who is subject to the experiences of acculturation. In viewing cultural differences primarily as disabilities, we neglect their positive aspects. Mexican-American culture represents the most constructive and effective means Mexican-Americans have yet been able to develop for coping with their changed natural and social environment. They will further exchange old ways for new only if these appear to be more meaningful and rewarding than the old, and then only if they are given full opportunity to acquire the new ways and to use them.

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## Anglo-Americans and Mexican-Americans

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## Some Effects of Parochial School Education in America

### *Introduction*

THE MOST WIDESPREAD CONCEPTION of American material well-being sees the great wealth of this country primarily as being poured into the hectic consumption of a glittering variety of chrome-trimmed conveniences and high-calorie foods. While there is some truth in this conception, as in any stereotype, the high national income manifests itself in a number of ways. The numbers of voluntarily supported religious and educational institutions, privately financed community services, and private public health organizations is impressive. America's better universities (and some of its least commendable) exist on private bounty, past and present, despite the fact that state governments provide inexpensive and generally good higher education in state universities.

Americans also maintain what is undoubtedly the largest privately financed elementary-school system: the denominational schools of the Roman Catholic Church. On a smaller scale, other denominations, notably the Evangelical Lutheran Church (the Missouri Synod), also maintain private elementary schools. At present some six and a half million pupils are enrolled in the denominational schools, constituting approximately fifteen percent of the total elementary school population.<sup>1</sup> Of these six and a half million, approximately 85 percent, or five and a half million, are enrolled in the parochial schools of the Roman Catholic Church.

Privately financed denominational elementary schools paralleling an excellent state-financed system can be found in other countries (for example, France), but the unique characteristic of the American

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## *Parochial School Education in America*

denominational schools is their attempt to provide education on a mass basis. In France, Church schools primarily serve the upper classes. In contrast, our parochial schools recruit their pupils from all levels of society. These are not schools for the elite, primarily supported by high tuition rates, but a privately financed school system designed to serve the mass of Catholics, who, by virtue of their origins in Europe and the recency of arrival in this country, are spread throughout our class system, with heavy concentrations in the lower strata of American society.

How this unique institution has arisen and the functions it now serves constitute the main concerns of this paper. While our attention will center almost exclusively on the Roman Catholic schools, we shall also refer to others. Specifically, this paper will attempt to provide answers to three major questions: (1) How and why did the extensive parochial-school system arise in the United States? (2) What is the present-day institutional patterning of the Roman Catholic schools? (3) What are the consequences of the parochial-school system for the individual Catholic, his church, the social groups of which he may be a part, and the larger community?

The treatment of the first two questions will be light, in favor of a detailed consideration of the last one. In answering it, we shall draw upon sociological studies, much of whose data has not been previously published.

### *The Historical Roots of the Parochial Schools in America*

At the time of the adoption of the Federal Constitution, nine of the American states had established churches, with several denominations represented. Perhaps only the little state of Rhode Island had complete religious liberty as we conceive of it today. When supported as a state enterprise or as an arm of local government, the schools of the time were denominational in character, upholding in their instruction the doctrines of a particular church.<sup>2</sup> Some of today's great secular universities were then primarily denominational seminaries: Harvard was a state-supported Congregational seminary. For some decades after the War of Independence, this condition persisted, for the First Amendment prohibited the federal government from establishing a national church but did not prevent individual states from giving special recognition to particular denominations.

The state churches of the eighteenth century did not last long into the nineteenth. Immigration as well as schisms in established

denominations brought about a proliferation of sects, so that by 1840 the separation of church and state had taken place in every state within the Union. During the same period, interest was growing in public education. Public-school systems were being established, and controversies arose over what were the religious teachings to be taught within them. In state after state the solution to the diversity of denominations was to make the new schools "nonsectarian."

As the public schools extended their coverage and became increasingly "nonsectarian," they came under fire from the more orthodox denominations, whose religious leaders felt that a secular education would weaken the faith of children. Several denominations began to consider the advisability of setting up parochial schools. In the 1840's, the Presbyterian Church urged its congregations to set up schools for children between the ages of five and twelve. The Presbyterian experiment was at best feeble, and by 1870 this denomination had given up its attempt. The various Lutheran denominations, which since their arrival in this country had maintained denominational schools, renewed their emphasis on the importance of church schools. In 1846 the Evangelical Lutheran Church (the Missouri Synod) was established. From its inception it emphasized denominational schooling, and today it operates the largest parochial-school system among the Protestant denominations.

It was also during this period that the Roman Catholic Church began to grow to the stature of a major denomination. The heavy Irish immigration to the eastern seaboard cities, plus the arrival of many from the German Catholic states, swelled the ranks of the Church. To the Church leaders of the time, the "nonsectarian" public schools, in which the King James version of the Bible was used, were "Protestant" schools. Early in this period the bishops of the Church urged each parish to establish a denominational school; but it was not until the Third Plenary Council of the hierarchy, held in Baltimore in 1884, that the Church made it obligatory for each parish to set up its own school and for each Catholic to send his children to a parochial school. Catholic parochial schools—state-supported, if possible, privately financed, if necessary—were seen as the answer to the need felt for the religious education of Catholic youth.

Of the several nineteenth-century attempts to set up mass denominational school systems in the United States only the German Lutheran and the Roman Catholic efforts have successfully survived to this day. From the attempts of the other denominations only a few secondary schools have survived, but these are primarily serving an elite clientele.

## *Parochial School Education in America*

It is crucial to an understanding of the contemporary functioning of parochial schools to consider the factors which have made for the success of the Roman Catholic and the German Lutheran denominational schools. Several salient features of the two successful parochial school systems are probably among the most important reasons for their success. To begin with, in both cases, more than denominational purity was at stake. In each case very self-conscious ethnic groups were identified with each denomination: the Irish and Germans in the case of the Roman Catholics, and the Germans alone in the case of the Lutheran Church. In each case the church was a major form of identification in the old country, and the strength of identification was augmented by their experience in the new land. Both the Irish and the Lutherans had had some experience in maintaining their church under unfavorable conditions: the Orthodox Lutherans against a reformed state church in Germany, and the Irish against the established church of England. The Irish in particular had developed the institutional devices for maintaining their church in a hostile environment and had also evolved customs favoring a heavy financial support of church activities. In addition, each group brought with it an experienced religious cadre, and when established in this country quickly set up organizations for the recruiting and training of future cadres.

In the case of the Lutheran schools, their ethnic character was quite obvious. These were German language schools in which religious subjects, at least, were taught in that language. German was the liturgical language of the Missouri Synod up to only a few decades ago, and even today the church leaders are largely from German ethnic stock. It should be noted that the success of the Lutheran schools was greatest in the rural areas and small towns of the Midwest, where many Germans had settled. Even as late as 1947 a majority of the Lutheran schools were one- or two-room rural schools. Although the amount of instruction conducted in German has decreased considerably since the anti-German hysteria of World War I, it seems likely that these schools have played an important part in keeping German as the most widely used foreign language in American households: in 1940, of the fourteen million Americans who spoke a foreign language as their "mother tongue," over three and a quarter million spoke German, more than twice as many as spoke the next most popular language, Italian.<sup>3</sup>

While the rural isolation of the German Lutherans helped them maintain a viable denominational school system, the urban Irish Catholic schools derived a similar strength from their position at

the bottom of the urban heap. The anti-Catholic movements of the nineteenth century helped maintain the strong attachment of the Irish to the Roman Catholic Church. The German Catholics benefited from very much the same geographical isolation as did the Lutherans.

Undoubtedly, these two denominations were aided in the struggle to maintain their parochial schools by their ideologies of noncompromise with their environments. Both the Roman Catholic Church and the Missouri Synod were militant and dogmatic bodies each of whose leaders insisted that their church alone was truly Christian.

The successful denominational schools, therefore, were those identified with particular ethnic groups and run by religious organizations which either already had, or quickly developed, the institutions for maintaining and recruiting a cadre of teaching personnel. In more recent times, the success of the French Canadian immigrants in establishing and maintaining an extensive foreign-language parochial school system provides another illustration of the importance of this pattern. As we shall see, these historical origins have left their mark on the Roman Catholic schools of today.

Although these are factors which apparently make for an initial success in establishing a successful denominational school system, they are not as well suited to the maintenance of such systems over long periods of time, given the processes of assimilation which all ethnic groups in America sooner or later apparently undergo. As the period of its initial entry into this country recedes into the past, the attachment of each group to its national origins tends to be dissipated, and the continued success of a denominational school system may perhaps be best assured by calling upon other types of motivation. The denominational schools, compared to the public schools, must provide as much or more aid to the aspirations of the emerging middle classes and at the same time lose some of their ethnic stamp. In this connection we note the heavier emphasis during the past two decades in both Roman Catholic and Missouri Synod schools on higher educational standards, and a corresponding decline of instruction in foreign languages. At present the Roman Catholic schools are more than holding their own, but the evidence seems to point to a considerable decline in the popularity of the German Lutheran schools.

### *The Contemporary Roman Catholic Parochial Schools*

*Doctrinal Basis and Organizational Structure.* The doctrinal basis of the Roman Catholic parochial schools stems from the Third Plenary

## *Parochial School Education in America*

Council of the American hierarchy held in Baltimore in 1884, and has been reiterated a number of times. The Council declared it morally binding on every Catholic to see to it that his children had proper religious training. The vehicle for such training was the parochial school, or, if such schools were not available, provision in some other fashion for such training. In order to provide for proper training, each parish was ordered to set up denominational schools within two years and to make provisions for the religious instruction of those children who could not be accommodated in parochial schools. In this pronouncement the hierarchy set the pattern of mass education under parochial jurisdiction.

The goal of a school in every parish, with every Catholic child in a parochial school, is still far from being fulfilled today (see Table 1. Slightly more than half the parishes in the United States at present support parochial schools, and about the same proportion of Catholics have attended them. It should be noted here that statistics on attendance in private schools are notoriously unreliable, and the proportions quoted here are subject to a large and unknown error.

With few exceptions, the Catholic elementary schools of today are financed and administered by individual parishes. The parish pastor undertaking to organize a school has full responsibility for raising the necessary capital, obtaining teaching personnel from one of the teaching orders, and providing operating funds. A diocese may often undertake to provide building funds to be repaid on easy terms. A diocesan superintendent of schools, whose powers are primarily administrative and advisory, provides some degree of uniformity in curriculum and standards. He may also have direct control over diocesan high schools; few parishes are large enough or rich enough to support the more expensive secondary education.

The Plenary Council of 1884 urged the establishment of free parochial schools. Today, however, most parochial schools charge tuition fees. Compared to those charged in secular private schools, these fees are nominal—estimated to be about \$25 per year per pupil in the Chicago area—and are usually waived for pupils in need. The major part of school expenses is raised from voluntary contributions from the total congregation. Compared to that of public or secular private schools, the per capita cost of parochial schooling must be considerably less, since the salaries paid to the sisters and brothers are only nominal. In fact, mass denominational schooling is a tribute to the dedication of the members of the teaching orders.

The teaching personnel of the typical parochial school is provided

to the parish by a religious community. The parish undertakes to furnish housing, subsistence, and a nominal salary. When it is not possible to obtain enough sisters from a religious community, lay persons may be employed to round out the full complement, a practice that has become more common recently during the postwar expansion of the parochial school system.

The curriculum of the parochial school must, of course, conform to whatever standards individual states set up. Catholic textbooks contain obvious differences from those in use in public schools; they stress Church doctrine wherever this is applicable. The more or less standard curriculum of American schools is further heavily supplemented by instruction in both doctrine and ritual. Catholic secondary schools are most frequently organized on a diocesan level. The curriculum is primarily college preparatory, for few schools offer the comparatively more expensive training in either commerce or the manual arts. Greater stress is placed on the provision of secondary education for girls than for boys.

Because statistics on school attendance in the United States are so poor, it is hard to judge what the long-term trends in the number of children educated in parochial schools have been. Certainly, as one may see in Table 1, the number of parochial schools has grown considerably since 1900, even though the proportion of parishes supporting schools has remained fairly constant. What fragmentary statistics exist on school attendance indicate a different trend:

TABLE 1  
NUMBER OF ROMAN CATHOLIC PARISHES AND PARISHES WITH SCHOOLS:  
1900-1959

Year	Number of parishes	Parishes with schools	Proportion with schools	Proportion of elementary-school children in non-public schools
1900	6,127	3,812	63%	7.6%
1930	12,475	7,387	59%	9.8%
1938	13,132	7,597	58%	10.2%
1952	15,164	8,493	56%	13.2%
1959	16,753	9,814	58%	14.8%

*Sources:* The figures in the first two columns for the years 1900 and 1930 were taken from Romer, *The Catholic Church In the U.S.A.*, 1950, and for the years 1938 and 1952 from *The National Catholic Almanac*, 1941, 1955, and 1960. Data in the last column were obtained from *Health Education and Welfare Trends*, U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1960.



## Parochial School Education in America

parochial schools are educating a larger proportion of the total population in school today than in 1920. One thing is certain: the growth of parochial schools and the numbers of pupils in absolute terms demonstrate the viability of this institution.

*The Social Context of the Parochial Schools.* In order to obtain a more intimate understanding of the contemporary functioning of parochial schools, we shall now turn to a number of sociological studies<sup>4</sup> of various Catholic populations. Our tactic will be to compare Catholics who are products of the parochial schools with Catholics who have attended public schools. In some instances, it will be possible to compare Catholic parents who have sent their children to the two school systems. It must be borne in mind that these data are fragmentary. The researches cited were not designed primarily for the purposes to which we shall put them. In addition, they cover but a small proportion of the total Catholic population in the United States, the New England area being heavily favored. A note of warning: the interpretation of these findings is filled with ambiguity. Some difference in quality between parochial- and public-school Catholics may be a consequence of the difference in educational experience, or it may merely reflect differences in family backgrounds between Catholics who send their children to parochial schools and those who send their offspring to the public schools.

Although it is virtually impossible to fix with any great exactness the proportion of Catholics who have either attended parochial schools or who have enrolled their children in them, it is probable that this proportion for the United States is around fifty percent.

TABLE 2  
TYPE OF SCHOOL ATTENDED BY SEX

A. Diocese of St. Augustine, Florida			
Married Adult Catholics	Men	Women	Total
Proportion who have attended parochial schools	55%	58%	57%
100% =	[7,045]	[8,757]	[15,802]
B. "Bay City," Massachusetts			
Catholics aged 20 and over	Men	Women	Total
Proportion who have attended parochial schools	49%	58%	55%
100% =	[236]	[270]	[506]

Sources: A., Kelly, p. 43; B., unpublished data from the "Bay City" Project.

Parochial schools are available in only three out of every five parishes, and the capacity of the schools is ordinarily below the maximum needs of the parishioners. Attendance at parochial school is neither open to all Catholics nor do all take advantage of it. Data from studies in "Bay City," Massachusetts, and the Diocese of St. Augustine, Florida, yield estimates that fifty-seven and fifty-five percent respectively of the adult populations concerned have attended parochial schools (see Table 2).

Given the fact that not all Catholics attend parochial schools, what are the major differences between those who do and those who do not?

First, there is a slight tendency for parents to favor parochial schooling for their female as compared with their male children. Table 2 indicates that both in Massachusetts and Florida adult female Catholics are more likely to have attended parochial schools. This sex difference, however, is not very large.

Evidence as to the class of families sending their children to parochial school is somewhat equivocal. In industrial "Bay City," it appears to be the "blue collar" families who prefer parochial schools; Strodbeck's study of the New Haven high schools shows an even stronger tendency for the class difference to show a "white collar" preference for parochial schools; Kelly's study of Florida indicates that parochial school attendance increases with greater educational attainment (see Table 3).

In short the preponderance of evidence indicates that parochial school attendance is associated with higher occupational status;<sup>5</sup> the contradictory data from "Bay City," as we shall see, is partly explained by that community's ethnic composition. There are two fairly obvious explanations for this general tendency. To begin with, upper-status groups in America have been found to be generally more "religious" in their behavior—they belong to church organizations and attend church services more frequently. Second, sending their children to parochial school may be felt as a financial burden to lower-income families. Although the average tuition fee may be small, lower-income families with a number of children of school age may find even this charge more than they can afford.

However, economic differences within the Catholic group also reflect ethnic origins. The earlier immigrants have risen higher in the occupational scale than have later arrivals. In Table 4 it can be seen that ethnic group differences in parochial-school attendance considerably overshadow those between the "white collar" and "blue collar" occupational levels, as is shown in Table 3. In "Bay City,"

# Parochial School Education in America

TABLE 3

SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS AND ATTENDANCE AT PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS

## A. "Bay City," Massachusetts

Adult Catholics	"White collar" occupations	"Blue collar" occupations
Proportion who have attended parochial schools	44%	50%
100% =	[143]	[342]
Proportion who have sent their children to parochial schools	56%	69%
100% =	[74]*	[165]*

## B. Arlington-Somerville, Massachusetts

Catholic families with oldest child between 6 and 10	"White collar"	"Blue collar"
Proportion who have sent their children to parochial schools	55%	29%
100% =	[20]	[21]

## C. New Haven, Connecticut

Catholic boys in first 3 years of high school	"White collar"	"Blue collar"
Proportion attending Catholic high school	49%	26%
100% =	[267]	[518]

## D. Diocese of St. Augustine, Florida

All married Catholics in diocese	Educational attainment				
	Less than 8 years	8 years	9-11 years	12 years	More than 12 years
Proportion who have attended parochial school	49%	53%	57%	59%	66%
100% =	[1,464]	[3,740]	[2,725]	[6,564]	[1,861]

\* Only parents of children who have reached school age.

Sources: A., the "Bay City" Project; B., Portis, Table 2.12; C., Strodbeck, unpublished data; D., Kelly, p. 43.

where a large contingent of French Canadians maintains a French-language parochial school, it is they who are most partial to the parochial schools. In this community, the French Canadians, being the most recent immigrants, are on the bottom of the occupational

ladder. The Italians, whose parish has established its parochial school only within the last decade, show the smallest attendance at parochial schools. Ranking behind the French but considerably ahead of the Italians are the Irish, whose parochial schools date from 1880.

Note that in "Bay City" parents in every ethnic group are more likely to send their children to parochial schools than to have at-

TABLE 4  
ETHNIC BACKGROUND AND ATTENDANCE AT PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS

A. "Bay City," Massachusetts				
Catholics aged 20 or over	Irish	Italians	French Canadian	Unclassifiable and other Catholics
Proportion who have attended parochial school _____	57%	12%	72%	41%
100% = _____	[99]	[61]	[230]	[103]
Proportion who have sent children to parochial schools _____	63%	50%	74%	52%
100% = _____	[38]	[28]	[123]	[50]

B. Arlington-Somerville, Massachusetts

Catholic families with oldest child between 6 and 10	Irish	Italian
Proportion sending children to parochial schools _____	74%	14%
100% = _____	[19]	[22]

C. New Haven, Connecticut

Catholic boys in first 3 years of high school	Irish	Italian	Poles	Other
Proportion sending children to Catholic high school _____	45%	31%	19%	34%
100% = _____	[158]	[354]	[75]	[203]

In the "Bay City" study, ethnic background was determined by classifying persons according to the country of origin of the most closely related foreign-born ancestor. When this information was lacking, respondent was classified according to his surname. A similar procedure was employed by Strodbeck. Undoubtedly, many of the unclassifiable respondents are of Irish origin, whose families have been in this country for more generations than our short genealogies would detect and whose names are not detectably Irish.

Sources: A., the "Bay City" Project; B., Portis, Table 2.4; C., Strodbeck, unpublished data.

## Parochial School Education in America

tended themselves. This generational difference is particularly striking in the case of the Italians. In the parents' generation only twelve percent attended parochial school, whereas fifty percent of the parents are presently sending their children to such schools. This increase in parochial-school attendance probably reflects the growth of parochial-school facilities in the community.

In Portis' study of Arlington and Somerville, we have only the Irish and Italians to compare. Here we find that the former are far more likely to send their children to the parochial schools. It should be noted that in the two neighborhoods studied by Portis the parishes were "American," headed by pastors of Irish ancestry. In the eyes of the Italians in these neighborhoods the churches were "Irish." Indeed, for Italian immigrants on the Eastern seaboard, the "American" church often appears heavily Irish. In New Haven the same ethnic pattern is repeated. The most likely to send their sons to Catholic high schools are the Irish, followed by the Italians, and then by the Poles.

In the data of Table 4 an over-all pattern can be discerned: except where non-Irish ethnic groups have set up their own parochial schools in connection with their national parishes, it has been the Irish Catholics who have been most faithful to the church doctrine concerning school attendance. The parochial schools have been attractive to each ethnic group when they have been identified as ethnic in character, with the "American" or English-language parish in New England being identified as primarily Irish.

A measure of the extent to which parochial-school attendance represents attachment to an ethnic group can be ascertained from Table 5. Those parents who have considered it "not important to

TABLE 5  
IMPORTANCE OF ETHNIC TIES AND CONFORMITY TO THE SCHOOL-  
ATTENDANCE PRACTICES OF ETHNIC GROUPS

*Arlington-Somerville, Massachusetts*

School attendance	Importance of ethnic ties and customs	
	Important	Unimportant
Deviates from ethnic group practice	0%	31%
Conforms to ethnic group practice	100%	69%
100% =	[14]	[26]

Source: Portis, Table 2.5.

keep some of the ties and customs of the land your people came from" were the most likely to deviate from the school attendance practice of their ethnic group, that is, Italians sending their children to the parochial schools or Irish sending their children to public schools.

A somewhat different approach to the determiners of parochial-school attendance is afforded by Strodbeck's study of New Haven high school students. Because the major purpose of his study was to investigate factors involved in mobility aspirations, his data allow a contrast between parochial and public high school students, according to the degree to which each group is mobility-oriented. Table 6 presents the responses of the two groups of students to a series of questions designed to measure the extent to which they are willing to break away from their families and in addition to strive for occupational success. Since the achievement of mobility involves both dimensions, these questions measure to some extent their aspira-

TABLE 6  
ATTACHMENT TO FAMILY AND ACHIEVEMENT ORIENTATION AMONG  
PUBLIC AND PAROCHIAL HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS

*New Haven, Connecticut*

A. Attachment to family	Type of school attended	
	Public high school	Catholic high school
Proportion agreeing to, "When teen-agers get married their main loyalty belongs to their [parents]." _____	49%	38%
Proportion agreeing to, "Nothing in life is worth the sacrifice of moving away from your parents." _____	33%	25%
Proportion agreeing to, "To me a family means a large family of parents, their children and grandchildren, the uncles, aunts, cousins and in-laws." _____	55%	42%
B. Occupational achievement		
Proportion disagreeing to, "The best kind of job is a secure, not too difficult job, with enough pay to afford a nice car and eventually my own home." _____	27%	39%
Proportion disagreeing to, "Success is already in the cards, so a man might just as well accept it and not fight against it." _____	27%	39%
100% = _____	[522]	[268]

Source: Strodbeck, unpublished data.

## *Parochial School Education in America*

tions for mobility. Because such desires are usually conditioned by the class level of the students' families, the fathers' occupations are held constant in the table.

Although the differences between parochial and public high school students are not very large, they do tell a consistent story: the parochial student, whether from a "white collar" or a "blue collar" background, is less attached to his family group and more oriented toward the prevalent middle-class norms of occupational success. If these data are indicative of Catholic secondary schools in general, it would appear that the more mobility-conscious Catholics are to be found within such schools. Perhaps by virtue of their curriculum or their teaching methods, the Catholic high schools serve as better mobility channels for Catholics than do the public schools.

In summary, the data reviewed so far emphasize the role played by ethnic origin in attendance at parochial schools.<sup>6</sup> The differences in school attendance among ethnic groups have by and large been greater than other contrasts, either of occupational class or sex. Attendance at parochial schools appears to be primarily a manifestation of attachment to an ethnic group. In communities in which each ethnic group has its "own" parochial school, attendance will be high in every such group. Where only "American" parishes are established in a community, it is the Irish Catholics who are most partial to the parochial schools, reflecting the extent to which this ethnic group has dominated the Catholic Church in America. It should be remembered that these findings apply mainly to the New England area. Perhaps in other areas, where other ethnic groups have played dominant roles (for example, the Germans in Wisconsin), the dominant group exhibits the same behavior as do the Irish in New England.

*The "Effects" of Parochial School Attendance on the Individual Catholic.* The analysis now enters a more difficult area in attempting to provide answers to the question, "What effect does parochial schooling have upon the individual Catholic's attachment to and his attitudes toward his social environment: his church, ethnic group, and community?" The analysis will pursue the same method as before—parochial-school Catholics will be compared with persons who have attended the public schools. As before, when we find differences between the two groups, it will not be possible to tell whether these differences antecede school attendance or are consequences of differences in schooling. We shall be on safer ground when it is found that the two groups are alike. In such cases we can be reasonably sure that the type of schooling had no effect on the particular characteristic being studied.



In evaluating the data of this section, it must be borne in mind that large differences cannot be expected between adults who have had different types of schooling. For most of the adults studied, their school days are long past, and the effects of this experience can be expected to have diminished with time as subsequent experiences diluted the residue of earlier events.

*"Effects" on Religious Behavior and Attachment to the Church.* Perhaps the most obvious place to look for the effects of parochial schooling is in the area of religious behavior. The manifest purpose of the schools is to preserve Catholics in the faith of their fathers. A good part of the curriculum is given over to the teaching of ritual behavior and the doctrinal tenets of the church. According to the

TABLE 7  
RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCES AND TYPES OF SCHOOLING  
*Diocese of St. Augustine, Florida*

A. Religion of spouse and validity of marriages	Married Catholic males	
	Attended public schools	Attended parochial schools
Type of marriage		
Proportion married to Catholic spouses ----	81%	84%
Proportion validly married -----	85%	89%
100% = -----	[2,768]	[2,503]
	Married Catholic females	
	Attended public schools	Attended parochial schools
Type of marriage		
Proportion married to Catholic spouses ----	67%	71%
Proportion validly married -----	88%	89%
100% = -----	[3,012]	[3,298]
B. Observance of Easter duties	Married men	
	Attended:	Attended:
	Public schools	Parochial schools
Proportion receiving Holy Communion during Lent -----	63%	74%
100% = -----	[2,699]	[2,456]
	Public schools	Parochial schools
	72%	81%
	[2,939]	[3,300]

Sources: A., Kelly, pp. 128-129; B., Kelly, p. 126.

## *Parochial School Education in America*

studies we have surveyed, the parochial schools are apparently successful in achieving their purpose, although this success is not outstanding.

The data of Table 7 indicate that parochial-school education does predispose one to be more observant of certain types of ritual duties. Thus parochial-school attenders are more likely to perform their Easter duties—receive Holy Communion during the Lenten season—but the differences between men and women overshadow those between persons with different types of schooling. In contrast, the effect of parochial-school education on patterns of marriage is considerably less. Parochial-school graduates are a little more likely to marry Catholics and to contract valid marriages (that is, marriages solemnized by Catholic clergy). Again this difference is considerably overshadowed by differences between the sexes. Among the Florida Catholics females are much more likely than males to marry outside their religious group; perhaps this indicates greater chances for women to marry higher on the social ladder.<sup>7</sup>

All told, the data from Kelly's study of Florida Catholics do not indicate that parochial schooling is a very effective means of preserving the faith. Parochial-school graduates are more observant of their religious ritual duties, but this difference in their favor is not very large, being overshadowed by differences in both sex and education.

*"Effects" on Attachment to Ethnic Groups.* Since it is one of our main conclusions that attendance at parochial schools is a function of ethnic group attachment, it is particularly unfortunate that the studies available have so little direct evidence on how attendance aids in preserving this ethnic attachment. Table 5 has shown that those who consider ethnic ties important are unlikely to deviate from their ethnic group's pattern of school attendance. Apparently, whether an individual attends such a school or not depends on the custom in his ethnic group and on his parents' attachment to this group. Now we shall consider how experience with parochial schooling aids the French Canadians to retain their language as a household tongue. The data pertain to the French Canadians in "Bay City," Massachusetts, where it will be recalled that a parochial school gives at least part of its instruction in French.

Although it is not possible to make statements on the basis of the data of Table 8, one thing is fairly certain: that the persistence of French as a household tongue is intimately associated with the French parochial school, and the greater a family's experience with this schooling, the more likely it is that French is spoken in the home.

The parochial school, then, may play a crucial role over time in the maintenance of this ethnic group.

TABLE 8  
THE USE OF FRENCH AS A HOUSEHOLD LANGUAGE AMONG FRENCH CANADIANS  
"Bay City," Massachusetts

Types of schooling experience	Proportion speaking French in the home	100% =
Parents and children who have attended public schools	40%	[78]
Mixed public and parochial school experience	58%	[26]
Parent with public-school, children with parochial-school experience	71%	[24]
Parent with parochial-school, children with public-school experience	71%	[24]
Parents and children who have attended parochial schools	86%	[107]

Source: "Bay City" Project, unpublished data.

*Attachment to Catholic Leaders as a Reference Group.*<sup>8</sup> How effective are parochial schools in welding the Catholic group into a cohesive aggregate? Because these institutions function so as to reinforce the individual pupil's sense of identity with his denomination, it might be anticipated that this experience would also carry with it a heightened readiness to "think and act like a Catholic" in a variety of situations. Parochial-school Catholics would therefore be more likely influenced by what their religious leaders have to say on a number of nonreligious issues. In more technical terms, the church leaders might serve as a reference group to whom the individual looks for advice and guidance. Indeed, if we are correct in our interpretation of the meaning of parochial-school attendance as a manifestation of group attachments, we should expect that religious leaders will be an important reference group for Catholics who have attended the Church schools.

We turn to the "Bay City" Study for empirical evidence. The major focus of this study was on the processes of opinion formation in a local election. The persons interviewed were asked to designate the groups of leaders to whom they would look for advice and guidance in making up their minds on local issues. A list of twenty-

## Parochial School Education in America

four such potential reference groups, including labor leaders, social classes, and so on, was presented to each person and he was asked to select his reference groups from among the list. Included in the list were the categories "Catholic leaders" and "Protestant leaders." We have taken a respondent's choice of a category as an indication that he would be willing to pay at least some attention to the statements of this group on the issues in question. This provides a measure of the respondents' *potential* reference groups, in the sense that we have measured only their willingness to pay attention, not whether they in fact have ever done so.

TABLE 9

CATHOLIC LEADERS AS REFERENCE GROUPS, ETHNIC ORIGIN  
AND TYPES OF SCHOOLING

*"Bay City," Massachusetts*

A. Religious leaders as potential reference groups on school issues _____	Parochial-school Catholics	Public-school Catholics	Public-school Protestants
Proportion citing religious leaders as reference groups _____ 100% = _____	53% [321]	34% [166]	22% [251]
B. Religious leaders as actual reference groups in school board and mayoralty elections *	Parochial school		Public school
Proportion citing Catholic leaders as having been helpful in: school board election _____ Mayoralty and council election _____ 100% = _____			
	24% 16% [193]	18% 12% [193]	
C. Religious leaders as potential reference groups; ethnic origins	Proportion citing Catholic leaders as reference groups on school issues		
Respondent attended:	Irish	Italian	French
Public schools _____ 100% = _____	29% [51]	32% [56]	47% [66]
Parochial schools _____ 100% = _____	49% [59]	55% [11]	51% [174]

\* Only those Catholics who voted in the election are included in this table.

Another question, asked in connection with other queries on a recent local election, was whether or not in fact the same reference groups had been "helpful" to the respondents in making up their minds on the candidates and issues in the election. The answers to

this last question yielded a measure on the actual reference groups of the persons interviewed.

The highlights of the analysis of religious reference groups are given in Table 9. Parochial-school Catholics are the most likely to cite religious leaders as both potential and actual reference groups. Catholic leaders apparently have a ready audience within their religious group for any attempts to wield mass influence. Furthermore, it can also be seen that all the Catholics are more likely to be influenced by their religious leaders than are the Protestants. This religious difference may well reflect the differing definitions of the role of the clergy in the two groups.

If the second part of Table 9 is compared with the first, the Catholic leaders are seen to have a stronger position as potential than as actual reference groups. Furthermore, the leadership of the Catholic clergy is acknowledged more frequently in school elections than in the election for mayor and city council. This last finding indicates either that school issues are viewed as more within the realm of the legitimate concerns of the clergy, or that the clergy were more active in one rather than the other contest.

Finally, in the third part of this table it can be seen that the effect of parochial schooling holds within each of the three ethnic groups. Note that the least willing to accept leadership from the clergy are the public-school Irish, a fact perhaps reflecting the greater educational attainment of this group. Among the parochial-school Catholics, ethnic background makes very little difference in the designation of Catholic leaders as reference groups.

*Participation in and Interest in Community Affairs.* Parochial schooling apparently is related both to the individual Catholic's attachment to his religious leaders and to the cohesion of the Catholic group. We shall now raise the question of whether this internal cohesion is bought at the price of weakening ties to the larger society. In other words, is the strength of the in-group accompanied by a withdrawal of interest in and support of community institutions? Many of the critics of denominational schools have advanced this weakening of the community as one of the most serious consequences of parochial schools.

For some empirical evidence on this question, we turn again to the "Bay City" research. Most of the data contained in Table 10 indicates that the type of schooling experienced by Catholics of the community has only a small effect on the individual's relationship to his community. Parochial-school Catholics are about as interested in local politics and as attached to the community as public-school

## *Parochial School Education in America*

Catholics. However, the type of school attended does have an effect on the amount of interest shown in school affairs. Public-school Catholics are more concerned with the issues that may arise concerning the public schools.

The lower degree of interest on the part of parochial-school Catholics in the affairs of public schools should not be interpreted as a withdrawal of attention. Rather, as can be seen in Table 11, parochial school Catholics are no less interested in the public schools than are other persons who do not have children who have attended the local public-school system. In other words, the group with the highest interest in school issues consists of those who are currently sending their children to the public schools. Those who have no children or whose children were sent to schools in other communities show as low a degree of interest in the local system as do parents who are sending or have sent children to the parochial schools.

TABLE 10  
CATHOLIC INTEREST IN AND ATTACHMENT TO THE COMMUNITY  
AND ITS INSTITUTIONS

*"Bay City," Massachusetts*

A. Attachment to the community	Parochial school	Public school
Proportion strongly attached to the community* 100% = _____	80% [193]	76% [193]
B. Interest in local politics		
Proportion with high interest in local politics** 100% = _____	28% [220]	29% [207]
C. Interest in public school affairs		
Proportion with high interest in school affairs*** 100% = _____	22% [220]	35% [217]

\* Answers to a series of questions concerning willingness to migrate from the community.

\*\* Answers to a series of questions on the readership of political news in the local newspaper, attention paid to events in the city council, self-rating of interest in local elections, etc.

\*\*\* Answers to a series of questions similar to those in B, above.

All told, the evidence we have brought to bear from the "Bay City" study points to very little effect of parochial schooling on the individual Catholic's relationship to his local community. Compared to other Catholics of similar occupational level or educational

TABLE 11  
INTEREST IN SCHOOL AFFAIRS ACCORDING TO  
RELATION TO LOCAL PUBLIC SCHOOLS

"Bay City," Massachusetts\*

Current relationship to "Bay City" schools	Proportion with high interest in school affairs	100% =
Currently with children in the local public schools	51%	[179]
Currently with children in local parochial schools	28%	[104]
Children had attended local public schools in the past	22%	[102]
Children had attended local parochial schools in the past	23%	[34]
Childless or had sent children to schools in other communities**	21%	[397]

\* Adults aged 20 or over.

\*\* Essentially no difference between being childless or having sent children to school in other communities.

attainment, the products of the church schools show little difference in their attachment to the community and their interest in local politics. Even the parochial-school Catholics' interest in the affairs of the local public schools does not differ significantly from that of other citizens whose children are not currently in the local schools.

*Attitudes Toward Community Institutions and Public Issues.* Although there seems to be no great difference between the two types of schooling in their effects on the *amount* of involvement in community affairs, there may still be some effect on specific *attitudes* toward community institutions and public issues. Both sides of a controversy may be equally involved and yet be divided sharply in the direction of the policy to be taken on the issues in question. Public-school Catholics may thus feel quite differently from the graduates of parochial schools about the quality of the public schools or about their own political loyalties. Table 12 compares the two groups of Catholics with each other and with the Protestants in "Bay City."

Only small and inconsistent differences can be discerned between parochial- and public-school Catholics in their attitudes toward either Bay City's public-school system or its school committee. Nor can it be said that the Catholics as a group differ radically from the Protestants on this score. If anything, there is a slight tendency for



# Parochial School Education in America

the parochial-school Catholics to have a higher opinion of the local public schools than the Protestants.

Nor are there any appreciable or consistent differences in agreement to a number of stereotyped statements about the public schools. Even on the charge that public schools influence children away from the ideas of their parents, we cannot find that parochial-school Catholics differ consistently either from other Catholics or from Protestants.

When the relations between church and state are in question,

TABLE 12

ATTITUDES TOWARD LOCAL INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC ISSUES

"Bay City," Massachusetts

Adults aged 20 and Over	Catholics		Protestants
	Parochial	Public	
Percent rating the local school board "very good" _____ 100% = _____	25% [281]	19% [158]	21% [241]
Percent rating local public schools as "very good" _____ 100% = _____	13% [281]	17% [165]	10% [254]
Percent agreeing that "public schools change children away from their parents' ideas" _____ 100% = _____	17% [223]	12% [242]	17% [208]
Percent agreeing that "public schools are not teaching the fundamentals as well today" _____ 100% = _____	37% [254]	37% [157]	46% [236]
Percent agreeing that "all schools, including church schools, should get financial aid from the state" _____ 100% = _____	90% [328]	68% [170]	43% [240]
Percent agreeing that "public schools should give time off for religious teaching" _____ 100% = _____	86% [324]	48% [168]	44% [255]
Average percentage vote for Republican candidates in school-board elections _____ 100% = _____	52% [301]	57% [147]	80% [215]
Average percentage vote for Democratic candidates in school-board elections _____ 100% = _____	41% [216]	45% [124]	15% [185]

however, major and consistent differences appear between the two religious groups and within the Catholic contingent. Parochial-school Catholics are the most favorable to state aid for church schools and to released time for religious instruction. Protestants stand at the opposite extreme, while public-school Catholics occupy a position in between.

In short, only when religion itself enters as a direct issue can we discern the Catholic's school experience as affecting his attitudes toward public schools. Perhaps we see here the consequences of the reference-group phenomena discussed in an earlier section of this paper.

The voting records of the three groups in a local school board election present something of a paradox (Table 12). From close observation of the course of the election, one cannot observe any overt reference to religious issues. Yet the data indicate that voters were divided primarily along religious lines, the Protestants clearly preferring Republican candidates and the Catholics showing a relative preference for Democratic candidates. Parochial-school Catholics gave the Republican candidates the smallest percentages, although they were not consistently the strongest supporters of Democratic candidates.

Although attention in this paper is being paid primarily to the Catholics, it is of some interest to note that it is the Protestants who behaved with the highest degree of partisanship in the school-board elections. The degree of support given by this group to the two parties is considerably greater than the difference in votes given by the Catholics; in other words, the Protestants were more heavily Republican than the Catholics were Democratic. In these results we are presented with another paradox: although the Protestants were less likely to acknowledge religious leaders as potential and actual reference groups in school elections, their behavior was much more determined by their religious membership than that of the Catholics. Perhaps the solidarity of the Protestants is not a product of their churches and clergy acting as leaders, but stems from more informally organized group processes. This phenomenon may also reflect the greater stake which the Protestant group may have felt in this particular election.

Table 13 contains data on more general political and social orientations. In their preferences for one rather than another political party, the parochial- and public-school Catholics cannot be distinguished from each other. However, differences can be discerned in attitudes toward labor organizations and toward the social-welfare

## Parochial School Education in America

activities of the New Deal-Fair Deal variety. On both counts the parochial school Catholics are slightly more "liberal," expressing greater approval of labor unions and of social welfare legislation. It is hard to interpret what these results signify. Without more knowledge of the attitudinal atmospheres in either the public or parochial schools, it would be hazardous to impute these differences to the content of the instruction in either one or the other school system. Perhaps we are again dealing with concealed ethnic differences which further analysis may yet uncover.

TABLE 13  
GENERAL POLITICAL ATTITUDES

*"Bay City," Massachusetts*

Catholic adults aged 20 or over	Parochial	Public
Proportion Democratic in local politics -----	69%	68%
100% = -----	[210]	[209]
Proportion high in Economic-Liberalism Scale*--	36%	25%
100% = -----	[220]	[210]
Proportion "pro-labor" on attitudes-toward-		
labor scale -----	61%	57%
100% = -----	[206]	[193]

\* The Economic-Liberalism Scale contains questions on government ownership of public utilities, extension of social security, government health insurance, etc. A high score on this scale indicates a generally favorable response to measures of the New Deal-Fair Deal variety.

*Some Conclusions Concerning Effects.* Out of the welter of data presented in the preceding pages, only two clear patterns emerge. First, it is apparent that the parochial-school Catholic is more closely identified with his church than is the public school Catholic. Although he is only slightly more likely to conform to Church requirements concerning ritual obligations, he has a high regard for his religious leaders as guides in public affairs when the welfare of his church is at stake. The Church and its leadership are for him a significant reference group, and he is a staunch supporter of the Church on such matters as state aid for Church schools.

Second, we could find no evidence that parochial schools tend to alienate individual Catholics from their communities. Parochial school Catholics are as involved in community affairs as anyone else of comparable occupational position. Furthermore, the choice of parochial-school education is apparently not so much a rejection of the public schools as a choice of something qualitatively different.

It would appear that an improvement in the quality of the public schools would not materially affect their attractiveness to Catholics, for the greater pull of church schools is based on religious qualities which the public schools have deliberately avoided.

### *Conclusions*

From the body of materials presented in this paper, two main conclusions can be drawn concerning the parochial schools of the American Roman Catholic Church. First, there is apparently an intimate connection between the cultural backgrounds of American Catholics and their success in establishing and maintaining a mass-educational enterprise. Early in the history of the Catholic Church in America the parochial schools became a symbol of the integrity of the Church and of the attachment of the immigrant ethnic groups to their national backgrounds and to the Church. The parochial schools further served over time as an important institutional device for maintaining group attachment. Even today the parochial schools still play very much the same role, particularly for the Irish and French Canadians in the New England states.

Second, despite the historical origins of these schools and their present importance in the life of certain ethnic groups, we have been unable to find strong evidence that parochial-school Catholics are very different from other Catholics. The influence of the school is shown most dramatically in areas where the Church has traditionally taken a strong stand, for example, on support for religious education, or on the performance of ritual duties. In other areas of life the parochial-school Catholic is only marginally differentiated from other Catholics. It would appear that the solidarity of the Catholic group or of the ethnic groups within the Catholic fold maintains itself primarily through other, more informal means. In this sense, the parochial schools do not appear to be the principal mechanism by which Catholics maintain themselves as a distinct group among the American people.

These conclusions are not given without some modifying qualifications, discussed below. Furthermore, they raise almost as many points as they settle concerning the nature of the Catholic church and its parochial schools in America. The most important qualification to be placed on these conclusions is that they apply primarily to New England, where the major part of our data has been obtained. In that part of our country, Catholic-Protestant relations have long been poor, with both sides all too quick to see the slights in the actions

## *Parochial School Education in America*

of the other. For the Irish Catholic immigrant, nineteenth-century New England was scarcely a hospitable place in which to settle, and when the Catholics became a majority in the twentieth century they did not lose this opportunity to redress an unfavorable balance of wrongs. Where Catholic-Protestant relations do not have as long a history of suspicion and rivalry, the church may not be so central to the self-conceptions of the Catholic group, and the social-psychological meaning of parochial schools, as we have shown it to be in this article, may be somewhat different. Indeed, Fichter's study<sup>5</sup> indicates that this may be the case in places where ethnic identities have lost their fervor and the mixing in the American pot has gone on longer. In South Bend, Catholics apparently feel themselves merely another Christian denomination rather than the embattled and beleaguered underdogs in a well-established caste system.

A second qualification stems from the nature of the data we have been able to assemble. We have viewed the church and the parochial schools through the eyes of the ordinary parishioner, but the Roman Catholic church is much more than a body of believers. It is also composed of a cadre of clergy and an organization which are not lacking in experience in this world of power and politicking. We have seen how parishioners use and are affected by parochial schools, but we have not seen how the existence itself of such a school system affects the cadre of the church and the institutions of the local community.

In this last connection, several hypotheses may be advanced. First of all, there is no doubt that the parochial schools represent useful recruiting grounds for the clergy and the religious orders. Teaching sisters and priests scan the student body carefully for signs of vocation, and often the measure of a good parochial school is not how many achieve success in the secular world but how many take the vows of poverty and chastity.

The participation of the Roman Catholic Church in the job of educating our youth adds legitimacy to its concern with education in general. Throughout the land, wherever parochial schools educate a goodly proportion of the young, the public system is sensitive to what the church hierarchy thinks and says about education in general. For some public-school educators, the very existence of a parallel mass education appears as a threat. The parochial elementary schools of the Roman Catholic Church have the explicit aim of enrolling about 8,000,000 out of the 33,000,000 children of elementary school age. In cities in which the Catholics form the majority, the kind of financial and political support for good public-school edu-

cation may often seem jeopardized by that fact alone. If in addition the public-school educator is someone to whom the Roman Catholic Church is a distasteful, medieval anachronism, the success of the Church in maintaining its schools may seem to have been bought at the price of a lowering in quality of public education in general.

In the data presented in this article there seems some substantiation for this conclusion. We have noted that the parent who has sent his children to the parochial school manifests a low degree of concern for public schools. The parochial-school parent pays little attention to the affairs of the school board or to public controversies over school issues. In addition, when we consider that he must support parochial schools by voluntary contributions, his interest in the public schools may consist primarily of a concern for the tax rate rather than with the quality of public school education.

Furthermore, there is some evidence that the politics of school elections become transformed. In Massachusetts, say experienced politicians, a place on the school board is often the first step in a promising political career. This may certainly be one of the hazards of being the school official in a community in which there is a well-developed parochial-school system. If school-board elections become means to other ends, then they can also be easily transformed into battlegrounds for demagogues, with irresponsible demands being voiced for lowered school taxes. There is no doubt that the school systems in the metropolitan areas of New England were once the most advanced in the country. Their decline has often been attributed to the factors we have suggested above.

There is yet another way in which the existence of a parochial-school system affects the public schools. In a city like "Bay City," Massachusetts, where about sixty percent of the population is Catholic, with an even larger proportion in the lower middle classes from which public-school teachers are recruited, the personnel of the public-school system is largely Catholic and largely educated in the parochial-school system. In "Bay City," Protestants concerned with the public school have often pointed to the composition of the teaching personnel as strongly affecting the kind of education given. We, of course, cannot evaluate this claim from our data.

Finally, we must consider the effect of the withdrawal of a significant portion of the potential student population into the parochial schools. Strodbeck's study of the New Haven high schools indicates that it is the Catholic with a higher IQ and higher motivation who goes to parochial school. Under these conditions, the public schools may become dumping grounds for the less gifted or the "problem"

## *Parochial School Education in America*

Catholic children. This has actually occurred in the French-Canadian neighborhood of "Bay City" where the public school contains a handful of Protestant children and the problem children whom the French-Canadian parochial school either would not accept or have expelled. Among the general population, more significantly among the teachers in "Bay City," this school is reputed to be the poorest in the system. This effect of withdrawal may become all the more serious as the Catholic group rises in occupational and class status and is replaced on the lower levels by other groups. In some neighborhoods in our large metropolitan areas, the public schools have as their constituencies children from the two extremes of the class system, those from the fairly high non-Catholic groups and those from the lowest rungs of the occupational ladder. This phenomenon helps to explain the recent spurt in popularity of private nondenominational schools as, for example, those in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and in the University of Chicago neighborhood.

In this article we have tried to show how it is possible to employ the techniques developed in the empirical branches of social science to cast some light on important issues on the contemporary American scene. The controversies surrounding public education and its alternatives need more material than we have been able to assemble here. These data are fragmentary, but they can be augmented by studies which are wider in scope and cover in greater depth some of the more important topics, such as the power position of the Catholic Church in America.

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olic families with children of school age is reported in Bernard Portis' *An Empirical Analysis of Catholics, Choices between Public and Parochial Elementary Schools*. Unpublished Bachelor's Honors Thesis, Department of Social Relations, Harvard University, 1956. (c) The New Haven High School Study. Conducted by Professor Fred L. Strodbeck and reported in David C. McClelland et. al. (eds.) *Talent and Society*. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1958. The data appearing in this paper were prepared from the basic data kindly made available to the authors by Mr. Strodbeck, whose generosity is gratefully acknowledged. (d) The Diocese of St. Augustine Study. Based on an extensive census of all Catholics in the diocese of St. Augustine, an area covering almost the entire state of Florida, in which more than 50,000 persons were interviewed. All tables shown here were recomputed from data presented in Father George A. Kelly's *Catholics and the Practice of the Faith*. Washington: Catholic University Press, 1946.

- 5 One study of a South Bend, Indiana, parish also shows the same tendency. See Joseph H. Fichter, S. J., *Parochial School*. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1958), p. 384.
- 6 Fichter's study found no differences among persons of different ethnic backgrounds in sending their children to parochial school, and indeed had some difficulty in determining the ethnic background of parents to begin with, since more than seventy percent had come from mixed ethnic backgrounds. Fichter describes his parish as the "parish of the future," in which the national origins of American Catholics have become so diluted as no longer to have any meaning for present day behavior.
- 7 Father Schnepf's study of an unnamed southeastern seaboard city parish during the late 1930's showed a stronger preservative effect of parochial school education. Gerald J. Schnepf, *Leakage from a Catholic Parish* (Washington: Catholic University Press, 1942), pp. 106-111.
- 8 Data in this section have been more fully analyzed in Alice S. Rossi's *Determinants of Reliance on Religious Leaders as Reference Groups*, unpublished memorandum of the "Bay City" Research Project, and James M. Shipton, *Reference Groups in the Formation of Public Opinion*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Social Relations, Harvard University, 1955.

JOSHUA A. FISHMAN

## Childhood Indoctrination for Minority-Group Membership

THIS PAPER deals with the minority-group child and the schools specifically set up for his education within the group. It attempts to examine the effects of such formal education on the attitudes and behavior of the child toward the values, customs, and individuals of the larger society. It also inquires into the effects of the school on his view of himself as an American and as a member of a specific ethnic group. It attempts to assess the extent to which the school contributes to his self-definition and his aspirations as a member of his own group, as well as of American society as a whole.

The school in America operates within a complex cultural environment. There exists an "American" society, in no way dependent on Jews or Catholics, Poles or Italians, Negroes or Orientals. The core of that society is white, Protestant, middle class, and it attracts all other particles to it. This is the culture into which immigrants are assimilated, and it forms the one accepted set of standards, expectations, and aspirations, whether they pertain to clothing, household furnishings, personal beauty, entertainment, or child-rearing.

Yet this does not mean that there is a single core group. Certainly, the white, Protestant, middle-class Americans cannot be said to share a single clear-cut set of cultural patterns. There are important rural-urban, North-South-West, Episcopalian-Lutheran-Baptist, and other differences. Psychologically, however, the term "core culture" still makes sense, particularly when it is used from the point of view of any given minority. It is no more difficult to speak of American than of French or Russian national characteristics. The American cultural constellation is not a fixed one, but it is certainly there as a structural, dynamic, meaningful whole.

The present discussion deals with only one theatre of activity, the life of the minority-group child, and with only one instrument, his

school. There are infinitely more complex and diversified social processes that affect both school and child, but it is nevertheless useful to concentrate on a specific set of problems and to build on a single set of assumptions. The assumptions posit a compelling American core culture, toward which the minority-group child has ambivalent feelings. He is attracted to it, surrenders willingly to it, desires to participate fully in it. The imperfect congruence between his aspiration and the possibility of his being absorbed generates ambivalence whenever he is rejected. Nevertheless, the minority-group child is ever ready to swallow his pride and try once more. This core culture, therefore, establishes the direction and intensity of American impact on the minority-group child and on his feelings of belonging. We are here attempting to examine the effects that schools established by minority groups have upon these attitudes.

It will be useful to say something about the concepts of retentionism, separatism, integrationism, and biculturalism that figure in the discussion that follows. By "retentionism," I mean the attempts by the minority group, either through the school or by any other means, to retain unique values and behavior, either in an altered or adapted form, or under the maximal self-determining conditions which the given minority group has attained.

By "separatism," I mean a tendency not to interact with the American core. Separatism is exclusive; it posits the superiority of the in-group, and the inferiority or undesirability (often in moral or ethical terms) of the core group. Separatism is a matter of degree, however, and the above definition merely indicates its extreme forms.

By "integrationism," I mean a tendency to maximal interaction with the American core. Integrationism posits the preferability of the "core" group to that of the minority in-group. Integrationism looks toward the incorporation of the member of the minority group in the "core." Although integrationism is regarded by its opponents as a euphemism for "a will to disappear," it is not necessarily that. When it is weak, it may not even mean a denial of separatism, since the two may co-exist within the same individual or group.

By "biculturalism," I mean an orientation toward a maximally creative and positive involvement in the value-behavior complex of both the minority and the core. Biculturalism involves selection from both systems and a synthesis of the elements selected. Biculturalism results from the interaction of two healthy cultural systems within a single individual or group, with neither system dominating the other. It also represents a nonextreme and unfinished solution, one that must be worked out, bit by bit, over time. It is not an immediately available

system which provides ready-made solutions to all present and future problems, as do the extremes of separatism or of integrationism.

These remarks will be limited to only three of the American minority groups, the Negroes, the Catholics, and the Jews. These are the groups on which most psychological and sociological research has been concentrated; studies of their schools extend over more than a few decades. Furthermore, these are the largest minority groups, and their success in the bicultural rearing of their children, therefore, will strikingly affect the course of other, smaller minorities. What is more, since they constitute a quarter or more of the American population, their experiences are of great importance for the entire structure of life in the United States. Finally, these three groups differ radically as to their relation to the core, their internal organization, and their retentionist interests and activities. It will be useful to note whether these differences affect the retentionist outcomes of stimuli derived from school experiences. If not, it is possible that all American minority groups display strong psychological and social similarities in relation to the core.

The problems of Negroes in the United States are in many ways markedly dissimilar from those of other American minority groups. Instead of the removable stain of immigrant status, they carry the indelible stain of pejorative pigmentation. Their former bondage sets them apart from even the most disadvantaged white-skinned minorities, while their liberation has left a still sensitive scar in American social, political, and economic life. They constitute the only American minority with whom memories of white fratricide and of interracial homicide are alike associated. Severe sexual taboos and dislocations in status surround their acceptance into white, Protestant, middle-class society. Their deliverance is still a long way off.

Negro secular schools, staffed and supported by the Negro community specifically to foster a positive biculturalism, do exist at all rungs of the educational ladder.\* Negro religious schools may also

\* Even more than in the case of other American minority groups, it is important to spell out the values of American Negro societies, with respect to both their congruences and conflicts with the American core values. There are a few studies which indicate that upper-, middle- and lower-class Negroes and whites have very similar values and child-rearing practices. On the other hand, the variants in Christian tenets, the folksongs and tales, the group values related to recent servitude, the ties with African groups now achieving or approaching nationhood, the "typical" views of self and of life that are related to being Negro—all these are known only intuitively, and are suggested here as elements in a specifically American-Negro cultural milieu.

aid the same purpose. Unfortunately, there have been few studies of children or young people attending either type of schools.

The only parochial setting in which Negro children have been fairly intensively studied is the segregated public school. This school differs from those of other minority groups, first because it is neither maintained, directed, nor, indeed, positively regarded by the community it serves, and second, because its curriculum and standards are limited by the very community which imposes inferior status on the Negro. As a result, the segregated public school has often functioned under conditions inverse to those governing other minority-group schools: both the direct and the indirect stimuli for keeping segregated schools come from the outside, not the inside.

Nevertheless, the similarities in striving among America's minority-group children are such that findings based on the segregated Negro schools do not differ significantly from those based on the voluntarily segregated institutions sponsored by other groups. One may ask about segregated Negro education some of the questions we ask about Catholic and Jewish schools. To what extent do they succeed in bolstering pride and security in one's group? To what extent do they succeed in communicating to their students the accomplishments of Negro culture in this country and elsewhere? To what extent do their students develop positive self-feelings and identifications with being Negro, as well as the ability to interact positively with white society without denying the values and achievements of their own group?

An early series of studies and more recent ones as well<sup>1</sup> have consistently pointed toward the high premium placed on light pigmentation by Negro nursery-school children attending both voluntarily and involuntarily segregated, semisegregated, and mixed schools. All Negro children, from the lightest to the darkest, tend to report their own pigmentation as lighter than it actually is, and light-skinned Negro children still frequently identify themselves as white at ages when darker Negro children have accepted the actuality, though not the desirability, of their negroid features. Light-skinned nursery-age children are preferred as friends, are oftener assigned desirable characteristics, and report fewer difficulties later in connection with being Negro when they are aged ten to twelve. The Northern Negro child permits himself white self-ascriptions more frequently and until a later age than the Southern Negro child.

These attitudes and preferences certainly do not spring from stimuli originating in the school. The Negro child derives them from adult

Negro values, and the latter, in turn, are derived from the core society and the core values, toward which the values of the American Negro are oriented. These values are not bicultural, and they permeate the Negro child's attitudes to himself and others.

A number of studies over a long span of years have reported that the attitudes of Negro children (attending segregated and semisegregated schools) toward white children are more favorable than the attitudes of the white children toward them.<sup>2</sup> This preference has been found to increase with the age of the Negro children. Negro children have also been found to be critical or nonaccepting of other Negroes in some of the areas mentioned by white children, for example, in their mechanical and intellectual ability.<sup>3</sup> Several investigators have concluded from such data that American children reflect the social attitudes of the society of which they seek to be a part, regardless of the race, color, or creed of the particular group of which they are members.<sup>4</sup> Differences are only in degree, not in kind. The fact that the attitude of segregated Negro high-school students toward Negroes was, before the Supreme Court decision of 1954, more positive than was previously reported<sup>5</sup> may have wide-reaching implications if it can be related to other social processes in both the Negro and the white communities. One related factor was the recorded improvement in white children's attitudes to Negroes in the same communities. The upheaval and dislocation after the Supreme Court decision may have negated the mutually facilitating process that was possibly in operation.

Two other studies of great theoretical interest compare Negro children attending schools of various degrees and types of segregation. Both are more than a decade old, so that further investigation would be needed to make sure that their conclusions still obtain. A comparison of attitudinal adjustment toward Negroes and whites on the part of Negro students in mixed and segregated high schools in Ohio<sup>6</sup> found that the least significant difference between these two groups of students was in their attitudes toward "other" pupils (these were predominantly white in the mixed schools), although even specific attitudes to Negroes were not reliably different. A highly provocative study compared the attitudes of children living in all-Negro communities in Oklahoma with those of Negro children residing in various biracial communities of the South and North.<sup>7</sup> The investigator concluded that an individual growing up in an all-Negro society would have virtually the same attitudes toward whites as would any other American Negro. On the other hand, the individuals reared in the all-Negro communities were found to have much more

favorable attitudes toward Negroes. This last finding recalls a much earlier one pointing to certain general benefits to personality accruing to children who attended segregated rather than mixed schools in Cincinnati.<sup>8</sup> Actually, the balance of benefits as between the two types of schools was precarious. The segregated group showed more social participation but less versatility in play, a greater tendency toward self-criticism, but also a greater interest in skilled professions, and, therefore, perhaps less inclination to leave school and try to get a job.

This research overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that the attitudes of American Negro children educated in segregated schools to their own group and to others, including the dominant white group, their vocational aspirations, their concepts of right and wrong, their hobbies and interests, to an overwhelming extent are influenced by the attitudes and behavior of significant core groups and by the attitude-forming media which the core society controls. Similar findings for Negro children attending nonsegregated schools are also plentiful. Although new conditions are now appearing, their general effect will probably make Negro children even more responsive and more exposed to the standards, strivings, and values of the core society. If this is really true for the Negro child (whose social distance from the core, to begin with, is greatest and is "legally" reinforced) and for the segregated school (at which attendance is enforced by external authorities), then the implications for children in other minority-group schools are unmistakable.

The American Catholic minority is quite different. Its schools, unlike those of the Negroes, are directly maintained by strong forces arising from within, rather than as a result of exclusion from without. Attendance is mandatory rather than merely desirable—although a large area of "extenuating circumstances" is recognized as excusing nonattendance. Unlike the case of the Negro minority, the issue of self-directed separation versus greater integration in the American community is a live one among Catholics, with both alternatives actively competing. Unlike the Jewish community, there are no structurally safeguarded gradational subdivisions within the Catholic religious leadership that correspond to alternative retentivistic philosophies. Like the Jewish minority, American Catholics come from a variety of European backgrounds. Two important factors in the development of American Catholic institutions, however, have been the numerical superiority and the superior status of Catholics of Irish derivation. Certain uniquely Irish-Catholic experiences in the "old



country," as well as specifically Irish experiences on their arriving in America after the potato famines, have all left a stamp on the course of Catholicism in the United States.

Though they are the largest and best organized religious-cultural group in this country, Catholics have influenced American values and institutions far less than their thirty-odd million might have led one to predict. This is probably attributable to two opposing forces: the engulfing appeal of American secular life, on the one hand, and the tenacious in-breeding of Catholic energies through a huge network of educational, social, cultural, and economic institutions paralleling those of the core society, on the other. Although non-Catholic Americans have pointed to the separatist-retentionist power of this latter complex of forces (not to mention some people's dread that Catholics might dominate American life), Catholic leaders have even oftener recognized the constantly debilitating influence on Catholics of the dominant forces in American society as a whole. Recent changes in Catholic voting behavior, the rising rate of Catholics' marrying non-Catholics, the extremely high rate of their attendance at non-Catholic institutions of secondary and higher education—these are facts not to be overlooked in discussing the success of Catholic retentionist efforts in contemporary America.

A large-scale, thorough study of boys attending Catholic high schools<sup>9</sup> revealed the preponderant influence of the home and neighborhood over church and school in establishing interests and attitudes. Nearly half the two thousand boys studied in twenty schools throughout the country declared that their schools had not influenced their vocational choices, and fully two-thirds considered that their teachers did not understand their problems. Only 12 percent named the priest as their source of intimate counsel, while 56 percent believed that their parish provided insufficient social meetings for boys and girls. An athlete ranked first as their ideal or hero, while Jesus took third place. As to the aspirations they expressed, money ranked first, material possessions for pleasure ranked second, and eternal happiness and salvation third. Heading the list of their personal problems was the question of purity and sex. One-third reported they were unaware of what was sinful. Their primary sources of information on sex were companions (half of the boys), secular books (39 percent), secular magazines (32 percent), priests (26 percent) and "the street" (23 percent). A study of girls, while it revealed slightly less of a departure from the values of school and church, also showed a noticeably questioning attitude toward restrictions in reading, movies, and drinking.<sup>10</sup>

The ability of the Catholic parochial school to further retentionism may be measured in terms of religious understanding, belief, and practice, and of leisure-time and vocational interests. With respect to religion, Catholic educators have reported many findings that demonstrate the difficulties of their task. A series of interesting studies shows the lack of success as late as the eighth, ninth, and tenth grades in training children to recognize the central position of the Mass in Catholic worship: almost two-thirds of over a thousand parochial-school eighth-grade children investigated gave unsatisfactory replies.<sup>11</sup> By far the largest number of parochial-school children leave the Catholic school system after the eighth grade to attend public high, vocational, and technical schools. Those remaining in the ninth and tenth grades are a much more select group, at least as far as parental and home factors are concerned. Even so, studies of children in these two grades revealed that the gain in understanding and attitudes concerning the Mass was small, in spite of one or two years of difference in maturity and in instruction.<sup>12</sup> Even graduates of twelve- and sixteen-year programs of Catholic-sponsored study are described as retaining merely "a string of dogmas and moral precepts, threats and promises, customs and rites, tasks and duties [which are regarded as] imposed on unfortunate Catholics whilst the non-Catholic gets off free."<sup>13</sup>

A series of studies of the topics Catholic high-school boys remember in connection with retreats consistently points to purity and sex as of major interest, as compared with a negligible interest in God, ultimate ends, prayer, grace, and the sacraments. Reading interests during periods of retreat show a similar trend. Although in one study students attending Catholic schools were found to be more spiritually motivated in forgoing their own immediate satisfactions for the benefit of others, they did not differ at all from comparable students attending public schools in their readiness for such self-sacrifice.<sup>14</sup>

The familiar pattern of accepting direction from elsewhere than the school is also observed in leisure activities and vocational goals. The reading interests of Catholic high-school boys, for instance, are concentrated almost exclusively on sports, adventure and mystery stories. Indifference to Catholic publications of any kind is general.<sup>15</sup> Interest in religious vocations, as reported by a variety of investigators, or the influence of religion on any vocational choice is slight and steadily decreases as the children grow older.<sup>16</sup>

In intergroup relations, the successful inculcation of school-derived and school-supported views also seems negligible. Thus the attitudes to Negroes on the part of white, Catholic, parochial-school

## *Childhood Indoctrination*

children in the South have been found to be negative; they showed no improvement with an increased length of school attendance, and differed not at all from those of Catholic children attending public schools. The phenomenon cannot be ascribed to the Negro's overwhelming non-Catholicism, since Catholic parochial-school children in the Southwest are even more intensely anti-Mexican (and the Mexicans are Catholic) than the students in the South are anti-Negro. Anti-Jewish sentiments among parochial-school children have also been chronicled. Thus it seems that the child arrives at the Catholic parochial school with already established attitudes and needs in relation to his total American environment, and that the school itself is not strong enough to change these attitudes, even when it regards change as desirable. A similar conclusion concerning the impact of Catholicism on the political, social, and economic attitudes of adult Catholics appears from the nationwide Catholic public-opinion surveys conducted by the Catholic University of America.

Perhaps the extent of intermarriage is the best criterion of the ability of the Catholic parochial school to regulate its students' integration with the general American community. Although even in the absence of intermarriage it may well prove impossible to maintain a dynamic minority-group community, it certainly seems improbable that such a community can be maintained if the group cannot control attitudes to intermarriage. The many studies (with only one to the contrary) which have disclosed that attendance at parochial school does not appreciably affect the Catholic child's attitudes toward intermarriage<sup>17</sup> must be taken as evidence that the retentionist effectiveness of the Catholic school, when face to face with the "indulgent" American Protestantism and nonviolent secularism of the twentieth century, is far less than obtained during earlier periods, when Catholics suffered actual persecution.

The tireless efforts of Catholic leaders to employ parochial education to transmit the deep philosophical and religious differences which separate Catholicism from American Protestantism and from secularism have been most consistently embarrassed by the strivings of Catholic parents, young people, and children. Although the educators protest that it is "surely not enough" for parochial schools "to boast that their graduates are fine Americans [since] this is not the divine standard by which they shall be judged,"<sup>18</sup> they nevertheless suspect that they have often been forced to trade their "splendid educational heritage for a 'mess of North Central Association potage.'"<sup>19</sup>

The Jewish school of whatever type can be no more effective in creative retentionism than the Catholic school. In fact, Jewish education, serving a numerically smaller and far less organized and unified group, functioning most frequently on a supplementary basis (on weekday afternoons or Sunday only), and concentrating on the short time span of late childhood and early adolescence, faces many problems unknown to Catholic education. In many ways the Jewish minority epitomizes values and trends found in the core, and it is the most urbanized group in a society tending to increasing urbanization. Its tradition of universal intellectual and higher-order conceptual interests dovetails with the core's increasing devaluation of manual drudgery. Its traditional educational emphasis brings it into contact with the very best of American and worldwide cultural and technical proficiency at a time when the core society itself is entering on a frenzied pursuit of higher and technical education. The shedding of Jewish traditional ways and beliefs has therefore been hastened in a period of unparalleled American pragmatism, secularism, and permissiveness in the personal, social, and economic spheres. Under such circumstances, the current which the Jewish retentivist school must battle is strong indeed.

There have been surprisingly few studies of the effects of Jewish schooling of any kind upon concurrent or later interaction with the "America-American-Americans" complex. In most Jewish educational circles there is a strong disinclination for objective studies of "outcomes"; such calculation is nontraditional, and in addition there is probably an unconscious recognition that the better the calculation, the less pleasant the truths revealed. Estimates of outcomes involving Americanism are doubly taboo. At one ideological extreme there is a hypersensitivity to the idea that perhaps anything less than a "perfect adjustment" to the American environment is obtained, particularly in view of the fact that something quite different from an adjustment to "American success" is desired in the first place. At the other extreme is a similar fear born of the realization that the bicultural efforts of the school cannot really compensate for the rebuffs the child receives from the core society.

In a group such as this, that needs at least eleven distinct types of schools, all for the purpose of indoctrinating its young for membership in a minority group, in accord with varying philosophies, one might expect somewhat differing results for retentionism. On the whole, however, a fragmented Jewish education can no more point to any signs of successful biculturalistic retentionism than can a seemingly uniform Catholic education. In fact, the results are strikingly

similar for both groups, even if, regrettably, we must rely on studies conducted over many years, with many disparate instruments.

A series of studies spanning twenty-five years by the only investigator to have done more than superficial work provides us with interesting and consistent results.<sup>20</sup> With respect to attitudes toward and knowledge of Jews and Jewishness, L. Lehrer has consistently found that there are only insignificant differences between children receiving a formal Jewish education and those without such an education, or among children differentiated as to the specific type of Jewish education received. Some minor differences in sex and age do approach significance, but their consistency from one study to another is low. It seems justifiable to conclude that the highly differentiated organizational-ideological sponsorship of Jewish education corresponds neither to dynamic differences in the parental societies from which Jewish school children come, nor, most emphatically, to the different milieus of Jewish children. Lehrer concludes that "no matter how divergent the various circles of the Jewish people in America, no difference is noticeable among their children in the . . . character of their national belonging. Apparently, the Jewish environment is so constructed that every circle leads to the same psychological state in early childhood."<sup>21</sup> Yet another quotation from Lehrer's work suggests a conclusion which seems as relevant today as it was over a decade ago, and as applicable to children attending non-Jewish minority-group schools as to those attending Jewish schools:<sup>22</sup>

In a community where Jewishness is restricted to an existence primarily on an ideological, intellectual plane and is insufficiently enriched by the natural forces that exist in a full way of life . . . a child who is detached from our social functioning will sense in us primarily our weak and discriminated status, a status from which it is imperative that he escape. This will lead him to seek proximity to others, to search for protection by identifying with those objectively stronger, not knowing that this mode of adjustment also opens the way for tragic disappointments and conflicts.

That the Jewish schools, therefore, wield insufficient forces for "attaching" the vast majority of children from "unattached" homes to Jewish social functioning is an undeniable fact.

Other studies point to the mild effect of Jewish education in establishing unique behavior or values. That such education does not appreciably affect traits of character and personality is shown by at least two early studies.<sup>23</sup> A comparatively recent one concludes that in choosing friends Jewish boys' behavior toward one another does not reflect the degrees or kinds of Jewish education their parents have selected for them.<sup>24</sup> A highly regarded recent investigation states

that Jewish boys in attending synagogue and neighborhood centers strive for increasingly broader, "in common," non-Jewish friendships and activities as they grow older and as their socio-economic level rises.<sup>25</sup> This is also the finding of a companion study of both boys and girls in another city.<sup>26</sup> Some insignificant correlations between childhood Jewish education and early adult Jewish activities have also been reported.<sup>27</sup> A study comparing Zionist and non-Zionist college students reports that both groups failed to mention Jewish education (a background variable on which they differed significantly and in the expected direction) among the facts they believed had affected their current attitudes toward the Jewish group.<sup>28</sup>

Two studies point to interesting successes in retentionism. In one, the students of Yiddish secular schools who had obtained the highest scores on a scale reflecting the degree to which they heard and used the Yiddish language also defined themselves as Jews (not employing the "American" option) more frequently than did children with lower scores on this scale. These children, however, did not differ from the others with respect to leisure activities,<sup>29</sup> the number of intimate friends they claimed, or the public-school marks they achieved. They did differ significantly from the others in the frequency with which they expressed interest in Yiddish for its general cultural and group-survival values, rather than for family, secretive, or general educational values. The investigator concluded that the high scores on his bilingual scale were concomitants of specific in-group identifications, but that they had no concomitants in the child's general activities and interests beyond the control of the in-group. In the absence of reliable data concerning either the measure of bilingualism or its concomitants, as well as in the absence of any following study of the longitudinal permanence of the findings, this claim—although it may be valid—seems somewhat premature. Assuming its validity, we cannot but be impressed by its separatist connotations, as opposed to a biculturalism that is truly open in both directions.

The same author also recently reported a large-scale study of the negative stereotypes concerning American values, practices, and persons subscribed to by students attending eleven separate ideological-structural types of Jewish schools.<sup>30</sup> Except for one type of school, no significant difference in their readiness to accept these negative stereotypes was noted between students attending different types of Jewish schools, whether the children were classified only by types of school or were further classified by age, length of attendance at the Jewish school, parental occupation, parental birthplace, or parental

education. The one consistent exception involved the students of Orthodox all-day schools. These students showed a significantly greater willingness to accept such negative stereotypes. However, when these students were grouped by age, from eight to thirteen, their acceptance of negative stereotypes lessened steadily, with the result that by the time they were thirteen there was no longer any important difference between these students and all the others. Within the Orthodox all-day school, an analysis by years of study (holding age constant) also suggested a decreasing acceptance of negative stereotypes concerning American values, practices, and persons. The author concluded that American-Jewish children, regardless of the specific type of minority-group indoctrination they receive, seek acceptance by and participation in the American core society. For many Orthodox all-day school students, coming as they do from separatist homes and adult milieus, the school functions as a major agency for Americanization, acquainting them with American pastimes, cultural values, and societal opportunities. Again, the conclusions are probably exaggerated; but, if we grant their validity, the only retentionist successes to which they point are heavily tinged with exclusiveness and separatism at the direct expense of biculturalism.

A few additional studies may be mentioned. A recent study compared the attitudes toward non-Jews on the part of Jewish children attending a "traditional" all-day school with those of other Jewish children (equated for age, sex, and parental socio-economic status) attending public schools. This study substantiates the hypothesis advanced by an earlier investigation, that no significant differences would appear.<sup>31</sup> The two samples of pupils were also compared with respect to their in-group attitudes. No clear differences emerged between the two groups of children, so dissimilar in their Jewish experiences. Dissatisfaction with being Jewish was about equally prevalent. Although differently rationalized and verbalized, the dissatisfactions in both samples derived from the individual and social restrictions and from the penalties perceived as being the concomitants of Jewishness. In addition, both groups regarded the positive features of Jewishness in much the same manner; they overrated the importance of Chanukkah, for example, and underrated other features of Jewish tradition. This compensatory mechanism for feelings of inferiority because of the colorful pageantry of Christmas is a significant index of the source of values and aspirations for both groups. Just as "parochial" as opposed to "public" education for Jewish children does not seem to be the "controlling variable . . . in the etiology of positive and



negative out-group feelings in young children," neither does it seem to be such a variable in ambivalent feelings toward membership in the Jewish group.

Yet another recent study, with somewhat different primary interests, considered not only the ideological affiliation but also the generational position among Jewish children.<sup>32</sup> Its findings agree with those of the studies previously reported. Jewish boys from the first to the third generation show an ascending "inner maladjustment" on a projective scale for measuring personality. Socio-economic status and the ideological affiliation of the school or synagogue attended seem to have little effect on these or subsequent scores. Scores on a structured measure of "social maladjustment" show an opposite trend, with the third-generation boys scoring best, and the first generation, worst. In connection with this last measurement, the author believes that boys born abroad, whose parents are not fully Americanized, may either feel somewhat insecure in their overt relationships with American society, or they may not as yet be endeavoring to adopt American norms of social adjustment. The third-generation boys, however, seek to appear as fully Americanized, as socially indistinguishable from the core group, as possible. In connection with the first measurements cited above, the author believes that the higher the degree of acculturation without acceptance by the dominant group, the greater the probability of "inner maladjustment" and marginal feeling. The generational trends were as clear among boys attending Orthodox schools of various structural types as among boys attending schools of other ideological and structural combinations.

Finally, it is appropriate to mention a study of those who continue their Jewish education past the normally terminal, elementary level.<sup>33</sup> These young people, attending Jewish supplementary high schools and teachers' seminaries in various cities, were asked to describe any crises they had experienced which had almost brought them to the verge of quitting. The respondents with the most intensely Jewish home environment most frequently named crises involving the attractions or demands of the surrounding, non-Jewish, cultural sphere. Subjects from less intensely Jewish homes, and, therefore, probably in no such conflict about the attractive features of the general American environment, usually attributed their crises to dissatisfaction with the Jewish school itself.

Many people are concerned about the marginal man, and in truth he represents a conspicuous problem in the participation of Jewish and other minority-group children in American core society, whether or not these children attend a minority-group school. The school is

generally too weak to produce enduring conflicts or enduring retentionism. The reason for a marginal relation lies in the core society and its "look me over but don't touch me" invitation to the minority-group child. A vigorous biculturalism could abolish this marginal relation, as could a vigorous separatism. The minority-group school, however, is too debilitated and timid for either of these ventures. It is certainly in no position to undertake the more difficult and the more initially disruptive of the two, a genuine biculturalism.

This does not mean that the minority-group school accomplishes nothing, however. It exists in order to maintain certain minority values, which wage a losing conflict with core values; but this is only one level at which the effectiveness of minority-group schools can be evaluated. There is undoubtedly a second level, that of social relations, and here the school serves to maintain intragroup relations among minority-group children. It is one of the institutions of the minority-group community that preserves a relative amount of solidarity and intragroup feeling from childhood through marriage, and as such it affects choices in friendship, political opinions, levels of aspiration, and biases. The relation between school and neighborhood should perhaps be studied more carefully. The most effective minority-group school may prove to be one located in the more highly organized or more culturally intensive of the minority-group communities.

The foregoing studies are sadly insufficient as a research program for answering many significant questions about the minority-group child. Spread over a quarter of a century or more, they suffer from shortcomings in their design and in their statistical analysis; they reveal a bewildering proliferation of methods and lack the refinements of controls and independent checks—above all, they lack the interdisciplinary focus and enrichment that differentiate true research programs from fragmentary short-term excursions.

Nevertheless, these studies do serve as straws in the wind, and our confidence in them is bolstered by the consistent trend they show. The minority-group school is patently unable to rechannel the major strivings and the behavior of the child in relation to the "America-American-Americans" complex. Not only is the child's response to American values, goals, and opportunities beyond regulation or substantial modification by the school, but also this response is well established even before the child attends school. With these values, goals, and opportunities beckoning to the minority-group child as attractively (if not more so) as to the child with a core background, the ethical, ethnological, and logical arguments for biculturalism run against insur-

mountable difficulties from an entirely different realm. Dynamic biculturalism may exist in certain parts of the globe, but not in any setting like America's constellation of socio-psychological and politico-economic realities. These realities make it simpler for American minorities to maintain a "separatist" existence than a bicultural balance. A two-front campaign is beyond their logistic resources; a one-front campaign is frequently beyond their emotional and material longings, for it entails excluding one's self from the American dream.

The weakness of retentionism is perceived even by minority-group leaders. Thus, the basic needs of children and adolescents are chiefly met by activities and programs that have little if any in-group distinctiveness. These programs imply that, if the leadership must painlessly work toward its long-range retentionist goals, it must provide art, recreation, counseling, comradeship, medals, and newspaper publicity. The less central and less distinctive goals are played up because these, not the retentionistic goals, are of natural and immediate interest.

Retentionism as inculcated by the schools, therefore, has often had little to show for its pains other than an ability to retreat according to plan. The few reported instances of the successful inculcation by the schools of minority attitudes and behavior are striking indeed. Their common denominator is some type of ethnic exclusivism, rather than pluralism or a broadly conceived biculturalism. Furthermore, a longitudinal study of them has unfortunately been entirely neglected. After all, our ultimate interest is not merely in the consequences of indoctrinating children, but in the mature adult; and at present we have very little from which to extrapolate the successes in retentionism beyond the meager studies of children reviewed above. A few investigations, however, do indicate a substantial consistency between childhood and adult patterns, and in these cases the findings and their implications confirm the conclusion that the schools have only a slight retentionist effect.

If, as it appears, the attitudes and responses of minority-group individuals to American core society do not originate mainly in the school, then we may turn briefly to the following factors, some of which, at least theoretically, may better determine such responses—indeed, may determine the nature of the minority-group school itself.

*The compatibility of values and behavior.* To what degree are the "modal" traits of personality, the "typical" values, goals, and customs of the minority group compatible with those of the core society? This question must be reexamined periodically, since such compatibility as may exist is itself a function of other variables mentioned below.

Retentionism is probably facilitated when a minority and a core society, from the beginning, do not share similar values in terms of material success, attitudes toward centralized governmental intervention, political democracy, and characteristics such as aggressiveness, independence, and experimentalism. Ultimately, it may be more difficult for retentionism to operate successfully in areas where the values are maximally dissimilar or discrepant.

*Participationism and separatism.* Does the minority group reach out toward participation in the core society, or does it so structure its life that separatism is the conscious or preferred outcome? The minority-group school can probably function best against a separatist background. In fact, even the core school may find that under optimally separatist conditions it must accommodate the views of the minority. Participationism as well as separatism undoubtedly exist to some degree within any minority group. Their extent and influence must be mapped, and the effectiveness of the school studied in that light.

*Change versus no change.* Intimately related to the two considerations above is the attitude to changes in its own values on the part of the minority group. It would be misleading to claim that each group merely desires to maintain its own way of life. Societies vary tremendously in their attitudes toward change. The direction of change must also be considered, since the school that is subject to emphases on revitalization or nativism may receive from the society at large impulses different from those that operate when retentionism alone is at issue.

*Vitality and exclusiveness.* Minority groups differ in the degree to which they try to provide their members with structured activities in diverse areas of life. They also differ in the degree to which they succeed in attracting and holding interest in such activities. When the school is the only agent for retentionism, its effectiveness will be the less, and correspondingly, when it is a part of the whole constellation of adult and child activities in all spheres (recreational, cultural, social, religious, and economic), it is the greater.

*Generational cleavage.* To some extent this is a variable related to time. The cleavages in language, customs, values, and goals are probably least either soon after or long after the first exposure of the minority group to the American core society. This curvilinear relation affects the school, and the attitude of an in-group society to such a cleavage must therefore be ascertained before the effectiveness of the school can be gauged. When I. L. Child (1943) posited his rebellious, in-group, and apathetic types,<sup>34</sup> he was speaking of a society in the

throes of a generational cleavage. Now that our minorities, to the third and fourth generation, have been exposed to American life, this typology may have less meaning. If it still has value, the proportions in each of his three types may show marked changes and thus may produce side effects with which the school must cope.

*Contributions from abroad.* A minority society which is continually receiving blood transfusions from abroad may be able to maintain schools exhibiting greater retentionism than one to which no new blood arrives. The new blood may consist either of ordinary immigrants or teachers, leaders, writers, or others coming from the "old country" to settle in or visit the "colonies" here. Books, music, periodicals, and financial subventions may also stiffen retentionism. Thus, communication with the old country, cultural envoys from the old country, even campaigns to help the old country—all may serve to strengthen emotional and behavioral bonds, just as the school does. On the other hand, if the old country has disappeared, the effect on the school can be shattering.

*The status of the old country.* The disappearance of the old country from the political or cultural map is the extreme instance of dislocation in origins. Wars, political and social changes, economic transformations, or any factors that make the home country different from what it was when the minority group lived there, will affect retentionism. Tensions between the home country and the United States, the appearance of new elites, extensive reforms in language—these are all disruptive factors which must affect the minority-group school here.

*The "new country."* The American mass media, not only in communications, but also in education, recreation, consumption, and production, are a potent force in reducing the distinctiveness of any segment of our population. Even if the democratic and self-determining values of the core group do affect the minorities, such values may be powerless against a uniformity that grows by mutual consent.

*Demographic factors.* The importance of numerical factors is self-evident, particularly if the group settles in highly urbanized surroundings and places a premium on participation. Since the minority-group school often serves a limited area and may therefore have a small enrollment, such further demographic factors as sex ratio, age distribution, population density, and the presence and status of other minority groups must be considered.

It would not be putting it too strongly to say that these factors (and any other larger societal factors) determine either the bicultural or retentionist success of the minority-group school. They interact,

of course, and, in different groups at any time or in the same group at different times, they account for the variations in ascertaining school outcomes. If the school is to be a success, some need must be felt for the survival of the minority group. There must be some soil from which it can get nourishment—economic necessity, the social protection of the individual, religious convictions, or national pride. There must be some sociogenic or biogenic purposes it helps to serve better than do other groups in our complex society, in which multiple reference groups are so common. The school itself must build on these foundations, with greater or less success. It cannot normally be expected to provide those foundations.

In most sizable American minority groups, the trend of the variables mentioned above does not encourage the successful pursuit of creative bicultural retentionism. On the other hand, the American core society, even in the distant future, cannot be expected to assimilate physically the American Negro, Jewish, or Catholic societies. A triple or quadruple (or higher multiple) melting pot is here to stay. This represents the final problem—or tragedy—of the large American minority groups. Both psychologically and socially, the minorities are destined for a state of suspended animation. Having surrendered their own creative cultural props in the pursuit of the American ideal, they are left with the dilemma that the creators of the dream have themselves lost faith in it, and the dream itself cannot then be realized.

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JOSHUA A. FISHMAN

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## OPINIONS AND ISSUES

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### The Situation of Democracy Western Political Institutions in the Twentieth Century

FIFTEEN YEARS after the Armistice of 1918, Hitler was Chancellor of the Reich, Mussolini Prime Minister of a fascist Italy, and the Central and Eastern European countries, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, had suspended the functioning of representative institutions and were being governed by authoritarian or despotic methods of one kind or another. At the time, democracy was degenerating into fascism (if one agrees to apply this name to the purely authoritarian or single-party regimes which were rising up against Communism and parliamentary government), and the more or less real Communist menace was being pointed up to justify this recourse to violence.

What is the picture at the present time, fifteen years after the unconditional surrender of the Third Reich? The European countries which, after the first war, had preserved constitutional regimes based on a multiparty system, retained them after the second. These regimes have become far more stable and are more widely accepted than they were in the 1930's. Austria and Germany have, at least in appearance, joined the group of democracies which we shall call stabilized democracies.

Among the European countries, France and Italy belong to a second category. The former has, except during the German occupation, continually safeguarded its representative and liberal institutions, but it has not succeeded either in winning the population as a whole over to the regime or in ensuring the latter against a kind of permanent instability. As for Italy, it has the largest Communist party in Western Europe; and the very existence of a large number of militants and other citizens who act and vote in accordance with the orders of a party that aims at destroying constitutional pluralism

## *The Situation of Democracy*

makes it impossible to regard the regime as being definitely established.

An analysis of Europe alone would give an incomplete picture. After 1945, the Americans and the British attempted, consciously or not, to spread democratic institutions throughout Asia and Africa, just as the victors of World War I attempted to do in Central and Eastern Europe. In which countries have the institutions stood the test? Is their success assured in India? What is the significance of "guided democracy" in Indonesia and of the military-dominated regimes in Pakistan, Burma and Thailand?

Apart from the old European states and the new states in Asia and Africa, the United States, Australia and New Zealand are in the category of stabilized democracies, and most of the South American states are in a category closer to that of France and Italy than that of Great Britain or Switzerland. With the possible exception of Uruguay, the Central and South American states seem to oscillate between the two extremes of unstable democracy and stable despotism.

We shall first attempt to define the conditions of democratic stabilization in order to perceive, by means of comparison, what is lacking in the countries which thus far have not achieved this stabilization.

A democracy may be called stabilized when it is legitimate and normally efficient. A regime is legitimate if the vast majority of those it governs regard it as such. The less a constitution is challenged, the more legitimate it is. It is the disappearance or scarcity of revolutionaries that sanctions the legitimacy of a democratic (or, as I prefer to call it, constitutional-pluralistic) regime. As for efficiency, it lies in the stability of governments and the consistency of majorities. It does not exclude error (the diplomacy of English democracy was not superior to that of French democracy between the two wars), but it does exclude inability to choose. Democracy involves orderly competition among parties and candidates for office. It is efficient, in our sense of the word, when legal competition gives rise in actual fact to a majority, a government, a popular will, when the law of the majority brings forth an executive who is capable of acting and opponents who are resolved or resigned not to paralyse the action of their momentarily fortunate rivals.

The connections between legitimacy and efficiency are many and manifest. Legitimacy, that is, a general or all but general acceptance of constitutional rules by parties and citizens, gives governments the force they derive from popular adhesion. The governors have more

self-confidence; they are more ready to make major decisions when they feel no doubt about their authority, when they feel that the entire nation is behind them. Not that the entire nation approves of them, but that it unanimously recognizes their right to decide. Furthermore, the absence or weakness of revolutionary parties increases the chances of there being a government majority in so far as it reduces the number of systematic opponents, those who will not support any government because they are hostile to the regime itself.

Nevertheless, the two terms are not indissociable. A legitimate democracy may be inefficient if, for example, the various parties and individuals, though all, or almost all, approve the constitution, are unable to organize or to work together in such a way that a government can endure and apply a policy. French democracy never achieved this kind of efficiency, not even at the beginning of the present century, when it had almost eliminated left-wing and right-wing revolutionaries. On the other hand, a democratic regime, even though it is resisted by a strong extremist opposition, may accord its governors both time and authority, since the threat of revolution leads the defenders of the regime to unite.

Which countries have achieved this "democratic stabilization"? According to the sociologist S. M. Lipset, they are the following: Australia, Denmark, Great Britain, Ireland, Holland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States; that is, among the great powers, Great Britain and the United States (the only two English-speaking countries) and, among the small nations, Holland, the Scandinavian countries, and the white Dominions, plus the unique case of Switzerland. Between the wars, Czechoslovakia was relatively stable: it functioned with parties that were rigid, but which reached lasting agreements. Since the war, there have been in Finland an important revolutionary party and, at the same time, precarious coalitions; but, despite the proximity of the Soviet Union, the country has manifested an unusual and admirable capacity for democratic resistance. Except for the United States and the white Dominions, it is only in Europe that we find stabilized democracies of the kind found in Great Britain and Sweden.

It is easy to distinguish the characteristics common to the countries in which democracy is stabilized. They are all (with the exception of Ireland) developed countries (the word "developed" is to be understood in the sense implied by the opposite of "underdeveloped," that is, modern, industrialized, with a high per-capita income, a high coefficient of urbanization, and a low percentage of illiteracy). As these various criteria go together, sociologists add

nothing by listing them separately. They are all implied when we say that democratic stabilization seems, for the time being, to have been achieved only in developed or modernized countries.

However, modernization does not automatically entail democratic stabilization; nor is the latter incompatible with earlier phases of growth. The United States has practiced democracy since the end of the eighteenth century, and Switzerland was democratic long before the machine age. Development and wealth favor the functioning of democracy, but the conditions necessary to this functioning can appear in another social context and do not necessarily appear in a context of development.

What are the traits that at the present time characterize what we call *democracy*? As I see it, there are three such traits: the choice of governors and the exercise of authority in conformity with a constitution; free competition among parties and individuals in election to office; and respect for personal, intellectual and public freedoms on the part of the temporary winners in such competition. These three features exist simultaneously in stabilized democracies, and they are logically related to one another, but they are separable. The party in power does not always fully respect the freedom to criticize. There are many intermediate stages between the outright suppression of all opposition and the absolute equality among rival parties in the use of the press and the radio.

If, sociologically speaking, such is the reality of democracy, what determines its functioning or nonfunctioning in the abstract? Let us first consider the question with respect to the political regime itself. Democracy requires that a majority, a government, and a popular will emerge from competition. A regime can be paralysed if the political class is unable to establish coherent parties, if none of the leaders succeeds in obtaining a majority, and if they cannot manage to govern together, if the rules of the game (constitution, electoral law) aggravate group quarrels, etc. Whatever the society's degree of development, the functioning of a democracy depends upon political conditions which are all related to the basic problem of modern democracies; that of arriving at a common decision after the clash of opposed groups.

The strictly political conditions are all the more likely to be fulfilled if the neutralized army does not engage in politics, if the bulk of the population is relatively satisfied with its lot and counts on progressive reforms to improve it, if the extremist parties and grandiose ideologies have lost their power of attraction and if the problems to be solved and the measures to be taken do not encounter

irreducible opposition from important minorities. When the army threatens to substitute force for law, the constitutional process is impossible. When the masses feel they are being unjustly treated by the government, it is difficult for the latter to expose itself regularly to popular elections. If the extremist parties win millions of adherents, the regime loses part of its legitimacy. When governments have to choose from among incompatible policies and when important minorities are ready to fight rather than yield to the law of the majority, the regime is imperiled. The United States was confronted with this problem at the time of the Civil War, and France has been faced with it in connection with Algeria.

What relation is there between these favorable circumstances, on the one hand, and development (or modernization) on the other? The neutralization of the army was achieved in the English-speaking countries *before* the rise of industrial society. As a rule, the latter favors such a neutralization; in so far as government becomes a matter of regulating complex institutions and collective work, army leaders hesitate to arrest the constitutional process and themselves to exercise the functions of government. But the case of France, to which we shall come back, reminds us that there are exceptions. A society in the forefront of development, like that of the United States, inevitably gives its army leaders (who do not at all threaten democracy) a greater influence owing to the country's widening responsibilities on the world scene.

In like manner, a developed society can oftenest satisfy the people's demands or at least allow it to hope that reforms will be introduced and that justice will prevail. Consequently, the situation of extremists, both of the left and right, is weakened. Once the economy has entered the phase of cumulative growth, there is no longer—in normal times—any need of making decisions that seem to involve mortal danger for one group or another.

It is easy, therefore, by means of analysis, to account for the concomitance of *development* and *democratic stabilization*. But this same analysis enables us to understand the reasons why actual determination is not involved and to know the causes of the exceptions.

In all countries, even those which are developed, passionate discussion can take place, whether because a serious decision regarding external policy must be made or because an economic depression upsets domestic order. Such discussions have taken place in all developed countries in the twentieth century. The United States was more deeply affected by the depression of the 1930's than most European countries were. Great Britain was deeply split as to the

## *The Situation of Democracy*

attitude to be adopted toward Hitler and, more recently, Nasser. In neither case did the national crisis become a constitutional one. Public opinion tried to solve the problems confronting the nation as a result of the depression and of the existence of the Third Reich. It did not feel that in order to solve these problems, a constitutional reform was first necessary. In Germany, the Weimar Republic was swept away as a result of the joint pressure of the depression and the demands of the nationalists. In France, every national crisis automatically becomes a constitutional one. Even the developed countries have to deal, in the domestic or foreign sphere, with serious problems of a kind that arouse passionate debate. In order for a regime to be considered a stabilized democracy, it is not sufficient for its electoral and parliamentary procedure to seem legitimate and efficient in normal times. Legitimacy and efficiency must be able to resist crises.

In other words, although (if we are to judge from the experience of the present century) development makes for democratic stabilization, it can happen that the strictly political conditions of democracy do not correspond to the progress of industrialization and urbanization, or that they fall so far behind that the regime is unable to resist the first crisis that occurs. The examples of Germany, Italy, and France will enable us to define and understand the limits of the correlation between development and democracy.

In Europe, the democratic regimes have been exposed to attacks from three kinds of opponents: traditionalists, who defend the power of the king or the aristocracy against a drab bourgeois or parliamentary government; right-wing revolutionaries, whether fascists or nationalists, who draw part of their inspiration from traditional ideologies and borrow their methods from the extreme left; and socialists or Communists who denounce the camouflaging of class society and the domination of capitalists at the expense of the working class in democratic institutions.

The Weimar Republic was almost constantly under attack by such reactionary, violent, or utopian opponents. It succumbed when the opponents combined and made it impossible for any constitutional government to function, and when the gravity of the economic crisis and the impatience with which the nationalists made their demands finally devaluated parliamentary procedures. Any democratic regime would succumb in like manner to the conjunction of so many enemies and unfavorable circumstances.

Such a conjunction has become highly unlikely, however. The



three families of opponents are at least temporarily disqualified. The traditionalists have understood that in our time a parliamentary regime is less unreceptive to their values than is a fascist regime. The traditional order is gradually tending to withdraw into the greyness of a past that is over and done with. The right-wing revolutionaries or the so-called fascists have been judged at the bar of history, which they are the last to have a right to challenge. As for the Communists, they were compromised by their alliance with the national enemy, by the regime established in the nearby Soviet zone. Consequently, in the Federal Republic the democratic regime became legitimate all by itself, not because it was introduced and imposed by the victors, but because no other kind of legitimacy was available.

Has this residual legitimacy, so to speak, been gradually transformed into a recognized and consciously affirmed legitimacy? Although we lack the perspective to reply with certainty, it seems to me that it is taking shape. The Germans are discovering little by little that this plain and unglamorous regime is the one that corresponds essentially to their desires in present-day industrial society. Nevertheless, there are two circumstances that prevent us from answering categorically: the role played by a single man and the almost total absence of national ambition. To what extent will the Christian Democratic Party remain united? To what extent will universal suffrage designate one party to exercise power when Chancellor Adenauer is no longer there? Above all—and this question is far more poignant than the first—will the Federal Republic resign itself to the split? Will national unity be maintained intact when the Republic sets itself other objectives than that of regaining its place in the Western world? Let us not forget that it is in the sphere of foreign policy that negotiation and compromise, which are characteristic of a democratic regime, are less readily followed by positive achievement. In one sense, Western Germany, as a result of circumstances, has neutralized not only the army, but diplomacy as well. The case of France and that of Italy are different. In these two countries, millions of citizens vote Communist. In Italy, a socialist party is closely tied up with the Communist party. The dissidence of a large percentage of the electorate (20 to 25 percent in France, 30 to 35 percent in Italy, if one includes the Nenni Socialists) creates the permanent danger of a paralysis of the regime, if the "constitutionally" elected representatives are incapable of constituting a government majority that is both sufficiently large and sufficiently coherent.

Until now this danger has been warded off in Italy, owing to the unity—which has been maintained, despite everything—of the Christian Democratic Party. Whether it had an absolute majority or needed allies, it constituted the nucleus of a governmental coalition; it prevented recurrent governmental crises and the anxious seeking of new combinations. Conflicts within the coalition took place among groups within the Christian Democratic Party. They were less public, less flaunted, than conflicts between groups in the French Assembly.

Despite this relative success of the democratic restoration, there is no certainty as to the future. So long as one third of the electorate votes for parties which do not accept the rules of the game, which remain, as it were, outside the regime, the Christian Democratic Party is the only one that will prevent the chaos that characterized the Fourth French Republic. But the tension within the Christian Democratic Party often gives rise to a fear, perhaps an illusory one, of a split. In quite another connection, the forming of a governmental majority around a party that is regarded as an instrument of the Church has serious disadvantages in the long run.

It is the events of French history that reveal the greatest continuity, both in their confusion and their seeming paradox. In the twentieth century, as in the nineteenth, France has seemed incapable of finding rest and order in a unanimously accepted regime. Since 1930 she has been involved in the old cycle of regimes, constantly threatened because of the absence of legitimacy and efficiency. A more or less large percentage of the voters and members of parliament are openly hostile to the regime; the constitutional parties never manage to discipline their competition in such a way as to form lasting governments. In France, lack of legitimacy and lack of efficiency condition each other; the more systematic the opponents of the regime are, the more heterogeneous the government majority becomes. In 1956, the only possible majority in parliament included Antoine Pinay and Guy Mollet, the Independents and the Socialists.

This analysis, a classical one, is not false, but I think it superficial. French-style democracy, which has been based since 1871 on the supremacy of the Assembly, has regularly entailed a governmental instability that was only imperfectly offset in moments of crisis by the role played by outstanding individuals such as Clemenceau and Poincaré. This instability did not prevent between 1880 and 1914 exceptional achievements outside the domestic sphere: the broadening of the empire, the establishing of a great alliance against Germany, the winning of World War I. If this victory was too costly

and in the end fruitless, the fault did not lie (at least directly) with the regime.

From 1930 onward, the cause of the crisis was the conjunction of the regime's endemic instability and the national problems that were almost insoluble, owing to the insufficiency of the country's resources. How to stand up to the Third Reich, which was impatient to destroy the territorial order resulting from the Versailles Treaty? What position to take after the defeat of the army in 1940? How to maintain or transform the empire after 1945? The weakness of the government paralysed action, but the disputes within the political class and the split in public opinion reflected a deep uncertainty. Could the nation achieve the objectives which it set for itself or which circumstances imposed upon it? The Fourth Republic collapsed because it was unable either to keep or to give up the empire. Were Frenchmen ready for decolonialization in the English manner? Did an imperial policy have any chance of succeeding?

The events that have taken place since May 1958 confirm this interpretation. General de Gaulle has also been carrying out an ambiguous policy in Algeria, refusing both to negotiate with the FLN and to adopt the thesis of integration. He, too, is trying to keep Algeria associated with France, while making concessions to the Moslems. Because the regime of the Fourth Republic was a bad one and the various governments led a precarious existence, Frenchmen finally came to believe that once they had a strong state they would easily achieve their ends. They kept saying that it was in Paris that empires rose or fell. Everyone and everything was held responsible—anti-European nationalism, the Americans, liberal-minded Frenchmen, the Tunisians, the Moroccans, not the Algerians. The brief history of the Fifth Republic suggests a less distorted image of reality.

We thus perceive the complex significance of the Fifth Republic. It is an additional episode in France's tumultuous history. Threatened with civil war, confronted with the disintegration of the civil authorities and the virtual revolt of the army, Frenchmen almost unanimously hailed a savior, as they have so often done since 1789. The people's way of life and the state's way of administering were thereby modified as little as possible. On the other hand, the new constitution, in both theory and practice, is the very opposite of that of the preceding republic; it carefully defines and limits the prerogatives of parliament. In the Fifth Republic, the executive branch is so predominant as to seem authoritarian.

However, the early stages of the new regime do not yet warrant

our prejudging the future. The constitution divides the executive power between the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister. Owing to the personalities of the two men, it is the former who at present makes decisions regarding important matters and the latter who defends these decisions in the Assembly. As the constitution grants the President of the Republic the right to dissolve the legislature and as the Assembly majority, which was elected by claiming to be General de Gaulle's followers, is afraid of being disavowed by him in the next elections, the chief of state has in actual fact an almost unlimited authority. A regime which, on paper, is parliamentary functions as a presidential regime, or, if one prefers, as a personal regime operating on a legal basis and with a parliamentary front.

What, finally, are the lessons suggested by the transition from the Fourth to the Fifth Republic? According to some people, the events of 13 May 1958 illustrate the permanent danger of the army's invading politics, even in a traditionally democratic country. According to others, however, the army offers a nontotalitarian solution in the event of a constitutional crisis. When a regime is paralysed or a nation confronted by an apparently insoluble crisis, the army and an acclaimed leader make it possible to unite the people, and, regardless of temporary dictatorship, to modify institutions. According to still others, a democracy cannot engage in a colonial war, with the result that in order to maintain its sovereignty in Algeria, France has had to adopt a semi-authoritarian constitution. There is an element of truth in all these interpretations, and the non-ideological dictatorship of a charismatic leader will perhaps be taken as a model outside of Europe.

As concerns France, it is correct to say that the crisis has not yet been resolved and at the same time that the likelihood of finding a moderate solution is better than it was a year ago. So long as the Algerian war continues and the regime depends upon a single man, there is no certainty that the conflicting factions will respect constitutional rules. In other words, democratic legitimacy is not firmly established. Furthermore, the constitution lends itself to divergent interpretations: nobody knows what constitutional practice will actually be under a President of the Republic other than General de Gaulle. Despite this uncertainty, the probability is that a few years hence, when the crisis of decolonization has been resolved, France will have a more stable democratic regime than it had in the past century. However, democratic legitimacy may continue to be challenged by part of the electorate, and passionate disputes may be kept alive by the clash of conflicting interpretations of the national idea.

The contrast between stable and unstable democracies cannot be explained by any one determining factor, for example, the degree of modernization or the per-capita income. In view of the fact that the immediate causes of stability are the capacity shown by the politicians to discipline competition and the adhesion of the voters to the constitutional parties, there are many circumstances—some of historical origin, others an expression of the present structure—that can incline the political class to anarchy and make the masses accessible to the temptations of extremists.

Democratic legitimacy requires the allegiance of the conservative right and the socialist left to democratic procedures. Conservatives in England have long utilized and virtually monopolized these procedures. In France, on the other hand, revolutionary events have led conservatives to regard the republic and the parliament as enemies. Successes or failures in the international sphere strengthen or weaken democracy, since the regime is regarded, rightly or wrongly, as being responsible for the national destiny. Furthermore, the nature of national ambitions is not without consequences: postwar France, like prewar Germany, has had ambitions that a party regime cannot satisfy.

Similarly, the rallying of the socialist left is a function of both past and present. Economic progress and a rise in the standard of living obviously favor this rallying; they do not guarantee it. The workers may retain a revolutionary attitude, although the circumstances that once underlay it have long since disappeared. Discontented persons of all classes may go over to a revolutionary party when it is strong. The lower classes of the various nations are not equally inclined to opposition, disputes and factions, owing to a national psychology that may be of historical origin, though it may also be owing to natural character (however equivocal the expression).

Moreover, democratic stability is not necessarily an unmixed blessing. It is, of course, a good thing that constitutional rules cease to be challenged and that popular elections and parliamentary discussions produce a stable government. But at times ideological or national debates subside along with the constitutional debate. Democracy is no longer threatened, but it no longer has great powers; it no longer sets itself great objectives. It is doomed to moderateness, but it is subject to a kind of mediocrity. If there are only two parties, each of them must have an eye to the "unaffiliated" voters, those not committed to either party, right-wing Labourites who may go over to the Conservatives, or left-wing Conservatives who may go over

to the Labour Party. The two parties increasingly come to resemble each other and no longer arouse strong feelings in the general public. When, by accident, a decision is made that arouses politicians (the Suez expedition), the delicate mechanism of this supremely civilized policy seems to be in danger of jamming.

Is this the future of industrial societies? Must politics be reduced to what it is, a secondary activity which is mainly the business of professionals? Will administration be essentially the same, whatever the party in power? Will most of the old controversies be emptied of their ideological content and reduced to their technical elements? I do not pretend to give a categorical answer to this question. Let us merely observe that a less rigid party organization and more ideological or passionate discussion also help to maintain a kind of political vitality, a vitality that may prove to be important for democratic processes. These processes are perhaps threatened by a more subtle danger, one that a comparison of stable and unstable democracies alone is not sufficient to reveal, to wit, the gradual reduction of the role of free competition in the mechanisms of the economy. Relationships have often been established between market competition and competition between parties for the votes of the citizens. The two institutions seem akin in style, in the behavior of the persons involved and in the ideas that inspire them or that are used to justify them. Furthermore, it has often been wondered to what extent elimination of the market would entail elimination of constitutional competition.

In practice, the traditionally democratic states such as those of Great Britain and the United States have been able to intervene to a considerable degree in the economic sphere without in the least endangering the stability of their political institutions. Partial planning and partial state ownership of property have strengthened rather than weakened democracy by helping to win the working class over to the regime. Nevertheless, the fact remains that an entirely bureaucratic management of the economy may, in the long run, make competition between parties and the clash of ideas seem anachronistic. Perhaps the non-European countries which are becoming industrialized in the twentieth century will have difficulty in borrowing from democratic institutions precisely because the latter are contemporary with and akin to economic liberalism and are capable of surviving the latter when they are already rooted, but not capable of taking root where they do not carry on a tradition in a century in which administration, organization, and planning are universal passwords.

After World War I, an attempt was made to spread the democratic regimes of Western Europe, where they were born, to Central and Eastern Europe. After World War II, the countries which had achieved independence, in the zone not dominated by the Soviet Union, also attempted to introduce representative institutions. With few exceptions, these attempts resulted in unstable democracies or unstable despotisms rather than in stabilized democracies.

The new Asian states—India, Burma, Pakistan, Indonesia, Korea, Vietnam—might perhaps be compared to the South American rather than to the European states. The attempts to introduce democracy into South America go back more than a century. In no South American country has democracy achieved the stability of the Anglo-American type; it has oscillated everywhere on that Continent between a constitutional practice which has always been provisional and military dictatorships which have rarely been less precarious. The only distinction introduced by the sociologists is that between countries in which democracies and despotisms (equally unstable) alternate, and countries in which despotisms follow one another without any liberal interlude. Perhaps the South American countries are in the process of leaving this tumultuous past behind. In Uruguay, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, democracy is still of the Latin rather than the Anglo-American type; but it is tending to grow stronger. The generals are less inclined to disrupt the constitutional process by force; politicians and voters are more inclined to respect their own rules.

Why have the South American countries not succeeded in eliminating military coups d'état and despotisms? The difficulty lies not in answering a question of this sort but in distinguishing among possible and very plausible answers. The fact is that none of the South American countries displays the characteristics of "development" or modernization (urbanization, industrialization, a reduction in the number of illiterates, etc.). At the same time, however, many of these countries are racially heterogeneous, and all of them, including those that are racially homogeneous, have had a social structure which has been marked by extreme inequality. The upper class, most often composed of the great landed proprietors, has been separated from the masses by an abyss, even where the latter are of European origin. Although these circumstances as such are unfavorable to the establishment of a democratic regime, they do not yet explain the peculiar nature of instability in South America, that is, the shift of power back and forth from civilians to military men, the frequency of coups d'état, the interference of the army in poli-



tics. Similar (at least superficially) phenomena in the Near East and in Asia bring this old problem to the fore again: why have South American armies played such a role in politics? Let us first recall the commonplace idea set forth earlier in the present article: these countries have had neither the social structure nor the classes which elsewhere have created and maintained democratic institutions. In addition, however, experience seems to prove that in most cases the upper class lack a feeling and respect for the representative, electoral, and parliamentary mechanisms that constitute the expression of democracy. Candidates for office and factions have not felt morally obliged to abide by the results of popular elections.

At times, as in Argentina, the upper bourgeoisie have made an effort to imitate London and Paris and to practice parliamentary government. But their achievements have been weak and at the mercy of the armed forces, because this type of government was not congruous with the national life, did not interest the masses, and did not represent the nation as a whole. The upper class, separated from the people, has been hostile or indifferent to the regular functioning of a constitution, or, if by chance it was favorable, it has been incapable of imposing it upon the recalcitrant factions and the army.

These facts—the racial and social heterogeneity of the political corps, a governing class without a democratic tradition—created a context that favoured interference by the army. In order to explain such interference, three other causes should be added. First, the armies have never or rarely been called upon to fight “national wars” outside their own borders; they did not feel that a coup d’état would be a fatal blow to the unity of the army or the unity of the army and people. The army did not recognize the necessity of its own political neutralization in the interest of national defense.

The second and more important cause is that the South American armies were politically divided because the various factions in the army represented groups which, in a democratic regime, would have expressed themselves in parties. I once asked the editor of a Brazilian newspaper, “Why are South American revolutions led by officers?” “Because,” he replied, “our officers are the equivalent of your intellectuals.” A witticism, to be sure, but a significant one. The officers came from the middle classes or the upper level of the lower classes, as well as from the upper class. They attended schools where they received a modern training. Some of them broke with their environment and had the kind of impatient desire for political and economic progress usually attributed to European intellectuals. Hostile to parliamentary systems that were either anarchic or monopolized by

the upper bourgeoisie, they tended to support despotic regimes, some of which were essentially conservative and others authoritarian and socially progressive.

Third, power was usually embodied in a single man. In so far as democracy involved a depersonalizing of authority, it ran counter to the bent or need of these societies. After all, the merging of power with the man who exercises it and the choice of this man on the basis of his being backed by the army are perhaps the characteristic traits of a regime that stands midway between the monarchy of the past, which was destroyed by the repercussions of the French Revolution, and democratic legitimacy, which has not yet asserted itself.

At the present time, coups d'état and military despotisms seem to be on the decline. In Mexico, Brazil and Chile, the generals, conscious of the fact that when the masses participate in democratic procedures, intervention by the armed forces is dangerous, manifestly desire to ensure respect for the constitution. Even if this tendency to respect the constitution becomes increasingly general—which is far from the case—it is to be feared that South American democracy will be of the French or Latin and not the Anglo-American type (despite the frequency of presidential constitutions). The Latin type of democracy is the kind that is weakened by the defection of a Communist or quasi-Communist left and an authoritarian or reactionary right. Such defection manifestly characterizes the situation in all of South America, which is confronted with major economic and social difficulties. In countries that have gone beyond the phase of military coups d'état, the following phase will be that of a cold war between moderates and extremists (of both left and right) and not that of constitutional stabilization.

In the Arab countries of the Near East, the role of military men such as Nasser and Kassem, it seems to me, can be explained by what we called in connection with Germany *residual legitimacy*. The Islamic countries do not have a political society, in the Western European sense of the term. They have been governed in our time by functionaries (army officers, civil servants) and by the privileged class (pashas, great landed proprietors). In Syria, Iraq, and Egypt, religious and social heterogeneity is such that the parties are not national parties; they represent neither a class nor the citizens of the different groups sharing a conception of the state; they have inevitably represented a national or religious group, and, by virtue of their opposition to other groups, they tend to dissolve the unity of the state, which is more or less artificial (as judged by Western standards). Consequently, there remain only two possibilities: either

the traditional regime, or a regime progressive in its aspirations but established by officers in accordance with revolutionary methods.

In Saudi Arabia, the regime (which is being increasingly threatened) is still traditional; created by the leader of a puritanical religious sect by the old methods of sword and fire, it is maintained and run by the son of the founder. In Jordan, the king is the grandson of the Emir Hussein, descendant of the Prophet. There, too, the political tradition of Islam is being continued. In Syria, Iraq and Egypt, on the other hand, the crisis ended with the reign of revolutionary officers through the elimination of the other possible formulae. In Syria, a party democracy has degenerated into a succession of coups d'état and unstable despotisms. In Iraq, the Husseinite monarchy had linked its fate to that of a strong-man, Noury Said, who was faithful to the English alliance to the very end, and who genuinely wanted his country to be modernized, but who did not reckon with the social and national sentiments of the masses. In Egypt, the regime of Farouk, the pashas, and the pseudo-parliament was overthrown by a military plot that brought Colonel Nasser to the fore. As a traditional regime and a party regime are out of the question, the enemy (virtual or current) of the regime of the revolutionary officers is now the Communist party.

The military despotisms in the Near East appear at the meeting point of a tradition and a present-day necessity. They are partly characteristic of the Islamic past—power lies with those who wield the sword—and are partly adapted to the current situation. They fill the void left by the collapse of the traditional powers. They mark the coming to power of men who have received a Western training and are impatient to renovate their country; these men, who are animated by an intense nationalism, are hostile to Communism and indifferent to democratic processes.

The military regimes recently set up in Pakistan and Burma are not of the South American or the Near Eastern type. There was no coup d'état, in the strict sense of the term. The state authority had escheated; a military leader assumed power because someone had to exercise it. The military leaders had had a Western (British) training; they did not share the ideology of the South American armies. They took over the state on the basis of an almost opposite ideology. The state was to be impartial; as long as it was run by the army, it was to be neutral with respect to parties and classes. The army was the supreme recourse against the anarchy of a democratic regime, against the corruption and disputes of the professional politicians. It did not symbolize the sword against the law, but

order and authority against partisan disintegration. It obviously remains to be seen to what extent the generals can or will in the near future conclude an experiment which they regard at present as a temporary expedient. At the beginning, a military dictatorship needs to restore just authority and respect for law. If it continues, may it too not degenerate in turn?

Max Weber distinguished three chief types of power: the traditional, the rational and the charismatic. The king reigns in the name of the past; the functionary applies standards; the dictator derives his authority from the acclamations which welcome him or which he arouses. The first is based on custom, the second on reason, the third on the impulse of faith or devotion. All modern regimes contain elements borrowed from these three types of legitimate government; they differ in the way they combine these elements.

Most stabilized democracies are also those which have integrated the charismatic element into the regular functioning of their institutions. The American voter feels that he is voting directly for a man; the English voter knows the prime minister for whom he votes indirectly. Each party cries up its leader and utilizes the classical publicity devices to heighten his glamour and popularity. One of the chief weaknesses of the "Republic of the Deputies" in France was the almost total anonymity of the central authority. The heads of the executive branch, that is, the president of the Republic and the prime minister, were elected by the members of parliament. The electors did not know the man whom they were choosing as the highest executive. The Republic was so afraid of great men that it was forced from time to time to have recourse to saviors. In the absence of a monarchy, France wavered between parliamentary democracy, in which the temporary holders of power disappeared behind the institutions, and regimes of highly personal authority—Napoleon I, Napoleon III, Marshal Pétain, General de Gaulle. The mode whereby the president is elected in the Fifth Republic constitutes an attempt to integrate the charismatic element into the normal functioning of institutions. It is still too early to know whether the attempt will succeed.

Perhaps the success, at least the relative success, of democracy in India, owes a great deal to the role played by Mr. Nehru. The economic and social circumstances which, according to experience, make for democracy, do not exist in that country of four hundred million persons, in which more than a dozen languages are spoken, the majority of the population is illiterate and the standard of living

is low. If, despite the poverty of the people and the heterogeneity of the political corps, a party regime has lasted, this is owing to the fact that the British-trained political class is relatively coherent and that the Congress Party has had no rival. There is no substitute for the reign of the Congress Party. But the authority that the Prime Minister has exercised (thanks to his popularity) upon his party and upon parliament, has also been a favorable factor, a guarantee against the anarchic dispersion of factions and individuals.

Is the increase in the number of military despotisms to be explained by the heightening of the charismatic element at the expense of the traditional element and the element of rational machinery? It seems to me that this question can, in a sense, be answered in the affirmative. In so far as neither the masses nor the political classes believe in institutions as such, they tend to believe in leaders, heroes, or saviors. The readiness of France to follow a Bonaparte or a de Gaulle is the counterpart of lack of faith in democratic procedures. When tradition has collapsed and a constitution has not imposed itself, all that remains to run the state is a man (or men) designated by circumstances or an idea.

Who are the holders of power upon whom the devotion or resignation of a people centers? They belong, in the last analysis, to three social categories: the military officers, the intellectuals, and the professional politicians. In order for the last mentioned to be acclaimed, it is necessary that democratic institutions function in orderly fashion. The popularity of a Macmillan is the climax of a parliamentary career, the consecration of success. In countries other than the stable democracies, there are also heroes who are endowed with charisma. In our age, the heroes are those who have guided the fight for independence (Nehru, Bourguiba) or who have rendered historic services to the nation (de Gaulle). When leaders have not been chosen by events, there remain only two points of reference—the sword and the idea. He who commands the armed forces assumes power and then tries to win acclaim (Peron). He who acts in the name of a doctrine has the prestige that originally was attached to the ideas. The revolutionary leader is a leader of men and, at the same time, an interpreter of ideas. I am not trying to indicate in what follows all the more or less charismatic types of leader. There are others, as well, which depend upon the individual country and the circumstances that have given a particular individual personal authority over millions of men. This is only to suggest, once again, the complex relations, both of kinship and opposition, between military men and intellectuals.

The difference between these two types of men is generally regarded in the West as self-evident. It is generally assumed that the intellectual is radical and the military officer is conservative, that the former challenges the reality which he desires to subject to the mind's judgement, and the latter subscribes to the primacy of the values of action and scorns what too often seems to him to be ratiocination. Even in Europe this conventional image is a caricature, although military officers are as a body often conservative in outlook, and the left-wing intellectuals tend to be hostile to the sword (in France particularly, there has subsisted since the Dreyfus affair a latent clash between the university and the army).

Outside Europe, relations between the two social categories, as we have indicated, have a quite different aspect. Part of the officers' corps is of the same petty-bourgeois background as are many intellectuals. The education dispensed by the military academies is not essentially different from that received in civilian institutions of higher learning. Outside Europe, officers and intellectuals both have a tendency—although the function of the former is to fight and that of the latter to teach, write and think—to criticize the social environment and to desire its modernization. Furthermore, both groups (outside Europe) readily accept authoritarian methods in order to achieve reforms. As for the ideologies to which they adhere, these do not seem to be determined by the professions of the two groups, but rather by a number of circumstances which vary from country to country.

In the 1930's, there was much talk of the young Japanese officers who came from the countryside and were fiercely nationalistic, vaguely socialistic, and hostile to plutocracy and parliament. At present, there is talk of French army "captains" who are in favor of ideas of integration (for Algeria), have a severe attitude toward the wealthy colonists and are opposed to the "parliamentarians," whom they hold responsible for every possible disappointment. Armies succeed less and less in maintaining the neutrality formerly considered normal, in conflicts which are essentially political. When certain conflicting parties are tied up with foreign powers, the army cannot be above or stand apart from internal conflict. In a revolutionary period, the military framework in the revolutionary parties tends to merge with the ideological framework. Inevitably, the military officers become politically-minded, and the intellectuals seek means of force.

The neutralization of the army in stabilized democracies accentuates the, so to speak, insular originality of the Anglo-American

democracies in a world undergoing revolutionary transformations. Between the Anglo-American democracies, in which the army is in the service of the state and is subordinated to democratic law, and the Soviet regime, in which the army is in the service of a state that professes ideological orthodoxy, the rest of the world is experiencing the many forms of rivalry and cooperation between intellectual and officer.

Democracy as a historical idea has been linked with two other ideas: the idea of liberalism, on the one hand, and, on the other, that of nationalism or—quite the contrary—cosmopolitanism. In Western Europe and North America, democracy is now regarded as implying liberalism, security for the individual, intellectual and political liberties and the rule of law. Perhaps in certain countries liberalism can at times be safeguarded by sacrificing the “party regime.” In the Soviet-dominated zones, the regimes claim to be democratic, that is, to be an expression of the will of the people. They retain nothing, or almost nothing, of liberalism. Hence, the tendency at the present time is to stress freedom and the rule of law even more than competition among parties. This competition seems a means rather than an end. An authoritarian regime which is embodied in a man and is not subject to decisions of the electorate can be accepted as necessary, provided that it does *not* become totalitarian and that it retains the possibility of a future return to full democracy.

In nineteenth-century Europe the democratic idea has developed at the same time as the national idea. It was after the failure of democratic nationalism that the Bismarckian type of nationalism prevailed in Germany. How do matters stand in the middle of the twentieth century, after two world wars and the rise of National Socialist and Soviet totalitarianism?

We have noted above that it is difficult to reconcile a party regime with certain external political ambitions. In order to upset the territorial status that had been established at Versailles, Germany had to substitute the Nazi regime for the Weimar Republic. In our time, a democracy is less and less capable of an aggressive or imperialistic diplomacy. In addition to this very general remark, it should be observed that party regimes are exposed to the dangers that “internationals” create for any state. A party that aspires to the exercise of power within the framework of a given state by definition should be national and should be devoted solely to the nation's welfare. Every Communist party is a branch of an international party and is more concerned with the interests of that international than with the inter-



ests of the country within which it operates. In order to succeed, other parties tend to seek allies abroad and to define themselves in like manner with relation to a supranational force or ideal. Moreover, when the transition from one regime to another involves a radical change in the very conception of existence and values, it is not surprising for the individual to feel more closely linked with the party that embodies his hopes than with the land of his birth.

In this connection, one may wonder whether a continental or cultural patriotism is not in process of gradually transcending national patriotism. Do not those Germans, Frenchmen, or Italians who call themselves European feel a "continental patriotism"? Or is it a matter of an illusion, a dream? Are those persons who call themselves "Atlantic" really thinking of a "land" that has the dimensions of the Atlantic community? What would be the nature of parties in organizations which are still far from having given definite proof of vitality? Would there be liberal or socialist parties composed indifferently of Frenchmen, Germans, and Italians? The same problem that we mentioned in connection with the non-Western zones of civilization would appear on this level: when the political corps is not homogeneous, the parties may dissolve the national unity because they represent, not groups which are present throughout the territory, but regions which are more or less tempted by autonomy. If a six-nation parliament existed, the European political corps would immediately be torn apart in the event that the parties were German, French, Italian, etc. The solidarity of workers, socialists, or liberal voters, a solidarity transcending ancient borders, would give rise to "European parties" and would maintain the coherence of the political corps of Europe.

It is not possible in the case of Europe or the new states to formulate a dogmatic reply. But the question itself illustrates the problem that lies at the heart of modern democracies: under what circumstances are party quarrels compatible with national unity and the forging of a common will? At the present time we are more aware of the circumstances that make for democratic stability, but the democratic regimes imply, by their nature, a wager that is never definitely won.

## REPUTATIONS

"REPUTATIONS," a new Department of *Dædalus*, introduced in the Summer issue of 1959, announced its purpose as "the reviewing of seminal books and issues that have stood the test of time." Whether Sir James Frazer's *The Golden Bough* deserves such a distinguished place is a matter on which argument is possible. Two estimates of the work, considered in the light of what we now know of its subject, follow.

### I. EDMUND R. LEACH

#### Golden Bough or Gilded Twig?

SIR JAMES GEORGE FRAZER died on 7 May 1941. At that time he held a knighthood and the Order of Merit; he was a Fellow of the Royal Society and of the British Academy and of Trinity College, Cambridge; he was also a member of the Institut de France, a Commander of the Legion of Honor, a member of the German, Dutch and Belgian Academies of Science and the holder of honorary doctorates from the Universities of Paris, Strasbourg, Cambridge, Oxford, Glasgow, Manchester and Durham. As such, Frazer was, in terms of public esteem, by far the most distinguished anthropologist that has ever lived. But such loads of honor come only to scholars who are already past their prime, and to Frazer they had come before the year 1928. By 1941 the gilt was beginning to tarnish; the obituary notices published in *Nature* and in other British academic journals are almost embarrassingly negative; the *American Anthropologist* did not even bother to record his death.

Yet outside a narrow professional circle the ripples of Frazer's influence have continued to spread. Even today it is easy to find scholarly Englishmen who regard him as the supreme anthropologist, the final authority in his field. The reissue of the abridged edition of *The Golden Bough* as a paperback, priced at ten shillings, means that apart from Margaret Mead, Frazer still has no rival as an anthropological bestseller. Moreover, Frazer's "comparative method," though

out of fashion among the academic anthropologists, is still considered quite orthodox in some closely related fields; both E. O. James and Mircea Eliade, for example, regularly publish works on comparative religion which are at the same time anthropological studies in the classical Frazerian style.

It seems proper then that we should ask two questions. What was the basis for Frazer's once outstanding reputation? And, is the neglect on the part of a later generation of professional anthropologists fully justified?

Let me first outline some of the facts of the case. Frazer, a Scotsman by birth and education, first took a degree at Glasgow University and then proceeded to Cambridge, where he graduated in the classics. In 1879 he presented a thesis entitled "On the Growth of Plato's Ideal Theory" and was elected a Fellow of Trinity College. It is relevant not only that Frazer was Scots but also that Trinity was the wealthiest and most influential college in the University, and that classics was at that time the most esteemed branch of study other than mathematics. To use a phrase current among undergraduates of the present day: Frazer was well in on the Establishment. It may be observed too, that throughout his life he took good care to stay that way. Frazer's first publication (1884) was a school textbook edition of Sallust, in 1898 he produced a six-volume translation of Pausanias, and in 1929 a five-volume edition of Ovid's *Fasti*. Frazer may have been the world's greatest anthropologist but he did not allow his colleagues to forget that he was also a distinguished classical scholar.

In Cambridge the classicists had great influence, but so also had the men of God, and Frazer did not forget this either. Despite the seemingly heretical implications of much of his writing, Frazer always took special care to avoid giving ecclesiastical offense. It is surely surprising that in the midst of all his other activities he should have found time to publish in 1895 a substantial volume entitled, *Passages of the Bible: Chosen for their literary beauty and interest by J. G. Frazer, M.A., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge*. Moreover, he reprinted this in 1899, produced a second edition in 1909, and then reissued the second edition in 1927.

These facts are relevant because, if we examine carefully the circumstances in which Frazer became world famous, we find that this was brought about first through the support of a very famous, if unorthodox, Scottish divine (W. Robertson Smith) and second through the active propaganda of certain of his colleagues in the Cambridge classics faculty—notably that redoubtable lady, Jane

Harrison, who was four years his senior. No doubt Frazer would have become a distinguished anthropologist simply on the basis of his early work on *Totemism* and the short two-volume edition of *The Golden Bough* (published in 1890); but he only became a world famous anthropologist because at this particular period anthropology suddenly became fashionable and respectable among the academic elite, namely, the classical scholars of Oxford and Cambridge Universities. There was also Lady Frazer. She was a French widow whom Frazer married in 1896. She identified herself completely with her husband's career and combined the multiple functions of a literary agent and a public-relations officer. Without her efforts, the list of Frazer's orders, titles, and honorary degrees would certainly have been much shorter. Frazer by all accounts was a shy, retiring, and somewhat modest man, but his wife's skillful publicity made even his modesty a source of celebrity.<sup>1</sup>

In all this early work, Frazer's early association with Robertson Smith is perhaps the most important factor. Smith was a man of quite outstanding intellectual ability who achieved great eminence in many different fields. In 1870 he had been appointed to the Chair of Oriental Languages and Old Testament Exegesis at the Free Church College in Aberdeen. At that time the ninth edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* was being published in annual volumes, and Smith contributed articles under the general heading "Bible." These articles were considered by his Church colleagues to be heretical, and after a long wrangle Smith was dismissed from his chair. This dispute made him famous, and in 1882 Smith himself became editor of the *Encyclopaedia*. In the following year he was appointed to a chair of Arabic at Cambridge.

Between 1883 and 1885 Robertson Smith occupied rooms in Trinity College, where he befriended Frazer, a man eight years younger than himself, and it was at Smith's behest that Frazer contributed a series of articles to the *Encyclopaedia* under the letter "P"; these were *Penates*, *Pericles*, *Praefect*, *Praeneste*, *Praetor*, *Priapus*, *Proserpine*, *Province*. A year later, under "S," Frazer wrote on *Saturn*, and then under "T" came *Taboo*, *Thesmophoria*, *Totemism*. One is tempted to wonder whether either *The Golden Bough* or *Totemism and Exogamy* would ever have been written at all if the editor had happened to be working on some different letters of the alphabet! Robertson Smith fell gravely ill in 1890 and died in 1894. Frazer published the first edition of *The Golden Bough* in 1890 and thereafter created virtually no fresh work throughout the whole of his long life.

This last damaging statement needs to be elaborated. Frazer's later writings in nearly every instance are the expansion or reconstruction of work which first appeared in the vigorous first six years of his literary career while he was still under the direct influence of his friend Robertson Smith. For example, Frazer's very first anthropological article, dated 1885, was a fourteen-page paper entitled "The Primitive Ghost and his Relations." This article grew eventually into *The Belief in Immortality and the Worship of the Dead* (three volumes, 1913-1922). It was later reduced again to a lecture series entitled, *The Fear of the Dead in Primitive Religion*, dated 1933. An early item in this long series is "On Certain Burial Customs Illustrative of the Primitive Theory of the Soul," which appeared in the *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, and is therefore quite readily available. It shows the characteristic literary style of *The Golden Bough* already fully developed.

Besides this series of writings on the worship of the dead, the bulk of Frazer's anthropological publications falls into three other main series. *Totemism*, published separately in 1887, was a draft for the slightly shorter *Britannica* article published the following year. This item eventually grew into *Totemism and Exogamy*, in four volumes, plus a supplementary fifth volume entitled *Totemica*. *The Golden Bough* is a series in itself. This was two volumes in 1890, and twelve by 1915. In 1922, Lady Frazer produced the abridged one-volume edition, and Frazer himself added a thirteenth supplementary volume some years later.

The final group of writings is represented by *Folklore in the Old Testament*, which starts as a paper in 1907 and grows to three fat volumes by 1918. An exception, this is not derived directly from any early work of Frazer's own but draws its inspiration from Robertson Smith's writings on *The Religion of the Semites*.<sup>2</sup>

In fairness, let it be said that Frazer himself was at pains to stress his strong personal debt to Robertson Smith,<sup>3</sup> but it is easier today than in Frazer's own lifetime to perceive how fundamental this influence must have been. After Robertson Smith died, Frazer simply went on repeating himself without showing the smallest symptom of originality.

The degree of his intellectual isolation is quite remarkable. From 1898 onwards, Durkheim and his followers were publishing vigorously on matters highly relevant to Frazer's studies of magic and religion, and as early as 1907 Marett published a paper openly critical of one of Frazer's main tenets—the view that taboo should be regarded as "negative magic." Yet in the whole corpus of Frazer's

writings there is scarcely a reference to any of these rival authors. Durkheim does not even get a mention in the twelve-volume edition of *The Golden Bough*, though Hubert, Mauss and Marett manage to share a footnote in Volume I (p. 111); Durkheim, on the basis of minor papers published in 1898 and 1902, earns several pages of hostile comment in *Totemism and Exogamy* (Vol. IV, pp. 100-102, 127), but the rest is silence. A reader acquainted only with Frazer's own anthropological writings could readily assume that between the publication of Tylor's *Primitive Culture* (1871) and 1935, development in the general theory of the subject was at a complete standstill.

The sheer bulk of Frazer's writing is enormous (see Besterman's *Bibliography*), but to a very large extent it consists of compilations from the works of others. Frazer himself has recorded rather precisely his methods of work.

When I first addressed myself to the study of Social Anthropology . . . I made a practice of noting in a book the passages of authors who seemed to me of particular significance in their descriptions of the manners and customs, the beliefs and practices, of the various races of men, especially of those races of backward culture, an understanding of whom is of special importance for a knowledge of our race (Frazer, 1938, vii).

About 95 percent of Frazer's anthropological writings consist of these notebook "extracts" strung together.<sup>4</sup> Some passages are quoted verbatim, but most are "improved," for in general Frazer considered style more important than accuracy. He wrote:

[The extracts] are written for the most part in a plain, straightforward way, the authors contenting themselves with describing in simple language the things which they have seen or had heard reported by competent native informants. Few, if any, possess that magic charm of style which, by firing the imagination or touching the heart, can alone confer what we fondly call immortality upon a work of literature (Frazer, 1938, viii).

It is ironical that a change of fashion has made the "plain straightforward way" of Frazer's victims a more desirable stylistic model than that of Frazer himself!

From a scientific point of view, Frazer's "improvement" of his source material was quite disastrous. Doubtless he himself had every intention of making an honest transcription, but the inevitable vanity of the untraveled scholar gave certainty to his intuitions. When the recorded facts provided only circumstantial evidence in support of a Frazerian doctrine, Frazer could not resist the temptation to expound the inner implications as he saw them. Here is an example selected quite at random.

Pages 102-103 of Part IV, Volume 1, of the third edition of *The Golden Bough* are derived from paragraphs 81-83 of Walter E. Roth, *North Queensland Ethnography*. The total length of Frazer's text is slightly longer than Roth's but differs from it both in omissions and additions. Here is a sample. Roth's original version reads:

Among the Tully River blacks . . . a woman begets children because (a) she has been sitting over the fire on which she has roasted a particular species of black bream, which must have been given to her by the prospective father, (b) she has purposely gone a-hunting and caught a certain kind of bull frog, (c) some man may have told her to be in an interesting condition or (d) she may dream of having had the child put inside her. By whichever of the above methods the child is conceived, whenever it actually appears, the recognised husband accepts it as his without demur (Roth, 1903, para. 81).

In Frazer's modified version, this becomes:

The true causes of conception in a woman according to them [the natives of Tully River in Queensland] are four in number. First, she may have received a particular species of black bream from a man whom the European in his ignorance would call the father; this she may have roasted and sat over the fire inhaling the savoury smell of the roast fish. That is quite sufficient to get her with child. Or, secondly, she may have gone out on purpose to catch a certain kind of bullfrog, and if she succeeds in capturing it, that again is a full and satisfactory explanation of her pregnancy. Thirdly, some man may have told her to conceive a child, and the mere demand produces the desired effect. Or, fourthly and lastly, she may have simply dreamed that the child was put into her, and the dream necessarily works its own fulfillment. Whatever white men may think about the matter, these are the real causes why babies are born among the blacks on the Tully river (Frazer, 1914, 102).

It will be seen that each of Frazer's expansions and modifications of Roth has the effect of stressing the "childlike ignorance" of the natives concerned and their belief in homeopathic magic, two of Frazer's key principles. There is nothing in the original text to suggest that it is the "savoury smell of roast fish" which is thought to impregnate the woman, nor is it a legitimate inference to assert that these Australian aborigines were ignorant of the connection between copulation and pregnancy. The modern interpretation of the rituals described would be that in this society the relationship between the woman's child and the clansmen of the woman's husband stems from the public recognition of the bonds of marriage rather than from the fact of cohabitation, which is a very normal state of affairs.<sup>5</sup>

It is true that when Frazer wrote thus Malinowski had not yet em-



phasized the subtle distinction between biological and sociological paternity (Malinowski, 1927), and it would be grossly unfair to criticize Frazer because he failed to put a modern anthropological interpretation upon his evidence. But his amending of the evidence to suit his own theories is quite damning.

I regret to say that having checked a number of other similar instances I have to conclude that this was Frazer's normal method. He thought of himself as writing literature, not history or science; the evidence was simply raw material for fine writing. The only thing that can be said in extenuation is that he was always scrupulous in specifying the sources of his information. Those who are prepared to take the time and trouble can check back and become disillusioned.

It would seem, then, that the answer to my first question is that, academically speaking, there was very little basis for Frazer's great reputation. He was an enormously diligent reader and classifier of ethnographic source materials, but he was not an accurate scholar or an original thinker.

Even some of his closest associates perceived that his real merit was that of a popularizer and a propagandist. Jane Harrison wrote:

Among my own contemporaries was J. G. Frazer who was soon to light the dark wood of savage superstition with a gleam from *The Golden Bough*—the happy title of that book (Sir James has a veritable genius for titles)—made it arrest the attention of scholars. They saw in comparative anthropology a serious study actually capable of elucidating a Greek or Latin text. Tylor had written and spoken; Robertson Smith, exiled for heresy, had seen the star in the East; in vain: we classical deaf adders stopped our ears and closed our eyes. But at the mere sound of the magical words "*Golden Bough*"—the scales fell—we heard and understood (Harrison, 1925, 82).

Perhaps if Frazer had been more professional in his procedures no one would have listened at all.

There remains my second question. Is the present generation of anthropologists justified in neglecting Frazer's work? Clearly we cannot rely on the *details* of his story even if we use his bibliographies and accept his categories of assembled custom. But what of his ideas?

Frazer called himself a social anthropologist, but the bias of his interest was in psychology rather than sociology. He took over from Bastian the assumption that the fundamental psychology of human beings will everywhere be reflected by similar customary behaviors, or, conversely, that similar customs always have the same symbolic implications, regardless of the context in which they appear. But

Frazer coupled this belief with a curious contempt for his subject matter. If Tylor's "savage" sometimes seems to be a primitive philosopher struggling to solve the problems of existence, Frazer's "savage" is a lunatic at large—a child of nature, whose ignorance evokes our amusement rather than our sympathy (*Nature*, 1941: Marett).

Despite an occasional admission that there is much of the savage in us all, the whole drift of Frazer's argument is to emphasize the vast intellectual gulf which separates the modern white man from his primitive neighbors. Indeed, one reason why anthropologists of today find it difficult to respond to Frazer's glossy sentences is that they no longer regard tribal peoples as grown-up children. A paragraph such as the following, with its ethnocentric and racialist bias, is utterly distasteful to most modern readers:

If we exclude hypotheses and confine ourselves to facts, we may say broadly that totemism is practised by many savage and barbarous peoples, the lower races as we call them, who occupy the continents and islands of the tropics and the Southern Hemisphere, together with a large part of North America, and whose complexion shades from coal black through dark brown to red. With the somewhat doubtful exception of a few Mongoloid tribes in Assam, no yellow or white race is totemic. Thus if civilization varies on the whole, as it seems to do, directly with complexion, increasing or diminishing with the blanching or darkening of the skin, we may lay it down as a general proposition that totemism is an institution peculiar to the dark-complexioned and least civilised races of mankind who are spread over the Tropics and the Southern Hemisphere, but have also overflowed into North America (Frazer, 1910, IV:14).

But in fact, although Frazer was an evolutionist, he took evolutionist dogma for granted and was nowhere much concerned with human progress.<sup>6</sup> His contempt was not directed against savage and barbarous peoples, but against savage and barbarous customs, no matter who practiced them. His real interest lay in the illogicality of human beliefs, in the fallacies and fears which he labeled "superstition."

He claimed to demonstrate this illogicality by citing, side by side, innumerable instances of customs which (on his interpretation) entail fallacious associations of ideas. But he resorted too often to the rhetorician's trick whereby a lawyer who pleads a weak case piles on circumstantial detail so as to confuse the jury. It is only the sheer quantitative weight of Frazer's "evidence" which makes his arguments appear persuasive—at least to casual readers.

Here is an example. It will be recollected that the avowed purpose of *The Golden Bough* is to investigate certain classical accounts concerning the rites associated with the worship of Diana at

Nemi, and in the first chapter of that book, Frazer commits himself to the view that the Priest of Nemi was regarded as the spouse of Diana herself (Frazer, 1911, i, 40).

Now, we may agree with Frazer that there is nothing outrageously improbable about this hypothesis, but it is somewhat disconcerting to be informed in the next volume that "direct evidence there is none, but analogy pleads in favour of the view" (Frazer, 1911, ii, 121). Frazer thereupon proceeds to catalogue a long list of recorded examples of ritual theogamy (his examples come from Babylon, Egypt, Athens, Eleusis, Russia, Sweden, Gaul, Peru, North America, Bengal, West and East Africa, and the Maldiv Islands). He finally sums up by saying, "The evidence may, therefore, lend some countenance to the conjecture that in the sacred grove of Nemi, where the powers of vegetation and of water manifested themselves in the fair forms of shady woods, tumbling cascades and glassy lake, a marriage like that of our King and Queen of May was annually celebrated between the mortal King of the Wood and the immortal Queen of the Wood, Diana" (Frazer, 1911, ii, 171).

In fact, of course, the "evidence" has no relevance whatsoever; it is quite possible that the ancient rites of Nemi were such as Frazer suggests; it is equally possible that they were something entirely different; the "analogies" from other parts of the world have no bearing on the matter. Politicians can argue in this fashion, but not professional scholars.

Moreover, quantity apart, the comparisons incline to such an extreme generality that the professional finds them a source of irritation rather than stimulus.

This has been so since the beginning. It was the essence of Goldenweiser's devastating commentary on *Totemism and Exogamy* (Goldenweiser, 1910<sup>7</sup>) that Frazer makes totemism into such an all-embracing category that it becomes analytically useless. Similarly, Andrew Lang's acid remark that *The Golden Bough* is the "vegetable or Covent Garden theory of anthropology" implies criticism of the exaggerated scope of Frazer's categories, "fertility rite" and "vegetation god." Incidentally, it is alleged that Frazer was so disturbed by Lang's adverse comments that in later life he made a point of never reading any review of his books unless he was certain of open adulation! (Malinowski, 1944, 182-183.)

Frazer's generalizations are not necessarily false, but too often they appear trivial. For example, the discussions concerning the nature of magic which come at the beginning of *The Golden Bough* entail a number of perfectly valid insights into the psychological

mechanisms governing the association of ideas, but, for a generation which has been taught to accept the mysteries of psychoanalysis as commonplace, Frazer's argument seems "kid's stuff."

Here again we must avoid anachronism. The first edition of *The Golden Bough* was pre-Freud, and Freud himself found inspiration in a variety of Frazer's writings (Freud, 1915, *passim*), but even so, in our own post-Freud epoch, Frazer's elaborate decorum leaves a taste of smut. Granted all the excesses of Victorian modesty, it can scarcely have been necessary that every direct reference to an act of copulation should be circumscribed by such complex periphrasis as this:

Accordingly we may assume with a high degree of probability that the profligacy which notoriously attended these ceremonies was at one time not an accidental excess but an essential part of the rites, and that in the opinion of those who performed them, the marriage of the trees and plants could not be fertile without the real union of the human sexes. (Frazer, 1911, ii, 97).

It is not only the professional anthropologists who have reacted in this way. The ancient historians likewise are now inclined to be shocked both by Frazer's superficiality and by his tendency to equivocate. One of the sections of *The Golden Bough* which originally had the widest appeal was that covered by the volume bearing the subtitle, *Adonis, Attis, Osiris* (Frazer, 1906).<sup>8</sup> Although the direct references to Christianity in this work are extremely guarded, there is a very strong implication that the religious myth of Christ's resurrection is to be identified with similar myths relating to a variety of ancient oriental deities, all of whom are classed as fertility gods and corn spirits.

This attempt to place Christianity in its "historical" setting appeared very bold to many of Frazer's own contemporaries, but it is the reverse of history in any strict sense, and professional historians have been unimpressed. No doubt the parallels to which Frazer draws attention display a common psychological tendency, but it is wildly misleading to imagine that the political and religious ideas of all the peoples of the ancient Middle East belong to a single undifferentiated pattern (Frankfort, 1951). Yet a close reading shows that Frazer never actually commits himself upon such tricky points as to how far and in what sense he supposes the cult of Adonis to be similar to the cult of Jesus Christ.<sup>9</sup> We are only offered hints and insinuations, and are left to draw our own conclusions. A more worthwhile scholar would have expressed his views unambiguously and risked the storm of criticism which they might have evoked.

## *Golden Bough or Gilded Twig?*

Yet despite all these adverse comments, I still believe that a case can be made for urging professional scholars to pay much closer attention to the content of Frazer's work than has lately been customary. Frazer's ideas have dated. His theories on the origin of exogamy no longer interest us; his theories about the nature of magic seem tautologous and unimportant; but it is the facts themselves that matter, not Frazer's interpretation of the facts. Like an assiduous botanist, he has assembled and classified the customs of the world, and even though the principles of classification in terms of which he worked are no longer acceptable, the assembled facts remain a challenge to analysis.

True, we must in every case make sure that Frazer did not read more into his sources than the original record would allow; but granted that, the parallels to which he draws our attention are often very striking. Can we really simply dismiss them as purely accidental?

The customs Frazer records with such painstaking elaboration are all examples of ritual action. Yet his ultimate interest was not in the ritual as such, but in the underlying beliefs. He was naïve in his assumption that the nature of a belief can be immediately and directly inferred from the nature of a customary action; but on the basis of this (unjustified) assumption he further inferred that peoples of wholly different cultures can share the same type of belief. This is a proposition which deserves close attention.

Frazer does not seem to have found any epistemological difficulty here. He notes that peoples of different cultures sometimes indulge in closely similar ritual practices. He documents these similarities and then assumes that the people concerned share identical beliefs. This is not a logical inference but is there not, surely, a sense in which it might be true?

For the functionalist anthropologists who came after Frazer, it has been a primary dogma that items of custom are only comprehensible when observed in their total social context. Frazer's material has seemed useless to them because he was so consistently ruthless in neglecting the social context of his listed items of custom. Nevertheless, the functionalists share with Frazer the assumption that there is a direct integration between custom on the one hand and belief on the other. The difference is that where Frazer assumed that similar customs imply identical beliefs, the functionalist asserts that every custom (and hence every belief) is uniquely defined by its total social context. Thus functionalist dogma, logically pursued, would preclude all forms of cross-cultural comparison.

No professional anthropologist can feel happy about such a con-

clusion. Even those who feel that it is vain to search for general laws of sociology must still hope to arrive at sociological principles of limited generality. Yet clearly any method of demonstrating such principles must entail cross-cultural comparison. Hence a dogma which rules out cross-cultural comparison from the start is futile.

The way to escape from this paradoxical dilemma is to recognize explicitly that the link between belief and customary action is only indirect. No modern anthropologist dare neglect the functionalist doctrine that manifest custom can only be properly understood within the context of its social setting, and it follows from this that the cross-cultural comparison of *manifest* custom (in the style of Frazer and his followers) must now be excluded altogether. Certainly, every modern reader of Frazer should clearly understand that no firm inferences can legitimately be derived from the accidental circumstance that two sets of ritual action, in differing social contexts, bear a superficial resemblance to one another.

Even so, although in any one context manifest customs reflect only a local system of ideas and beliefs, there is still a certain level at which one can legitimately think of ideas and beliefs as cross-cultural phenomena. It is surely fair to assert that "the same" belief may appear in different cultures yet be reflected in quite different forms of manifest custom. If this is so, then it is the task of contemporary anthropology to re-establish a science of cross-cultural comparison by devising some kind of synthesis between Frazerian and functionalist techniques. But where Frazer concentrated on the assembling of similar items of manifest behavior, the modern task should be the assembling of similar ideas.

As British social anthropologists would put it, we cannot compare items of culture but we can compare structural principles, even if they derive from quite different cultural contexts.

Not very much has yet been done in this direction, though works such as those of Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1940), Radcliffe-Brown and Forde (1950), and Fortes (1953) are all steps in the right direction. But what I want to emphasize is the possible utility of Frazer's work for the purposes of such structural comparison.

It is the very recklessness and prolixity of Frazer's comparisons which attracts attention here. These piles of assembled fact pose problems. I do not think it matters much if the problems we perceive are quite different from those Frazer originally had in mind.

Let me cite an example of the sort of thing I mean. Chapter III of the *Folklore in the Old Testament* (Frazer, 1918, i, 78-103) is

entitled "The Mark of Cain" and Isaac Schapera has recently used the material there assembled as the basis of his essay "The Sin of Cain." The problems with which the two authors are concerned are quite different. Frazer's interest was in Cain as an example of a murderer haunted by his victim's ghost; Schapera's interest was in Cain as the archetypal legal example of fratricide. I need not elaborate here just why it is that contemporary anthropologists are likely to find Schapera's approach more interesting than Frazer's. My point is simply that in this case Frazer's work, though antiquated in itself, has modern application. Without Frazer we should not have had Schapera's essay at all.

This may seem faint praise for the work of the most celebrated anthropologist of all time, but it is surely the way of all science. Even though the modern astronomer does not turn to Tycho Brahe for his theories of the universe, he has nothing but praise for Tycho's careful cartography of the sky.

Frazer was a cartographer of custom, and even if in his lifetime he was credited with undue merit, his collections of fact remain—a quarry for the future rather than a dull record of antiquated ideas.

But in all this I have perhaps been evading the issue. I have said something of the circumstances in which Frazer came to be loaded with public honor and I have indicated why Frazer's massive volumes gather dust on the professional anthropologist's bookshelves but I have still not explained Frazer's continuing popularity. How is it that some thousands of people will *still* spend their ten shillings on a paperback version of *The Golden Bough*?

This I must confess is a puzzle. I suspect that the answer may be something like this. A recent biography of Jane Harrison suggests very strongly that the fascination she discovered in Frazerian anthropology had deep psychological roots (Stewart, 1959; see also *The Times Literary Supplement*, 24 July 1959). Frazer, without Freud's perception or frankness, was already suggesting the existence of a Dionysian, sex-inspired, primitive undercurrent sapping at the roots of conventional Victorian society, but his hints on these forbidden topics were all so elegantly phrased that even clergymen's daughters could read them with equanimity. It seems clear that part of Jane Harrison's interest in *The Golden Bough* lay in the fact that she was fascinated by the brute sadism of primitive sacrifice, and there must have been many of Frazer's early readers who were similarly motivated. That this should be the case even today is harder to believe, yet, in England at least, there may still be a class of persons who



would read Frazer as a respectable and more readily accessible substitute for Freud's *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*. It is an odd thought, but I can find no other explanation.

In a professional academic sense, none of Frazer's anthropological writings can today be read straight with either pleasure or enlightenment—they have become source books only—but I do not hold that Frazer's great reputation was undeserved. Freud, Durkheim, Jane Harrison, T. S. Eliot, Malinowski, and a host of others of the most diverse intellectual complexion have in their time found an inspiration in Frazer's works, and on that account alone he still deserves to be rated as a colossus in the history of English scholarship.

Today the involved elaboration of Frazer's sentences evokes a sense of ridicule rather than of magic. Yet even if the inspiration is gone, his categories of custom remain—a challenge to our curiosity.

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- 1 The following extract from a letter from Jane Harrison to Gilbert Murray, dated February 1901, is an indication of Mrs. Frazer's very thorough methods. "Mrs. Frazer has been sitting on my bed for two hours, telling me 'who not to know' i.e. who has not paid Mr. Frazer 'proper attention'! This is the price I pay for a few shy radiant moments under the Golden Bough—good conservative tho' I am, I am ready for any reform in the Game Laws for the Preserving of Eminent Husbands" (Stewart, 1959, 37).
- 2 Robertson Smith, in his preface to the first edition of *The Religion of the Semites*, stresses his debt to "my friend Mr. J. G. Frazer, who has given me free access to his unpublished collections on the superstitions and religious observances of primitive nations from all parts of the globe."
- 3 The full-scale editions of *The Golden Bough* are all dedicated to Robertson Smith.
- 4 Early in his career, Frazer engaged in "original research" in that in 1887 he issued a printed questionnaire entitled, *Questions on the Manners, Customs, Religions, Superstition etc. of Uncivilized or Semi-civilized Peoples*. Later versions of the same document were sent out in 1888, 1889, and 1907. The recipients appear to have been for the most part missionaries and colonial administrators. The title page of the original pamphlet bears the following: "Answers to all or any of the following questions will be gratefully received by J. G. Frazer, M.A., F.R.G.S., Trinity College, Cambridge, England. N.B.—As the Questions have been drawn up to elicit information about a large range of peoples, it is probable that many of them will not apply to the particular people with which you are acquainted. Mr. Frazer proposes to publish the results of his enquiries. Full acknowledgement will be made to those who

## Golden Bough or Gilded Twig?

have favoured him with answers and printed copies will be forwarded to them." In fact, Frazer does not appear to have made any systematic use of the answers he obtained to these circulars, though presumably some of this information is incorporated in his earlier writings. In the expanded volumes which make up his later work, the source material is provided almost exclusively by the published work of previous writers.

- 5 It is evident from Roth's text (heading of para. 81 and conclusion of para. 83) that he also assumes that the rituals described reflect the natives' ignorance of the connection between copulation and pregnancy but, unlike Frazer, Roth does not adjust his description to fit his interpretation.
- 6 Frazer claimed that magic is chronologically prior to religion and also that magical thinking represents a primitive form of scientific thinking. Both these evolutionist arguments are open to severe criticism (see Goldenweiser, 1933), but it does not seem to me that Frazer himself attached very much importance to the chronological element in his thesis.
- 7 Goldenweiser's references in this article are to Frazer's earlier writings on totemism, and his paper may have been completed before the publication of the four-volume *Totemism and Exogamy*. Even so, his comments serve as a major criticism of that work.
- 8 In the second (1900) edition of *The Golden Bough*, this material still covers only about 100 pages of Volume 2. The popularity of this section of the work led to its expansion into a separate volume entitled *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*, first published in 1906 and reissued in 1907. The third (1914) edition was re-incorporated into *The Golden Bough* to form Volumes 5 and 6 of the twelve-volume edition. The enumeration of the parts and volumes of this full-scale version of *The Golden Bough* is very complicated. It is summarised at page 147 of Volume 12 (Bibliography and General Index), and detailed explanations are given in Besterman.
- 9 The ambiguity of Frazer's writing on this point is well exemplified in a short note in the *Athenaeum* (4 January 1908), entitled "Attis and Christ." Frazer is commenting on the fact that at an early period Roman Easter was celebrated on 25 March and thus it coincided with the annual sacrifice to Attis. After quoting an early Latin text he writes: "If the testimony of this anonymous writer does not prove that the ecclesiastical authorities dated Easter at this time on purpose to eclipse a heathen rival, at least it proves that the coincidences and similarity of the two festivals attracted the attention of both sides, and formed a theme of bitter controversy between them, the pagans contending that the resurrection of Christ was a spurious imitation of the resurrection of Attis and the Christians asserting with equal warmth that the resurrection of Attis was a diabolical counterfeit of the resurrection of Christ. In these bickerings the pagans took what to a superficial observer might seem strong ground for arguing that their God was the older and therefore presumably the original, not the counterfeit, since as a general rule an original is older than its copy. This feeble argument the Christians easily rebutted by falling back on the subtlety of Satan, who on so important an occasion had surpassed himself by ingeniously inverting the usual order of nature." Despite the flavor of Gibbon, Frazer was able by such writing to persuade both heretics and Christians alike that he was on their side.

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*Golden Bough or Gilded Twig?*

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## II. HERBERT WEISINGER

### The Branch That Grew Full Straight

ANYONE who undertakes to defend *The Golden Bough* today must concede before he can confound. He must concede that Frazer falls just short of magnitude and far short of magnanimity; he is neither embattled nor heroic nor passionate nor tragic; and the absence of these qualities shows itself in the magisterial blandness of his style. He must concede that Frazer never set foot in the field so far as his anthropological work is concerned, though quite the opposite is true of his classical studies. Even as late as 1921, Frazer could still assert that the collection of data should be kept quite apart from the task of examining, comparing, and evaluating the evidence, that it should not, in fact, be entrusted to the observers in the field, but is best done by others in their libraries at home or at their universities. I suppose by this he meant himself, though in all fairness we ought to remember testimonials from field workers such as Malinowski: "The letters which I received from Frazer during my sojourns in New Guinea and Melanania helped me more by suggestion, query and comment than any other influence."<sup>1</sup> He must concede that if, with Darwin, Marx, and Freud, Frazer helped shape the modern mind, he is patronising toward Darwin, unfairly critical concerning Marx, and arrogant to Freud.

Nor is this all a defender of Frazer must concede. He must bow his head, though not so low as Lord Raglan would demand, under such a charge as this:<sup>2</sup>

Frazer was a great scholar and a great writer, but, as we all are, he was a man of his age, and that age remained the Victorian. He was also emphatically a Linnaean. He spent most of his life in collecting and sorting out facts and anecdotes about the superstitions of savages. He was not very critical in his use of authorities, and since he liked adding items

## *The Branch That Grew Full Straight*

from old and obscure writers to his collection, he often used unreliable material when better was available. . . . In the result, the picture of the savage world which he paints is misleading in the extreme. . . . The savage of Frazer and his disciples is a creature of fiction.

And one must acknowledge the force of Henri Frankfort's argument that there are many significant differences in the handling of the theme of death and resurrection by the various peoples of the ancient Near East. Admitting the possibility of a myth of a dying god which would contain features common to the myths of Egypt, Syria, and Mesopotamia, Frankfort nevertheless asserts that Frazer's dying god is ultimately depicted as a mortal in whom the spirit of fertility is for the moment incarnate, and who dies a violent death. But in the ancient Near East such a concept, Frankfort thinks, is foreign to the myth of the dying god; he is not incarnate in a human being and is not killed, but dies in the regular round of the seasons. Moreover, it is uncertain whether the dead god will be found, and even more whether he will be resurrected. The community does not passively await his resurrection but rather goes out in a frantic search for him, often symbolized in the mourning and search undertaken by his wife and mother. Again, Osiris ranks below the Sun God, nor is he the child of the goddess who saves him. Adonis is not thought of as a creator. Horus does not help Osiris, as Nabu and Ninurta aid Marduk and Enlil. Osiris is not merely a dying god; he is actually a dead god who never returned, as did Tammuz, to the land of the living, and his place there was taken by Horus. There are variations in the relations of these gods to plant life, to animals, and to water. Finally, there are many disparities between the various cultic practices associated with the gods. "The gods as they confront us in the religions of the ancient Near East," Frankfort concludes, "express profoundly different mentalities."<sup>3</sup>

Yet, for all this, it still cannot be denied that along with Darwin, Marx, and Freud, Frazer remains a major shaper of the modern mind. We must ask ourselves how this came about, how in fact the works of such different and difficult writers were able to stir—even to inflame—the imagination, not only in the intellectuals, who are much more open to the winds of doctrine than they like to pretend, but also in great masses of ordinary men, who are much more resistant to ideas, and especially to ideas which call out for change. We realize now that we are dealing with a much more profound problem than that of accounting for a mere shift in attitude through persuasion by reason, assuming this ever really does take place. For if we examine the books of such men as Frazer as incitements to the im-

agination and provocations to passion, we are struck by the realization that if writing was ever less calculated to arouse, to excite, indeed, to convert men of all classes and conditions, it is surely theirs.

Frazer was a conscious stylist who took as his models the Authorized Version—the allusions are deliberately worked in, especially in the purple passages—Addison, to some extent Gibbon, a little of Browne, and certainly the tradition of Latinate English. The tone of his writing is majestic, calm, yet somehow artificial, like the contrived majesty and calm of Elgar's large works; he leans over backward to avoid argument and commitment; he is chary of generalization, and the carefully artful occasionally slips into Brobdingnagian archness. I would suggest that the source of power behind the undistinguished prose is in each instance a way of looking at the phenomena of existence, a controlling and unifying metaphor on the grandest scale, so vivid, so dramatic, so immediately convincing, both emotionally and intellectually, that we cannot help being caught up by this new awareness, this startlingly fresh insight into the meaning of existence, this astounding bringing together of the disparate and lifeless fragments of experience into a pattern of order and meaning, and giving it all our most fundamental assent. And I would suggest that the source of power behind this new conception is in each instance the force of that ancient myth and ritual pattern of birth, death, and rebirth, now expressed in terms of the language, the orientation, and the needs of our own times and circumstances, and therefore made freshly relevant. Nor need we assume the deliberate intent on the part of these men to restate the pattern in contemporary accents; on the contrary, for too much self-consciousness would impose a merely artificial relationship. Yet, without intending to, each man in his own way has been able to work his way back to the ultimate fruitifying source of the Western tradition, and, as can happen to reaffirm its message that, in the face of an indifferent, even hostile, universe, man can live, and live meaningfully.

In the case of Darwin, Stanley Hyman has convincingly shown in *The Centennial Review* that "*The Origin of Species* caught the imagination of its time as a dramatic poem, and a dramatic poem of a very special sort,"<sup>4</sup> in point of fact, as a tragedy, with the struggle of existence as the agon and sparagmos, and natural selection or survival of the fittest as the anagnorsis and epiphany.

It is interesting to contemplate a tangled bank, [writes Darwin in the very last paragraph of *The Origin of Species*<sup>5</sup>] clothed with many plants of many kinds, with birds singing on the bushes, with various insects flitting about, and with worms crawling through the damp earth, and to



## *The Branch That Grew Full Straight*

reflect that these elaborately constructed forms, so different from each other, and dependent on each other in so complex a manner, have all been produced by laws acting around us. These laws, taken in the largest sense, being Growth with Reproduction; Inheritance which is almost implied by Reproduction; Variability from the indirect and direct action of the conditions of life, and from use and disuse; a Ratio of Increase so high as to lead to a Struggle for Life, and as a consequence to Natural Selection, entailing Divergence of Character and the Extinction of less-improved forms. Thus, from the war of Nature, from famine and death, the most exalted object which we are capable of conceiving, namely, the production of the higher animals, directly follows. There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one; and that, while this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being, evolved.

Thus the myth and ritual pattern, the cycle of birth, struggle, defeat, resurrection, and triumph is seen as the very program and process of nature itself.

If we substitute the proletariat for the God-king-hero of myth who regularly goes through this same cycle, then Marxism becomes a secularized version of the myth and ritual pattern, now expanded to encompass the vicissitudes of the mass of people themselves instead of their surrogate alone.

As soon as this process of transformation has sufficiently decomposed the old society from top to bottom, [Marx declares<sup>6</sup>] as soon as the labourers are turned into proletarians, their means of labour into capital, as soon as the capitalist mode of production stands on its own feet, then the further socialisation of labour and the further transformation of the land and other means of production into socially exploited and, therefore, common means of production, as well as the further expropriation of private proprietors, takes a new form. That which is now to be expropriated is no longer the labourer working for himself but the capitalist exploiting many labourers. This expropriation is accomplished by the action of the immanent laws of capitalistic production itself, by the centralisation of capital. One capitalist kills many. Hand in hand with this centralisation, or this expropriation of many capitalists by a few, develop, on an ever extending scale, the co-operative form of the labour-process, the conscious technical application of science, the methodical cultivation of the soil, the transformation of the instruments of labour into instruments of labour only usable in common, the economising of all means of production by their use as the means of production of combined, socialised labour, the entanglement of all peoples of the world in the net of the world-market, and this, the international character of the capitalistic regime. Along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolise all advantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation; but

with this too grows the revolt of the working-class, a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined, united, organised by the very mechanism of the process of capitalist production itself. The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production, which has sprung up and flourished along with, and under it. Centralisation of the means of production and socialisation of labour at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated.

Again, the myth and ritual pattern is seen as the program and process of history itself, and, as Engels wrote in 1888 of *The Communist Manifesto*, its fundamental proposition is that in every epoch the prevailing mode of economic production and its corresponding social organization forms its ultimate basis so that the whole history of mankind is a history of class struggles, which has finally reached the stage at which the proletariat cannot emancipate itself from the bourgeoisie without at the same time emancipating society at large from all exploitation and class struggle. This proposition, Engels declares, "is destined to do for history what Darwin's theory has done for biology."<sup>7</sup>

Thus the two greatest external forces operative on man, nature and history, were brought by Darwin and Marx within the purview of the pattern of myth and ritual; it remained for Freud to apply that pattern to the inner life of man, and then to weld psychology, biology, and history into a consistent and unifying concept whose program and process were once again the pattern of myth and ritual. In one sentence in *Moses and Monotheism*, Freud summed up his contribution to psychoanalysis: "Early trauma—defence—latency—outbreak of the neurosis—partial return of the repressed material: this was the formula we drew up for the development of a neurosis."<sup>8</sup> And then, in a magnificent leap, he went on to relate the inner life of man to history itself:

Now I will invite the reader to take a step forward and assume that in the history of the human species something happened similar to the events in the life of the individual. That is to say, mankind as a whole also passed through conflicts of a sexual-aggressive nature, which left permanent traces, but which were for the most part warded off and forgotten; later, after a long period of latency, they came to life again and created phenomena similar in structure and tendency to neurotic symptoms.

The first two parts of *Moses and Monotheism* were published in 1937, but as early as 1911, when Freud was avidly reading Darwin,

## The Branch That Grew Full Straight

Robertson Smith, and Frazer—note his sources—he had already stated:<sup>9</sup>

I am of opinion that the time will soon be ripe for us to extend a principle, the truth of which has long been recognized by psycho-analysts, and to complete what has hitherto had only an individual and ontogenetic application by adding its anthropological and phylogenetically conceived counterpart. "In dreams and in neuroses," so our principle has run, "we come once more upon the *child* and the peculiarities that characterize his modes of thought and his emotional life. . . . And we come upon the *savage* too," thus we may complete our proposition, "upon *primitive* man, as he stands revealed to us in the light of archaeology and of ethnology."

Thus the primal law of nature, of history, and of the inner life of man is taken to be that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny, but with one significant alteration, the dialectical transformation of the highest sequence before, into the lowest stage of the next higher sequence, to use Hegelian terminology.

What, then, is Frazer's claim to rank with such men as Darwin, Marx, and Freud? It was Frazer who first set the pattern of myth and ritual on a firm historical foundation, who traced its tortuous movements, and, above all, gave it shape and coherence. For *The Golden Bough* is not a mere warehouse of myth, a conglomeration of unrelated facts, fables, and fancies, but a carefully structured organization of data collected from the most heterogeneous sources, whose variety and multiplicity are poured into a single, solid form which supports this thesis:<sup>10</sup>

We may illustrate the course which thought has hitherto run by likening it to a web of three different threads—the black thread of magic, the red thread of religion, and the white thread of science, if under science we may include those simple truths, drawn from observation of nature, of which men in all ages have possessed a store. Could we then survey the web of thought from the beginning, we should probably perceive it to be at first a chequer of black and white, a patchwork of true and false notions, hardly tinged as yet by the red thread of religion. But carry your eye further along the fabric and you will remark that, while the black thread and white chequer still runs through it, there rests on the middle portion of the web, where religion has entered most deeply into its texture, a dark crimson stain, which shades off insensibly into a lighter tint as the white thread of science is woven more and more into the tissue. To a web thus chequered and stained, thus shot with threads of diverse hues, but gradually changing colour the farther it is unrolled, the state of modern thought, with all its divergent aims and conflicting tendencies, may be compared. Will the great movement which for centuries has been slowly altering the complexion of thought be continued in the near future? Or will a reaction set in which may arrest progress and even undo much that

has been done? To keep up our parable, what will be the colour of the web which the Fates are now weaving on the humming loom of time? Will it be white or red? We cannot tell.

Freud also ended *The Future of an Illusion* on a note of gloomy apprehension; nor are Darwin and Marx exponents of a simple idea of progress. Rather, their telltale metaphors bring to mind ebb and flow, change and corruption, flowering and decay, the interpenetration of life and death: Darwin's tangled bank, Marx's entangled net, Freud's concept: "The picture which life presents to us is the result of the working of Eros and the death-instinct together and against each other,"<sup>11</sup> and Frazer's woven web. Hyman has acutely described Darwin's image of the great Tangled Bank of Life as "disordered, democratic, and subtly interdependent as well as competitive, essentially a modern vision,"<sup>12</sup> and we may apply his terms to the images of the others as well.

Frazer, then, is not quite the pedant or the naive evolutionist he has been made out to be, nor yet the indifferent and rationalistic denigrator of the peoples he spent a lifetime studying. Frazer saw the difference between the myths of Osiris, Tammuz, Attis, and Adonis, and he indicated it, contrary to Frankfort's criticism; but he also saw more, and that more is the measure of his achievement: he saw man engaged in a heroic attempt to work out for himself his place in a hostile universe; he sympathized with that attempt as only one who had followed it in all its bitter and frustrating detail could; and he evolved out of the mass of his evidence the tragic drama of man making himself over. He saw it as a tragic drama because he could perceive the false starts, the wrong turns, and the bestiality and cruelty of man toward man; he could also see that in the long run the attempt was doomed to failure, not only because the methods were perhaps hopeless in the face of the problem (for reality is ultimately unknowable) but also because the aim itself was bound to be fruitless (the universe does remain indifferent); but it was a tragic drama in another sense, too, for out of the struggle he could see that man might learn what he was capable of becoming (even though, with Freud, he suspected that man would not do so).

Like Freud, Frazer rejoiced in the accomplishments of his discipline, calling the new comparative study of the beliefs and institutions of mankind another Renaissance; like Freud, he had the courage to face the fact that in the revealing light of his new science "weak spots in the foundations on which modern society is built" are ruthlessly exposed. Surely he had religion in mind when he wrote that line. Like Freud, he declared as his justification: "Whatever comes

### *The Branch That Grew Full Straight*

of it, wherever it leads us, we must follow truth alone." It is true that Frazer occasionally used pejorative language when he wrote of primitive man; he was rather too fond of the phrase, "our rude forefathers"; but in the main he was neither insensitive nor unsympathetic, and he sought to understand the mental processes of primitive man within their own terms. Indeed, in the second volume of *Spirits of the Born and of the Wild*, he goes so far as to declare the savage "a better reasoner than his civilised brother." In short, Frazer neither judged nor condemned: magic was the best resource of man in primitive circumstances, just a religion was the best resource of man under later circumstances, and just as science can be in the present day. Each seeks the same goals but along different paths, yet it is certain that neither magic nor religion nor science possesses the ultimate answers.

The foundation of the elaborate edifice of *The Golden Bough* is the homogeneity of the human mind. In the preface to the first volume of *Balder the Beautiful*, Frazer assessed the value of his own work:<sup>13</sup>

My contribution to the history of the human mind consists of little more than a rough and purely provisional classification of facts gathered almost entirely from printed sources. If there is one general conclusion which seems to emerge from the mass of particulars, I venture to think that it is the essential similarity in the working of the less developed human mind among all races, which corresponds to the essential similarity in their bodily frame as revealed by comparative anatomy.

This principle of homogeneity is more fully explained in Frazer's appreciation of William Robertson Smith:<sup>14</sup>

Now when, laying aside as irrelevant to the purpose in hand the question of the truth or falsehood of religious beliefs, and the question of the wisdom or folly of religious practices, we examine side by side the religions of different races and ages, we find that, while they differ from each other in many particulars, the resemblances between them are numerous and fundamental, and that they mutually illustrate and explain each other, the distinctly stated faith and circumstantial ritual of one race often clearing up ambiguities in the faith and practices of other races. Thus the comparative study of religion soon forces on us the conclusion that the course of religious evolution has been, up to a certain point, very similar among all men, and that no one religion, at all events in its earlier stages, can be fully understood without a comparison of it with many others.

Thus it would appear that Frazer is a Uniformitarian in strict opposition to the Diffusionists; one will recall Raglan's attack on Frazer

on this point. However, the sentence following the one just quoted (from the Preface to *Balder the Beautiful*) reads: "But while this general mental similarity may, I believe, be taken as established, we must always be on guard against tracing to it a multitude of particular resemblances which may be and often are due to simple diffusion, since nothing is more certain than that the various races of men have borrowed from each other many of their arts and crafts, their ideas, customs, and institutions." Sensibly and characteristically, Frazer thus compromised the question, as he did again in his allocution<sup>15</sup> at the Sorbonne after he had been awarded a degree *honoris causa*.

Je crois que, tandis que beaucoup des resemblances qu'on trouve dans les idées, dans les arts, dans les institutions de tribus différentes s'expliquent par la théorie d'emprunt, certaines autres se sont produites indépendamment les unes des autres, grâce à la similitude de l'esprit humain, qui partout, pur répondre aux mêmes besoins de la vie, sait trouver des inventions à peu près pareilles. [And he then went on to formulate the rule]. . . . à l'égard des découvertes faites par l'homme, la probabilité d'une origine unique pour chacune d'elles varie en proportion inverse de la complexité des idées qu'elle implique.

But to continue the Diffusionist controversy would lead us to a sterile controversy over the limitations of Frazer's anthropological scholarship and theory which I have already admitted; the arguments, pro and con, on uniformity versus diffusion have been sufficiently rehearsed by Malinowski and Toynbee, to mention no others. I am sure that it is no secret by now that I am not interested in Frazer the anthropologist but in Frazer the myth-maker, for it is as a myth-maker that he has succeeded in capturing the creative imagination of our time. This is not the place for a long list of names, but I think I can safely say that there is hardly a writer or critic of consequence, from Yeats on, who has not to a lesser or greater degree, directly or indirectly, derived from Frazer that deep perspective in time and culture which is the particular mark of the contemporary consciousness. Just as Darwin suddenly plunged man into the remotest geological past, as Marx thrust him deep into the historical process, as Freud flung him along the endless corridors of the psyche, as Einstein hurled him into an awesome new space and a new time, so Frazer exposed the savage hidden in his past—and present. Frazer was right in speaking of a Renaissance, for as the first Renaissance differentiated microcosm and macrocosm by revealing a new earth, a new heaven, and a new man, so the second Renaissance widened the gap even more, and the frontiers between nature and man assumed even more fearsome

## *The Branch That Grew Full Straight*

dimensions and directions. Man was now seen as no more than a byproduct casually thrown off by vast natural forces whose purposes, if indeed there were any, were incomprehensible to him. He was at the mercy of forces both within and without himself over which he had no control, or, if he did, seemed to be used only for evil ends—the discarded plaything of nature and history alike.

So by their work, Darwin, Marx, Frazer, and Freud again forced man painfully to face the immensity, the indifference, and the evil of a universe which neither he nor his gods had made and on which, therefore, he could lay no claim. But if they left him in doubt and terror, at the same time they gave him the means of meeting that doubt and terror: they gave him the concept of man immersed in the very processes of nature and history, an integral part of them, and belonging to them, neither superior or inferior to, nor at odds with, but *in* nature and history. Just as Darwin bound man to his biological past, Marx, to his historical past, and Freud, to his psychological past, so Frazer bound him to his cultural past; and the unity of nature, history, and man, once broken, was reformed. It is this concept, bought at no small price, which accounts for the immediacy and intensity of their appeal. One does not have to read in *The Golden Bough* for very long when, from out of its meticulously structured sentences, so Handelian in tone and vocabulary, vivid, exciting, arousing our fears and hopes, engaging our compassion, provoking our anger, irritating, exhilarating, degrading, ennobling, there emerges the drama of man struggling to survive, and winning that struggle. Like the dying-reborn god of his own making, he engages in conflict with the powers of darkness, death, and evil; he is defeated; he suffers, he dies; he is reborn triumphantly; and he celebrates that victory in a new vision. Then the cycle is repeated on ever higher levels of achievement. Frazer has thus created the myth of the myth.

It will be objected that in reviewing Frazer's book I have devoted as much attention, if not more, to the work of his peers as to Frazer himself. But that is my point: he did, in his own way, what they did in theirs, and it is this accomplishment which gives him the right to be set beside the others. I suppose that if the prophets and the poets were the seers of the past, it is fitting that the scientists should be the seers of the present. Yet I like to think that what makes Darwin, Marx, Frazer, and Freud so meaningful to us is not their science, which we must admit can now be punctured at various points, but their prophecy and their poetry, which are impervious to attack, because they recall to us the old, harsh truth, which their epigoni would lull us into forgetting: "Good and evil we know in the field



of this world grow up together almost inseparably. . . . And perhaps this is that doom which Adam fell into of knowing good and evil, that is to say, of knowing good by evil."<sup>16</sup> The myth and ritual pattern tells us how and "where that immortal garland is to be run for," but it tells us, too, that it must be run "not without dust and heat," for "that which purifies us is trial, and trial is by what is contrary." Not without dust and heat is the trial to be won—this is the meaning of the pattern of myth and ritual, and this is what Darwin, Marx, Freud, and Frazer tell us again. Raglan and Malinowski tend to dismiss Frazer as the last of the Victorians, and I dare say the same charge can be laid against Freud; but in the sense in which I am treating them, they are timeless.

Only two years separated the birth of Freud from the birth of Frazer, and only two years separated their deaths. It would be fitting if somehow Frazer's animosity to Freud could now be softened. Freud ends *Civilization and Its Discontents* with this statement:<sup>17</sup>

The fatal question of the human species seems to me to be whether and to what extent the cultural process developed in it will succeed in mastering the derangements of communal life caused by the human instinct of aggression and self-destruction. In this connection, perhaps the phase through which we are at this moment passing deserves special interest. Men have brought their powers of subduing the forces of nature to such a pitch that by using them they could now very easily exterminate one another to the last man. They know this—hence arises a great part of their current unrest, their dejection, their mood of apprehension. And now it may be expected that the other of the two "heavenly forces," eternal Eros, will put forth his strength so as to maintain himself alongside of his equally immortal adversary.

Frazer, too, ended *The Golden Bough* on a note of mingled gloom and hope. I am sure he, too, would stand by the side of eternal Eros.

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
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